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A sample of 50 male and female subjects ranging 
in age from 12 to 73 were divided into three groups accord-
ing to the scale of maturity of moral judgment developed 
by Lawrence Kohlberg. Subjects were also tested on a measure 
of creativity developed by Torrance after the formulations 
of Guilford in order to test the hypothesis that the re^ -
lationship between creativity and maturity of moral judgment 
is curvilinear. Researchers have failed to develop any 
working hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
creativity and moral judgment or postulate any consistent 
theoretical framework concerning the possible relationship 
between these two constructs. The empirical investigation 
involved a scientific testing of a random selection of 
elementary subjects9 high school adolescents, and creative 
adults. Tests included Kohlberg8s Moral dilemmas and 
Guilford's Product Improvement Task. 
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A trend analysis was conducted to reveal whether or 
not a curvilinear relationship existed between the inde-
pendent variable (Moral Maturity Stages) and the de~ 
pe dent variable (creativity performance under each level). 
Curvilinear trends were observed in two out of four 
creativity subscales but were not statistically significant. 
It was concluded that these contradictory findings 
were due to the relatively small number of subjects tested, 
the narrow range or moral judgment scores, and the limited 
conception of creativity defined by the creativity measure 
used (The Product Improvement Task). 
It was suggested that an instrument assessing an 
identity status would be most useful as well as a creativity 
measure better suited for a theory of creativity essentially 
developmental in perspective. 
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From this world to the next? from utility 
to creation. Instead of words as market-place 
utilities, brand names to advertise established 
Items
 f the creative words which make it new. Words 
made new again* as on the first day of creationi 
eternityfs sunrise. Words used not to interpret 
the world but to change it; not to advertise this 
world but to find another. To pass from this world 
to the nexti from ordinary to extraordinary language. 




The traditional conception of the development of "moral 
character" rests on the assumption that moral development is 
a process by which amoral behaviour of the child is brought 
to conform with the values of the society and/or the culture. 
Such a position has lost favour up to the present and can no 
longer be considered tenable. However, the current indoctrin-
ation-relativism continuum of which many modern classroom 
teachers are faced has led to further confusion and a mis-
understanding of how young people may learn to cope both 
socially and morally in a changing socio-cultural matrix. 
In response to the void left by the rebuttal to character 
education, arguments for a less authoritarian and partisan 
conception of moral education have been put forth over the 
past 10 years by Lawrence Kohlberg and his followers. The 
work of Piaget (1932) formed the groundwork for a new gener-
ation of moral philosophers and researchers (Kohlberg, 1966 s 
Turiel, 1966f 1969) in America and comparable research in 
Britain (Wilson, Williams and Sugarman, 1967) « Contemporary 
research has stemmed from the premise of Dewey that "the ed-
ucative process can be identified with growth, as growing or 
developing, not only physically, but intellectually and morally" 
(Dewey, 1938, p*37). 
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Presently, most faculties of education and teacher train-
ing institutions throughout North America patronize at least 
some "values education" experts who hopefully approach the 
notion of morality so as not to attempt to impart "virtues" 
or effect conformist attitudes, but to foster the implicit 
or "innate" tendency of the child to develop intellectually 
and socially through interaction with the environment In every-
day life experiences. Teachers are being made aware of the 
"hidden curriculum" identified by Jackson (1968), and described 
in the process of schooling itself, and reflected In how students 
and teachers interact In the classroom and school. By the 
very nature of the teaching process itself, teachers may in-
advertently inculcate the formation of values not intended 
by the teacher and educational institutions may teach values 
antithetical to our stated democratic beliefs in its emphasis 
on conformity. 
The increasingly popular values clarification approaches 
(Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966) acknowledge that values are 
not absolute. They ask descriptively what "Is" rather than 
concern themselves with the prescriptive "ought". Although 
values clarification is a welcome alternative to moral indoc-
trination, it hardly contributes to the development of a con-
sistent moral philosophy. It is viewed by developmentallsts as 
perhaps a beginning but it doesnft go far enough. 
Lawrence Kohlberg1s research has emphasized a cognitive-
developmental approach towards an understanding of moral matur-
ity which rejects educational theories that feel a childfs 
full potential already exists within him (maturationalist view) 
or that require adjustment or "socialization" to the prevail-
ing norms (cultural transmission view). Kohlberg1s theoretical 
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framework provides educators with a welcome alternative to the 
values-relativity syndrome inherent in various methodologies 
towards understanding morality, both past and present. Although 
Kohlberg accepts the notion of socialization process, he dis-
agrees with the social learning theorist that all of us, and 
especially the young, are almost infinitely malleable, blank 
slates for moral conditioning. In this sense, Kohlberg is at 
odds with the classical behaviourist. For Kohlberg approaches 
moral maturity as a progressive attainment of greater logical 
complexity through an invariant sequence of cognitive stages 
and towards an appropriation of "higher" and "better" stages 
of moral thinking. This progression becomes, for Kohlberg, 
a process of relating to the world. A cognitive-developmental 
perspective offers mankind some security amidst the relativity 
of time, place, and customs of our modern universe in which 
we are groping for some form of universal principles which 
remain stable and around which individuals may organize their 
moral or value outlooks and priorities into a fundamental life-
perspective. Mass industrialization, modern technology, and 
the nature of the electric media have confronted us with many 
different cultural perspectives and changes in perception which 
must be internalized and accounted for in developing our ethical 
principles. Kohlberg1s "rational" approach to the question of 
morality provides a practical matrix from which it becomes 
possible to analyze and, to a great extent, "influence" our 
own consideration of ethical principles. 
Kohlberg maintains that cognitive development, logical 
patterns, or structures of thinking result from the "dialogue" 
between the childfs mental structures and the complexities 
presented by the environment. Knowledge, therefore, becomes 
an active change in the individual's pattern of reasoning brought 
about by resolving a moral conflict or dilemma. 
Kohlberg*s developmental approach shares in common an 
acknowledgement of Piagetss claim (1932) that there is a pre-
dominate cognitive and rational component in the development 
of moral reasoning, and that the aim of moral education is to 
nurture the childss conception and understanding of the princi-
ples of justice and fostering autonomous moral judgement. 
Emphasis on Piagetfs cognitive-social component in moral 
development has been employed to the exclusion of thoughtful 
consideration in moral educational research to the role of 
the "creative process" and to its corresponding affective di-
mentions—identity status--in particular. To the educator, 
as well as the researcher, the theoretical interpenetration 
of creativity and moral thinking presents a unique situation 
in which the "affective domain" may be better reconciled with-
in a moral developmental structure, and which, in turn, may 
possibly reveal a distinctive connection which may point beyond 
mere academic interest. As to what the possible "correlations" 
may prove to be comprise the empirical aspects of this study 
from which critical speculations ensue. 
Attempt at a synthesis between creativity and morality 
within a developmental framework has not yet been entertained 
by researchersi and, to this extent, this author attempts to 
create a new species out of existing theoretical bodies of 
knowledge in moral philosophy and psychodynamic theory. 
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Such an attempt is understandably speculative yet becomes worthwhile 
if it does nothing more than direct attention to the lack of research 
given by investigators to the creative process as it affects the process 
of moral or ethical values or judgements. A study conducted by Getzels 
and Jackson (1962) undertook as a prime focus, the change in moral 
outlook and value emphasis from values emphasizing character to those 
emphasizing adjustment. Tests were constructed and applied in order 
to categorize those subjects who were 'high in moral character but 
not in adjustment1 and, secondly, those who were fhigh in adjustment 
but not in character1. Needless to say, the criterion of the 'moral' 
group was similar to a "bag of virtues" approach and consisted basically 
of the mother's perception of her child. It appears that 'adjusted1 
individuals tend, on the whole, to seek experiences that are immediat-
ely gratifying rather than eventually rewarding, to prefer social 
interaction to personal achievement, and, where there is a conflict 
of ideals, to sacrifice moral obligations to interpersonal harmony1 
the individuals in the moral group tend to reverse those trends, and 
to assert their own autonomy. In short, this study cites 'adjustment1 
ds the analogue in the sphere of psychosocial behaviour corresponding 
to intelligence in the sphere of cognitive behaviour; both are essent-
ially adaptive. Moral character, on the other hand, is the analogue 
of creativity; both are distinctive of an original and individualistic 
type of child. 
Is there, in effect, a definitive relationship between the creat-
ive process and the ability to reason morally? Advances made in the 
realm of cognitive-developmental psychology as applied to moral thinking, 
and further research on the process of creativity hopefully will help 
us to begin an answer to that question. 
In the pervading context of modern society that sometimes views 
creativity as non-conformist, social sanctions against creative In-
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dividuals seem to reflect a presupposition that conformity with societal 
norms and values represents the desired end-point in creative thinking 
as well as moral behaviour. Viewed from this perspective, develop-
ing creative capacities in our orientation to a world-view, may prove 
either to be a useful tool in developing, for instance, individual 
role-taking capacities or adopting alternative ideologies (moral or 
otherwise), or a necessary evil which, taken to an extreme, produces 
non-conforming persons who become non-adaptive within the school system 
or soclety-at-large. In other words, society may view creative persons 
either with suspicion or reverencej in either case there are difficulties 
present in the social sphere, for creative Individuals to overcome. 
It appears reasonable and natural to ask whether or not the 
creative individual possesses an "unique" capacity for moral stage 
trans ition or conversely, for arrestment. It seems equally as logical 
to ascertain whether or not the creative capacities of an individual 
may influence or perhaps modify conventional moral thinking we norm-
ally think of as Stage 3 moral judgment based on Kohlberg1s model. 
Is this relationship between creativity and morality congruently 
temporali Is it non-monotonic? Is creativity less evident in con-
ventional moral thinking"and greater in principled thought? These 
questions must be pursued and investigated if we are to arrive at 
an understanding of the role of creative thinking In moral thought. 
Confusion about the compatibility of cognitive and affective 
dimensions of the creative process and relationships to moral think-
ing may encourage a reluctance on the part of a classroom teacher, 
to explore alternative strategies in order to stimulate moral per-
ception as a direct challenge to the students' attitudes and feelings. 
Pedagogically sound programs which offer simply "objective" courses 
in moral education which divorce themselves from a consideration of 
the dynamics of the creative process would tend to become ineffect-
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ual since, by ignoring the creative aspects of the Individual students, 
such approaches exclude the student's own feelings, emotions and 
individuality and this may, in fact, inflict psychological harm. 
There is reason to question the conventional assumptions about 
creativity which underly these educational misgivings. The literature 
of creativity contains numerous approaches from creativity as cog-
nitive, rational and semantic (Hallman, 1963)$ personal and environ-
mental (Dinkmeyer and Caldwell, 1970), mental health and openness 
(§hulman, 1966), Freudian (Rank, 1932), neo-Freudian (Gowan, 1965)9 
to psychedelic (Masters and Houston, 1966) interpretations, and while 
there are important differences between these conceptions of creativity, 
an overall developmental schect^initiated by Gowan (1972) attempts ,^ 
a theoretical placement of these multifarious and various viewpoints. 
John Curtis Gowan (1965* 1972) has attempted to approach creat-
ivity from a developmental frame of reference taking into account 
both cognitive and affective elements. Gowan's approach to his topic 
differs from Kohlberg's appmeh since Kohlberg Is predominately 
concerned with "cognitive-developmental" aspects of theoretical 
formulation. Gowan does not exclude the cognitive-developmental 
approach since he draws heavily from Piaget (1950) $ "but by also 
including approaches by Erikson (1963, 196k9 1969)$ and Kubie (1958, 
1965i 1967)$ Gowan's approach appears more eclectic, but is develop-
ed along organizational premises that allow, not only a comprehensive 
view of the creative process, but also a possibility of integrating 
other aspects of human development, moral thinking included. It 
is precisely because Gowan has used Piagetss structuralist formulations 
in his own model, that it becomes possible to chart out Kohlberg1s 
moral Stages into Gowan's matrix on creativity. 
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One significant gap in both Piagetfs and Kohlberg's 
structuralisms has been the area of the "aesthetic imagin-
ation" and the potential role it may play in the development 
of Intellectual and moral understanding (Simpson, 1976). A 
more inclusive understanding of the relationship between 
creativity and moral thinking may open a more systematic 
placement for figurative knowledge in Kohlberg's structuralist 
frame, which Piaget seems to pass off as a lower form of In-
tellectual development. It becomes increasingly important 
in an era of objective approaches in values education for 
teachers, especially, to accept the notion that value synthesis 
is not a science but probably encompasses, when done well, the 
virtuosity of an artist (Sullivan, 1977)• Creativity, in 
contrast to stating principles in an abstract manner to achieve 
a universalization, can aid in the formation of imaginative 
symbolism that has a compelling "intensional quality" evoking 
action and commitment in a way abstract principles could rarely 
do, by "fusing" the concrete with the abstract (Sullivan, 1977)• 
Sullivan illustrates this point using, as an example, a speech 
1 
of Martin Luther Kingi-
I say to you today, my friends, let Freedom ring! 
From the hilltops of New Hampshire, from mighty 
mountains of New York...from every hill and molehill 
in Mississippi...Let Freedom ring from every house 
and hamlet, from every street in every city...When 
Freedom rings we shall be able to speed that day, 
when all God's children, black men and white men, 
Jews and Gentiles, Protesants and Catholics, will 
be able to join hands and sing in the words of the 
old Negro Spiritual. Free at last! Free at last! 
Great God Almighty, we are free at last! We got 
some difficult days ahead. Some people are concern-
ed as to what would happen to me from some of our 
sick white brothers. Well I don't know what will 
happen to me now...But it really doesn8t matter to 
me now...because I've been to the Mountalntop... 
Like everybody I would like to live a long life... 
Longevity has its place...But I'm not concerned with 
that now...He's allowed me to go to the mountalntop— 
and I've looked over and I've SEEN the Promised Land. 
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So, I'm happy now. I'm not worried about anything. 
Mine eyes have seen the Glory of the Coming of the Lord. 
(I977t P*25) 
It could reasonably be assumed that imagery, used in a creative 
fashion, -helps to foster a commitment to action. Seen in this way, 
creativity becomes a "catalyst" for moral behaviour. Conversely, 
where moral maturity appears arrested at a conventional stage, there 
is considerable cause to speculate whether or not creativity becomes 
diminished as well. A corollary to this would be to examine whether 
or not an increase in creativity is associated with advanced moral 
maturity. 
Gowan (1972) has suggested that when creativity defined in 
both psychoanalytic and psychometric terms 'Correlates positively 
and significantly with Piagetfs (1950) logical stages, a distinctive 
pattern emerges that allows the investigator to consider both cog-
nitive and affective conditions for this correlation. Since Kohlberg's 
stages of moral maturity have been developed from Piaget's logical 
stages, it becomes possible to chart Kohlberg1s moral thinking stages 
into Gowan's synoptical grid. Further, it becomes important for 
the educator to realize the various ways moral commitment may possibly 
be stimulated by more creative measures than exist in abstractf universal 
or scientific hypotheses9 and that practical strategies may emerge 
from the developmental formulation of creative and moral constructs 
which will foster, to a greater degree, the overall development 
of the individual in response to today's educational emphasis on 
creative and moral growth. 
Statement of Purpose For fhis Study 
The initial purpose of the present investigation is to examine 
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the most recent literature on creativity with a view to developing 
a working hypothesis concerning the relationship between creativity 
and moral judgement. This is undertaken since researchers have 
failed to examine this relation or develop any consistent theoretical 
framework concerning the possible relationship between these two 
constructs. Secondly, this study will attempt, on the basis of this 
rationale to investigate empirically the relationship between creat-
ivity and moral judgement. The empirical investigation involves 
scientific testing of a random selection of elementary (Grade 6) 
subjects, high school adolescents (Grade 13) and creative adults. 
Tests include Kohlberg's Moral Dilemmas and Guilford's Product 
Improvement Task (as used by Torrance In the Minnesota Tests of 
Creative Thinking). A trend analysis will reveal whether or not 
a curvilinear relationship exists between the independent variable 
(Moral Maturity Stages) and the dependent variable (creativity 
performance under each level). This will depend upon what higher 
degree equation is required to provide a satisfactory fit for the 
data> assuming that a trend does exist. 
Definitions 
1. Creativity 
For the purpose of this study, the operational definition of 
creativity is defined after the formulations of Guilford (1959)2 
* *
 8 0 * * »»* aptitude traits that belong most clearly logically 
in the area of creativity and that have been discovered by factor 
analysis, many of them within the past en years. These include 
factors of fluency of thinking and of flexibility of tluinking, as 
well as of originality, sensitivity to problems, redefinition and 
elaboration. 
*.,*.,.. a number of relationships between non-aptitude 
traits and creative performance in tests have been Indicated. 
The two forms of flexibility of thinking seem clearly to be 
opposltes to two forms of rigidity in thinking. Redefinition 
seems logically opposite to the quality known as "functional 
fixedness". 
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•.....•••..most of the aptitude factors identifiable as belong-
ing in the category of creativity are classifiable in a group of 
divergent-thinking abilities. These abilities, by contrast to 
convergent-thinking abilities, emphasize searching activites with 
freedom to go in different directions, if not a necessity to do 
so in order to achieve an excellent performance. Convergent-
thinking activities proceed toward one right answer, or one that 
is more or less clearly demanded by the given information.
 # 
Guilford's definition is one of several "independent systems" 
which Gowan (1972) cites as instrmental in a definition of creat-
ivity. Accordingly, a supplementary definition of creativity is 
patterned after the formulations of Gowan (1972). The purpose 
of this "supplementary definition" is to allow for a broader in-
vestigation of the creative process which includes perspectives 
ranging from psychometric views to psychodynamic and developmental 
focal points. This definition statess^ 
,M,,,.M.,,,once a creative style of life has been establish-
ed through contact with the preconscious, processes and techniques 
tend to persist as strategies available to the ego» They may 
even expand and proliferate at any stage under suitable conditions 
of mental health and environmental stimulation. 
The definition continues? 
............creative performance is the synthesis of several 
independent systemss 
(a) differential abilities and their stimulation as in 
the Guilford Structure of the Intellect Model. 
(b) mental and physical health 
(c) antiauthoritarian and nurturing tendencies in parents, 
teachers and others in the environment, 
(d) the life styles established in the third and sixth 
stages of development. (Gowan, 1972, p.68). 
Gowan's comprehensive definition of the creative process 
allows for a better Investigation of the correlation between 
creativity and moral maturity within Kohlberg's structuralist 
approach, at the same time supporting Guilford's definition. 
By "establishing the preconscious" Gowan(l972) suggests that 
creativity is dependent upon the practice of making preconscious 
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experience defensible against the invasion of the other 
aspects of the psyche. The child, for instance, through 
exercising his fantasy to please his mother learns im-
plicit' ly the rules of relaxation and free association and 
play which are "requisite for him to gain access into this 
shadowed area". (Gowan, 1972, p. 62) 
Gowan uses alternate definitions of creativity from 
psychometric measures to new-Freudian descriptions. By focus-
ing on Gowan's "cognitive-structural" and "psychometric" 
definitions of creativity it becomes possible to analyze the 
creative process into a hierarchy of affective reactions 
mediated by the child's cognitive judgments. In this manner* 
sufficient consideration Is brought to bear on the "affective" 
dimensions of the psyche. This concept is in full accordance 
with the creativity measure used in the empirical Invest-
igation of this study and developed by Guilford (1962). The 
Product Improvement Task includes both the cognitive measures 
of fluency, flexibility, originality, and inventiveness and 
also allows for "preconscious regression in the service of 
the ego" by way of Kubie (1967)1 Kris (1953) and Gowan (1972). 
2. ' Curvilinear 
The revised edition of the Random House College 
Dictionary (1975) defines curvilinear as "consisting of or 
bounded by curved liness a curvilinear figure". In this 
study the term curvilinear is used in the context of a graph 
which indicates a trend whenever the means of a dependent 
variable (creativity) are not equal for the different levels 
of the independent variable (moral maturity). A graphed 
curvilinear trend is shown on page 130, If there is no trend 
the line graphed will not be curvilinear, 
3° Moral Judgment 
This term assumes a cognitive-developmental or "rational" 
component and may be used Interchangeably with "moral reasoning" 
and •"morkl' thinking". Further, in this present investigation, 
moral judgement is defined and measured after Piaget (1932) •-* 
"By this we mean the theoretical moral judgement as oppossed 
to that which occurs in actual experience." (Piaget, 1932, p.10^) 
"4. Moral Maturity 
Kohlberg defines moral maturity as "...the capacity to 
make decisions and judgements which are moral (that is, based 
on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such 
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principles" (Kohlberg, 1964, p.^ 25)*"" Again, this definition 
is in accordance with the broadest objectives of cognitive-
developmental psychology as pattered after Piaget (1932)? and 
which appear to coincide with the general approaches of moral 
educational research which stress the "rational" and "autonomous" 
principles set forth by Piaget and Kohlberg. This definition 
is also in agreement with the concept of moral maturity used 
by researchers as quoted in this study. 
Hypotheses to be developed 
When creativity is defined as "differential abilities" 
as in the Guilford Structure of the Intellect Model, and viewed 
as cognitive mediation of affective reactions, it is predict-
ed that creativity is likely to be "greater" at a "pre-
conventional" and "post-conventional" level of moral judgement 
in Kohlberg's terminology, and will be "less severe" at the 
"conventional" level of moral maturity. Although this study 
does not attempt to prove whether creativity is a component 
of morality, itself, it bears in mind the remark made by 
Kohlberg that "there should be an empirical correlation between 
maturity on "affective" and cognitive aspects of morality, 
even if affective morality is assessed by projective test or 
interview methods, not explicitly focused on moral judgement" 
(Kohlberg, 1969). 
Ik 
The general hypothesis to be developed iss 
(Ho1 )the relationship between creativity and moral 
judgement Is curvilinear 
In other words, it is assumed that creativity will 
correspond or covary, with varying height, with moral reason-
ing in a negative linear relationship to the lowest point 
(about middle range) beyond which the relationship is 
expected to change direction to a positive linear relation-
ship. 
Creativity has been shown to be reduced or stifled by 
guilt phenomenon (Rank, 1932); (Kubie, 1958); (Gowan, 1972). 
A study conducted by Roper (1973) revealed that large amounts 
of residual or "intro-punitive" guilt cannot co-exist with 
the "self-love" or "self-acceptance" prerequisite to the 
development of moral-autonomy and the sense of justice by which 
"post-conventional" moral reasoning (Kohlberg1s stages five 
and six) is defined. Just as guilt phenomenon is specifically 
characteristic of a Stage 3 "interpersonal concordance" 
orientation on Kohlberg's hierarchy of stages in moral 
maturity, there occurs, simultaneously, an immobilization 
of creative potential. Guilt is often fatal for the creative 
impulse for the energy which should go into productivity goes 
instead into fighting the "inner conflict" or what Kubie (1958) 
refers to as the "neurotic distortion of the creative process", 
Therefore, for reasons of severe guilt and identity diffusion 
"resulting from the discrepancy between what the ego wants 
itself to be and what it finds it can be and do" (Gowan, 1972, 
p. 29) $ creativity as defined and related to a sample of all 
three levels of moral maturity is likely to be least character-
istic of a "conventional" subject. The sub-sets of the'general 
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hypothesis (HOj_) may be stated as follows s 
(HO2) there will be greater creativity as measured 
by the Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the 
post-conventional stages of Kohlberg's scale. 
It is assumed that post-conventional subjects will 
correspond to a greater degree with Gowan's "love-affiliation" 
stage 6 (see table 2, p. 64 )* It is felt that the "self-love" 
or "self-acceftance" qualities that Kohlberg views as a pre-
requisite to the development of moral-autonomy is closely 
allied to Gowan's Intimacy Stage 6 and Agape-Love Stage 9. 
The higher the moral stage of reasoning the less likely there 
would be an immobilization of creative potencies due to factors 
such as "intro-punitive" guilt or developmental arrestment in 
a Piagetian logical stage (e.g. concrete operations). 
(HOo) there will be less creativity as measured by the 
Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the con-
ventional stages of Kohlbergfs scale. 
Roper (1973) has discovered that guilt phenomena are 
directly related to Stage 3 "interpersonal-concordance" 
orientation on Kohlberg1s moral hierarchy. It is reasoned 
that creativity is more likely to be hindered or stifled by 
subjects experiencing greater guilt conflicts. Therefore it 
is assumed that creativity will be least characteristic of a 
Stage 3 moral thinker. 
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(HO/j,) There will be greater creativity as measured 
by the Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at 
the pre-conventional stage of Kohlberg1s Scale. 
Gowan's Initiative and Industry (Stages 3 and k) are 
closely allied to Kohlberg1s pre-conventional stages of 
moral development. The Initiative Stage 3 corresponds 
more closely to pre-moral thinking and it is not expected 
that subjects in this study will exhibit pre-moral thought. 
Gowan's Industry Stage k9 which is also linked to pre-
conventional moral thought ,on Kohlberg8s scale, is not 
associated by Gowan with any significant creative growth. But 
it is still assumed that creativity will be higher in pre-
conventional moral subjects than conventional moral thinkers 
on Kohlberg's scale. This is because it is felt that 
guilt phenomena and peer pressure working against creativity 
a r e
 greatest at Stage 3 on Kohlberg8s scale (which corresponds 
to Gowan's Identity Stage 5)» 
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Limitations 
This investigation is primarily concerned with the 
creative process as It is manifested in individuals who 
possess normal mental health, as opposed to creative 
manifestations In neurotic or schizophrenic individuals• 
There appears agreement among researchers that neurosis 
has a tendency to : cause; a degraded quality of one's 
creative potential* According to Anderson (1959)? such 
Indivduals who appear neurotic are pseudo-creative.. They may 
have original ideas which, because of the neurosis, they do 
not consumate, This study does not attempt to take any one 
side of a controversy that has raged through human history 
about the source of inspiration—to what extent does creativity 
come from madness? Creativity is viewed in this research 
as a legitimate and healthy exercise of imagination. 
The dialectical relationship between the worlds of the 
painter, poet and musician concerns both subjective processes 
of consciousness and the objective pole of their inherited 
language, musical notes, and artistic medium involved. They 
are often protected from becoming neurotic or entering into 
madness in the process of radical creative emergence by the 
form of the media Itself—namely the paints, the words, and 
the musical notes. 
Origins of creativity will be expressed in psycho-
dynamic terminology whereas visible products of creativity 
will be described in psychometric terms. The dialectical 
interplay between origins of inspiration and emergent 
products will use terminology from both disciplines. The 
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"process of creativity has both cognitive and unconscious 
components. Since unconscious images appear highly charged 
with emotions (Jung, 1965)1 creativity will also be described 
in "affective" contexts. 
Guilford's Product Improvement Task and Kohlberg's 
Dilemma Situations will be used to empirically test these 
hypotheses• A detailed theoretical rationale for the hypo-
theses stated and the development of each are described in 
detail in the section Development of Hypotheses in CHAPTER 2. 
A detailed description of the instruments used to test 
the hypotheses appear in CHAPTER 3 under the headings 
Description and Pilot Study of Measures. 
Testing had to take place during the final month of the 
school term. The fee to score the Moral Dilemmas was 
considerable and inter-rater relibility could not be estab-
lished. Scorers for the Product Improvement Task who were 
suitable trained and qualified were difficult to find but 
were provided by the North York Board of Education free 
or charge—but constraints on their time were considerable 
and inter-rater reliability was, once again, not established. 
Partly due to the fee required to score the Moral 
Dilemmas and the amount of time I had to conduct the testing, 
the number of subjects was limited. Consequently It was 
difficult to acquire a broad range of moral maturity In my 
results. 
There were some reservations in using Kohlberg1s and 
Guilford's instruments. In the case of Kohlberg' there is 
a tendency in his research to over-extend the claims for his 
stage theory. Without denying the possibility of his stages, 
there is the question of whether or not he has captured only 
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one facet of the moral reasoning process. R.S. Peters (1971) 
o 
has reflected this concerns 
It may well be that some generalizations have been 
established about certain aspects of moral develop-
ment, but these may be peculiar to the limited range 
of phenomena studied. It would be unfortunate if 
these generalizations were erected into a general 
theory of moral development without account being 
taken of the differences exhibited by the phenomena 
that have not been studied, (p. 237) 
Although Kohlberg explores a particular aspect of the 
moral world which Is reflected by certain historical moral 
philosophical positions to the relative exclusion of others 
(see Murdock, 1962), I still find Kohlberg's instrument for 
the assessment of moral judgment to be the most sophisticated 
and reliable instrument that psychological assessment devices 
have to offer. The instrument can be reliably scored and 
is valid within the context of cognitive developmental theory. 
The Product Improvement Task has a reliability coefficient 
that exceeds *70« The diversity of samples and time intervals 
strongly suggests that the Product Improvement Task scales 
have useful reliability. Interscorer reliability is usually 
above .90 for individual scales scored. 
Some critics of Guilford have stated that the results 
of the Product Improvement Task are hard to distinguish from 
assessment of general intelligence. In other words, while the 
test may function as a substitute for a general intelligence 
test, the user can be misled by the creativity label Into 
believing that he is assessing something different from 
intelligence as usually defined. Criitics feel that no 
convincing empirical separability from intelligence has yet 
been demonstrated. 
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It is my contention that the Product Improvement Task 
may not measure all aspects of creativity, it does measure 
aspects of the Intellect that are not normally associated 
with general intelligence. Just how close the test comes 
to measuring creativity is speculated on throughout the 
study, 
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Literal meanings are packaged commodities for 
passive consumers! in symbolist poetry the read-
er is incorporated into the work, actively partici-
pates in the poetic process itself "the connect-
ion is left for the beholder to work out for him-
self." All the Lordfs people become prophets. 
Norman 0„ Brown, Love8s Body, p. 246. 
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CHAPTER 11 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE, THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Introductions The Technology of Moralitys A Social Perspective 
In terms of the cultural-psychological forces generated 
by todayfs modern technology and implicit in modern educational 
ideology, there has never existed a more urgent task for ed-
ucators than to accept the existential reality that creative 
ways of Implementing man's moral reasoning capacities has become 
an imperious issue confronting manss ability to direct and adjust 
to the changing world. No modern concept of psychology can ignore 
our relationship to the changing cultural forces and our loss 
with the identity of the past. 
Individuals appear reluctant to embrace philosophies 
of permanence or security as traditional values disappear 
in an age of mass technologyi 1 
Learning...assumed a classic, static universe, 
a universe once created and set running like 
a clock wound up. This appears in Newtonfs 
cosmology. We can see that the stately universe 
of Newton rested on an assumption we can no 
longer accept. That was that time was the 
same, or contemporaneous, throughout the whole 
of the universe. The theory of relativity in 
this century made that assumption impossible. 
Time, what ever It may be, is instant and 
local only to the individual, and relative to 
all other locales of the universe and to all 
other kinds of time. We live in a universe 
running relative to time, to place, and to the 
customs of men. Whether we grasp this in-
tellectually or not, that perception at least 
as revolutionary in its way than the New Learning 
was, pervades all our thinking and our lives 
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and therefore our learning and teaching. 
Knowledge is no longer a received corpus 
to be mastered! it is information grasped 
by a particular individual at a definite 
point in time and space, a point in con-
stant motion with respect to the whole 
universe, past, present and future (-Kerekes, 
1975$ P.67). 
Mass industrialism and modernization has shifted our view 
of humanity from a parochial standpoint to a "Spaceship Earth" 
or a "Global Village" in which the media is not only able to 
give mankind a global perspective 1 it can construct meaning 
and reality is such a way causing deleterious effects in 
human perception, attitude, values and self-image. Change 
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comes rapidly and without warnings 
Electric circuitry has overthrown the regime of 
"time" and "space" and pours upon us instantly 
and continuously the concerns of all other men. 
It has reconstituted dialogue on a global scale. 
Its message is Total Change, ending psychic, 
social, economic, and political parochialism. 
The old civic, state, and national groupings 
have become unworkable. Nothing can be further 
from the spirit of the new technology than 
"a place for everything and everything in its 
place". You canft go home again. (McLuhan, 19^7, 
p. 16). 
We are living in a society which alienates us from our 
emotions by over-emphasizing them. The "data managers" and 
"data deliverers" of our culture in the executive world 
of advertising are telling us what is real, what is essential1 
they rob us of our sanity by setting themselves up as a mental 
wall between us and reality. They are creating a packaged version 
of '"he world, and it is a sterile and colourless kind of 
psychosis given to the "media studs" who wrap up our values and 
morality in a brand name gauze. Our culture tends to alienate 
individuals within it, not by downgrading the intellect but 
by deifying the product of its own publicity. 
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Our culture Is alienating our emotions and intellects, 
"the affective and cognitive aspects of our psychological pro-
cesses. Trivia neuroses, the drama of uncovering your "own 
thing" or getting rid of "hang ups" occupy us more than the 
cultivation, for instance, of feelings towards other persons. 
In our present erafs "technological shuffle" we have collectiv-
ely defined our rational nature as to what can be measured or 
made visible. Although we can pass information from our 
senses directly into the convoluted, electrically connected, 
intellectually neuter pinches of our brains, we tend to lose 
touch with the "deeper side" of our nature. 
Western culture tends to view reality in terms of its 
symbol-making. In ancient times the Church produced the major 
symbols in support of the myths that they wished to perpetuate. 
Today, private governments and industry produce our symbols 
of reality on a mass production scale never before Imaginable. 
The media of television, for instance, provides a far-reaching 
way in which society can perpetuate its own mythical harlequin-
ade by means of the manufacturing of a symbolic cosmology that 
claims its own values,-morality, ritualistic imagery represent-
ation, unifying philosophy of life, and predictable, synthetic, 
easy-to-follow formats. Accordingly, entertainment or "show 
business mentality", which runs rampant throughout most forms 
of modern electronic culture, manifests itself in the cultivation 
of a "conventional" morality as opposed to a "principled" 
morality in the Kohlbergian sense. 
Research has empirically revealed that the rate of move-
ment through the developmental stages of Piaget and/or Kohlberg 
25 
and the final stage of equilibration of a person or group are 
Influenced by factors such as schooling, diversity of environ-
mental stimuli and the modal cognitive-developmental level of 
their society or sub-society (Fowler, 1976). 
The Moral Technology of the School 
Social forces resulting from technological changes In the 
environment are interrelated, often invisible to the individual, 
and constantly changing. The social environment, which has a 
profound psychological impact on each individual, must be critic-
ally examined and understood by teachers who wish to formulate 
relevant curricula in helping student's adapt to the changing 
moral views of modern society and increasing potential for 
mature moral thinking within a developmental and creative context. 
As educators, we must examine the school as a "total in-
stitution", and, in so doing, agree or acknowledge that in 
many respects it resembles a prison wherein there exists 
Involuntary clientele (students) and the staff who have real 
freedom of movement. Students often find that the criteria 
by which they are judged is arbitrary, artificial and often 
mysterious. Sometimes it is also equally mysterious to the 
teacher who receives criteria from the head of the departments 
principal, or superintendent. Students learn that in many cases 
the "game" is to discover what the teacher is looking fori 
real knowledge cannot exist outside the teacherfs (often restrict-
ed) frame of reference or reality constructs. Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that many students fail to take a more dynamic 
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and responsible attitude towards their learning. The school 
can easily become a "paper jungle" in which the students resolve 
to get through no matter what the cost or moral scruples involved. 
Therefore, intrinsic notions of morality are often suspended in 
this process. Research over the last few decades has presented 
an abundance of evidence supporting the basic generalization that 
schools, for the most part, stultify the creative process within 
students, generate" an acceptance of values relativity, abuse 
their authoritarian powers and subordinate the interests of the 
students to their owns 3 
Getting through school also involves learning 
how to suppress one's feelings and emotions and to 
subordinate onefs own interests and desires to those 
of the teachers. Up to a point, this, too, is useful 
a necessary aspect of learning to live in society. 
But schools tend to turn what could be a virtue into 
a fault by in effect excluding the childfs interests 
altogether. The result...is to create a cultural 
schizophrenia in which the student is forced to choose 
between his own relation to reality and the one 
demanded by the institution (Silberman, 1975% P- 151-2). 
John Dewey observed that children acquire great 
dexterity in exhibiting in conventional and expected ways 
the "form" of attention to school work while they reserve 
the "inner play" of their own thoughts, images, fantasies 
and emotions for subjects that are more important to them 
but quite irrelevant (1966). 
Hartshorne and Mayfs "Character Inquiry" (1928, 1930) 
implied that the "character" formation approach to moral 
'education was simply ineffectual, that traits or virtues 
such as honesty were highly situation-specific in children, 
and not significantly amenable to institutional training, 
Hartshorne and May discovered that children's tendency to 
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cheat depended on the risk of detection and the effort required 
rather than on intrinsic notions of morality! non-cheaters 
were merely more cautious than the cheaters, but not more 
honest; r 
These findings, which have been confirmed by a 
number of subsequent studies, reflect the prim-
itive morality which the culture of the school 
activity cultivates. "While most elementary 
school children are aware of, and concerned about, 
the harm done others by acts of aggression or 
theft," Professor Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard, 
the leading contemporary student of moral educa-
tion, writes, "their only reason for not cheat-
ing is their fear of being caught and punished. 
Even at older ages, teachers give children few 
moral or mature reasons to think cheating is bad. 
Sixth grade children tell us their teachers tell 
them not to .cheat because they will get punished"--
the most primitive level of moral judgement—or 
because fthe person you copied from might have it 
wrong and so it won't do you any good," a level of 
judgement only one step up on Kohlbergfs hierarchy. 
Teachers are always and unavoidably moralizing 
to children about rules, values and behaviour, 
but rarely think about the values they are com-
municating. "Many teachers would be most mortified 
and surprised to know what their students perceive 
to be their moral values and concerns,"Kohlberg 
observes. (Silberman, 1970, p. 151)-
The behaviour technology of the schools themselves, 
are becoming more socially relativistic in adopting the 
value-neutral consulting model of Skinner (1971) which 
equates value neutrality with acceptance of value relativ-
ity (Kohlberg, 1971). Likewise, educational policies 
founded on cultural transmission ideologies ignore most 
moral principles by so often adopting the doctrines of 
social relativism. The assumption of an individual rela-
tivity of values underlies much of our educational foundation 
whether expressed in the behaviouristic terms of Skinner (1971) 
or the modern romantic libertarian and non-indoctrinative 
terminology of free-school advocates. Answers to these 
problems have been exposed by Kohlbergss theoretical research 
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(1958, 1963, 1966, 1973). 
Philosophy of the times, in dealing with creative ways 
to adapt to the changing societal norms or in understanding 
the process of moral or ethical values or judgements, can no 
longer, as in the past, project the universality of reason and 
the humanity of men in an abstract wayi the philosophy of our 
day must become more "concrete to deal with such matters. 
A "post-critical" perspective proceeding on the assumption 
that our culture is in the thrall of a profound value crisis has 
recently been formulated by Sullivan (1977)t who views such a 
crisis as the product of the development of advanced Western 
capitalism in which there exists a "hidden curriculum" whose 
values are more or less appropriated through an unquestionlngly 
internalized form of socialization proceedure. Unconciously 
assimilated values must, therefore, be made subject to critical 
examination. This also calls for a serious questioning of the 
validity and consequences of the dominant assumptions about 
work, technology consumption, success and progress which are 
routinely transmitted in schools and classrooms. This, as 
Sullivan has made clear, cannot always be done within the 
liberal ideology of Kohlbergfs research, but certainly Kohlbergfs 
work can be used an an interpretive framework (Sullivan 1977). 
Explicit consideration of questions involving moral 
judgements have been largely ignored in the educational process. 
However, both in response to the awakening to the ills of educa-
tion and the need for a growing concern In the affective domain, 
theoretical research is beginning to address itself to the question 
of values education. Implicit value education (choice of 
reading assignments,^ class activities, evaluative techniques) 
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has always pervaded school curricula, and, to a great extent, 
is unavoidable. What we are seeing now, however, is conscious 
and specific. Education is beginning to come to terms with 
the multitude of conflicting value-claims and urgings which 
have left most of us In an uncertain state of confusion about 
what values, if any, to endorse. Educational research, by way 
of Kohlberg, is adopting the view that the classroom cannot 
afford to be value-neutral. The view of some educators that 
schools should only provide studentfs with opportunities to 
state their viewpoints on moral or social problems is currently 
under heavy criticism. For Kohlberg and his followers, the need 
to struggle with individual and social values and examine the 
social and moral problems of their culture in a systematic and 
open format is of paramount importance. 
Towards a theoretical perspective 
Amid the welter of speculation, elaboration and conjecture, 
research over the years has led to a developmental model of 
morality, which has become, as it were, the "inviolate genes" 
of moral education. Kohlbergfs cognitive developmental model 
of moral development is aligned very much with Piagetfs struc-
turalism and offers the modern world a concept of justice which 
deals with the current dilemma of value relativity. While the 
concept of developmental theory is basic to this study, emphasis 
on the examination of the social basis of any psychological 
theory should not be ignored in conformation of the notion 
"that within a social context, psychological theories are tied 
to the infrastructure of a society or socially defined groups" 
(Morss, 1975? Buss,1975). 
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Since the analysis of various psychological theories as they 
relate to the concepts of morality and creativity is the organ-
izing focus for this present study, some consideration, hf only 
peripheral, of the social premises which underlie much of this 
theoretical research, appears valid and useful. 
Cognitive styles 
Emphasis on the "cognitive" or "rational" approach has 
always dominated educational research strategies in exploring . 
the notion of learning. When research deals with the "affective" 
or "emotiorial" side of learning, it is usually within a framework 
consistent with the cognitive approach. Therefore, the growing 
numbers of people who are supporting values education as a 
"virtue" are doing so under the pretext of making moral education 
a new context, or a new indoctrination format by which current 
conceptual values can be transmitted to young people. Educators 
must be careful not to turn values into mere "facts" transmitted 
to students under new terminology such as "dilemma situations" 
or "clarification proc edures". This turns moral education into 
a value-as-content prejudice. 
Research models that try to put feelings, values and emotions 
into a conceptual matrix consistent with the study of the cog-
nitive domain filter relevant Information as many evaluation 
techniques In our classrooms filter reality. Can we really 
measure values and feelings? In other words, we must be 
cautious in avoiding the filtering of affective constructs through 
an analytical lattice or ideational labyrinth". Only then can 
we approach a truly humanistic view of man proposed by Kohlberg, 
Maslow, Fowler or Erikson. If we must pursue the affective 
domain (many researchers are considering .this worthwhile), we 
should do so from differing perspectives to include a more 
31 
"comprehensive" view of man. 
Towards a developmental approach to creativity 
John Curtis Gowan (1972) has organized the theoretical 
contributions on creativity into four sections in terms of a 
rational-psychedelic continuumi 
(1) Creativity as congnitive, rational and semantic, 
(2) Creativity as personality factors and environmental. 
(3) Creativity as mental health. 
(4) Creativity as psychedelic or existential. 
Creativity considered as a result of particular types of 
logical thought, growing out of combinational activity or new 
organizational patterns have been studied by Dewey (1910), 
Rossman (193l)t Edwards (1968), Bruner (1962) and Guilford (1967). 
Guilfordfs structure of the intellect model explicated in his 
classic The Nature of Human Intelligence {1967) emphasizes 
creativity as a product of "divergent thinking". 
Creativity as a personality correlate, especially of origin-
ality, energy, humour and self-concept is emphasized in the re-
search of Hallman (1963)1 Springer (Mooney and Razik, 1967)1 
Delias and Gaier (1970). 
Creativity as the result of environmental influence(espec-
ially parental rearing practice) is discussed at great length 
by Welsh (1967)9 and Hitchman (1956). Abdel-Salan (1963) 
found male adolescents creative, self-sufficient, alternately 
lax and exacting and a trusting, adaptable, surgent, easygoing 
cyclotheme. Ellinger (1964) obtained a correlation of .6 be-
tween creativity and home environment. Parents of creative 
children were found to be more involved in activities, read 
more to their children, and used less physical punishment. 
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Cross-cultural research supporting strong relationships between 
cultural, environmental and creative index has been conducted by 
Torrance (1969)1 Gowan and Torrance (1965)9 Torrance, Gowan, Wu 
and Aliotti (1970). 
Researchers who contend that creative functioning is pos-
itivily correlated with a high degree of mental health, openness 
to experience, and anti-authoritarian influences and tendencies 
in the individual's style of living tend to view creativity as 
a product of mental health. Maslow (195*01 Rogers (1959)f 
Jung (1967)1 Schachtel (I959)t Hallman (1963)1 Fromm (1959)* 
Hart (1950), Wilson (195*0 and Zilboorg (1959) generally agree 
on four dominant characteristics of the creative individuals 
(a) problem sensitivity 
(b) ability to tolerate ambiguity 
(c) internalized locus of evaluation (destiny and self-image) 
(d) spontaniety 
Creativity as a "thrust" from the unconscious and linked to 
sexual sublimation has been referred to by Freud (1938), Brill 
(1931)t Deri (1939)? Engleman (1952), Van Der Sterren (1952), 
Weiss (1953) and Schneider (1950). 
Adler (1952), Jung (1916) and Rank (1932) all rejected 
Freudfs sexual explanations and viewed creativity as a "life 
force", "compensation", or "collective unconscious". 
Besdine (1968, 1970), Gowan (1965)1 Kubie (1958), Ruten-
beck (I965)t Winnicot (1965) Sears (1969)1 Singer (1961), 
and Weisberg and Sprin .ger (1961).place a great deal of emphasis 
on the oedipal crisis during the narcisstic period of the child 
as the genesis of creative function. 
Fairburn (1938), Levey (19W, Schneider (1950), Segal 
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(1952)t Simon and Gagnon (1969) and Spock (1970) feel that 
creativity is necessarily linked to sublimation of aggressive, 
phallic or Incestuous desires (primary processes). 
Those who view the "preconscious" as the "source" of creative 
functioning can be included among Kubie (1958), Happich (1932), 
Kris (1952), Getzels and Jackson (1962), Schneider (1950) and 
Gowan (1969). 
Tart (1969)f Masters and Houston (1966), Moriarity and 
Murphy (1967) and Pang and Fort (1967) regard creativity as 
explainable mainly in paranormal terms such as existential, 
hypnotic, mystical, change, becoming, ESP phenomena, and pre-
cognition. Many of these researchers feel creativity can be 
enhanced by drugs or psychtropic chemicals such as lysergic acid. 
Results supporting the notion that creativity is more often 
found in younger individuals and can be explained as a series 
of chronological stages have been reported by Wallas (1926), 
Ghiselin (1952), Vinache (1952), Hutchison (l9Wt Botwinick 
(1967) and Bjorkstein (194-6). 
The Psychometric emphasis 
^Scientific study_of creativity began with Galton's (I896) 
study of mental capacities which were identified as hereditary 
and followed the other laws of "organic transmission" which may 
be ascertained by careful observation, and strongly influenced 
by family upbringing. Terman and Cox (19^ -7) also emphasized the 
genetic basis of talents but stressed the role of environment 
and schooling as well as the role of superior personality fact-
ors rather than emotional abnormality. Also, "genius" was solidly 
linked to a high I.Q, Accounts by artists and scientists con-
cerning their unconscious inspiration becoming refined and craft-
ed led Wallas (1926) to formulate stages in which the thought 
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processes of the thinker are brought to bear on the conscious 
and voluntary effort of his art. 
In 195^ Guilford published some hypothesis for research 
in which he used "factor analysis" to isolate specific aspects 
of the intellect which might account for creativity. Guilford 
(1959) defined the intellect as the collection of memory and 
thinking functions and processes. Intelligence is perceived 
as a very limited aspect of the intellect. According to 
Guilfordfs (1959) formulation, both aptitude and non-aptitude 
traits (temperament and motivation) are involved in creative 
thinking. Guilford sees creativity as essentially a cognitive 
process involving the adaptive traits of fluency,of words, 
ideational fluency, expressional fluency and originality. 
Research begun by Guilford led to further speculation by Getzels 
and Jackson. (1962) that creativity is most strongly, if not 
solely linked to I.Q. It was discovered by Getzels and Jackson 
(1962), however, that intelligence alone did not insure creativity. 
High level acts of creativity are performed by highly intelligent 
people, but nearly all people are capable of "some" creative 
acts. The research findings which support the notion that 
intellectual factors do not, in and of themselves, account for 
differences in creative ability correlate with Kohlberg1s (1968) 
remark concerning moral thinking in which he maintains that 
intelligence may be taken as a necessary, but not sufficient 
cause of moral advance. Concerning both moral advance and 
creativity, it appears that the intellectual factors seem to 
be a somewhat necessary, but not sufficient ingredient. 
Torrance (1959) found that I.Q. tests do not identify 
creative people. In fact, if the I.Q. test Is used as the sole 
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criterion for selecting creative children, we lose 70$ of the 
most creative. Just as Kohlberg (1973) emphasizes ego strength 
and role-taking abilities as necessary constructs in the process 
of moral judgement, so Torrance (1959) recognizes additional 
factors in the creative process such as flexibility, originality, 
depth of thinking and intuition, which cannot be accounted for 
by I.Q. alone. It appears that the essence of creative perform-
ance lay in the individuals ability to produce new forms, to 
risk conjoining elements that are customarily thought of as 
independent or dissimilar, or to go off in new directions. 
The creative adolescent, according to Getzels and Jackson 
(1963)? seems to promote the ability to free himself from the 
usual, to diverg from the customary. The high I.Q. subjects 
seemed to shy away from the risk and the uncertainty of the 
unknown and to seek out the safelty of the knowns ^ 
The high I.Q. subjects tend to converge upon 
stereotyped meanings, to perceive personal success 
by conventional standards, to move toward the 
model provided by teachers, to seek out careers 
that conform to what is expected of them. The 
high creatives tend to diverge from stereotyped 
meanings, to produce original fantasies, to per-
ceive personal success by unconventional standards, 
to seek out careers that do not conform to what 
is expected of them (Getzels and Jackson, 1963t P-172). 
Guilford (1957) defines two kinds of thinking, convergent 
and divergent, and maintains that originality comes about through 
divergent thinking processes. He feels, therefore, that the 
I.Q. test is ineffective! 6 
In tests of convergent thinking there is almost always 
one conclusion or answer that is regarded as unique, 
and thinking is to channelled or contolled in the 
direction of that answer...In divergent thinking, on 
the other hand, there is much searching about going 
off in various directions. This is most easily seen 
when there is no unique conclusion. Divergent think-
ing. ... (is) .. .characterized. . .as being less goal bound. 
There is freedom to go off in different directions... 
rejecting the old solution and striking out in some 
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new direction is necessary, and the resourceful 
organism will probably succeed (Guilford, 1957t p.19)-
Depending on how you define creativity, different manifest-
ations of it have been linked from early childhood years to adult-
hood. Tachistosopically presented tests were made by Andrews (1930) 
in order to observe the imaginative play of children from two 
to six. Grippen (1933) used constant contact methods with data 
and verbalizations while painting. Markey (1935) reported that 
no single test taps all the imaginative resources of the indiv-
idual and that the same test of imagination is not equally 
valid at all age levels. She reports that the correlations 
between mental age and test scores were slightly higher than 
correlations between chronological age and test scores. 
A psychodynamic emphasis 
A prime spokesman for the relationship of creative function-
ing to psychoanalytic psychology is Carl Jung (1964). Jung felt 
that he had observed the existence of certain "archetypes" or 
universals that stemmed from the "creative forces" of a collect-
ive unconscious shared and tapped by all of mankind. In addition, 
Jung divided personality into personna, social mask, and ego? 
the conscious and unconscious parts of the personality responsible 
for personal behaviour. 
Jung maintained that creativity is linked to imagination 
and intuition? the popular notion is that they are chiefly val-
uable to poets and artists and in "sensible" matters one should 
mistrust them. In Jung*s viewpoint, creativity supplements the 
rational mind or intellect and, even in the higher forms of 
science, may be applied to a specific problem. Suppressing, 
for instance, our creative interpretation of important symbols 
and events, could lead to violent outbursts. Creativity is 
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linked to the symbol-producing function of the unconscious. 
This function brings the original mind of man into advanced or 
differentiated consciousness. Jung sees modern man as a cerebral 
monster with hypertrophied rational faculties. (The surrealists 
of the 19^0fs strongly reacted against the suppression of creativity 
by the logical faculties). Suppressing our symbol-producing 
potential has disasterous effects? man loses psychic energy and 
is unable to express himself by the symbolic process in his 
consciousness. Rationalism can destroy manfs capacity to respond 
to numious symbols and ideas and puts him at the mercy of the 
"psychic underworld". Jung (1964) upheld the notion that creat-
ivity cannot rationally be explained, but within their areas of 
action one can recognize the archetypal patterns as a dynamic 
background activity. Jung maintains that certain exceptional 
creative breakthroughs of artists, writers or scientists must 
take into account an area of interrelation between the unconscious 
psyche and biological processes. The mindfs unconscious arche-
types appear as agents of a "creatio continua". 
Karl Gauss, the 18th century German mathematician exper-
ienced much of his creative insight as an unconscious order of 
ideas and that he found a certain rule in the theory of numbers 
which simply solved itself. 
Henri Poincare, the French scientist, maintained that if 
one could perceive onefs own unconscious at work it would be 
possible to visualize the unconscious activity partially becoming 
manifest to consciousness without losing its own character. 
This idea corroborates the Jungian notion that our conscious 
representations are ordered before they become conscious to us. 
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Accordingly, a satisfactory rational explanation of an event 
could be due to the fact that our conscious representations are 
ordered before they become conscious to us. As Von Franz (1964) 
points out, a satisfactory rational explanation of an event 
could be explained as a conscious idea in harmony with some 
preconscious constellation of contents in our unconscious. 
One method recently developed for creative "problem-solving" 
which trains the conscious to utilize information from the un-
conscious or preconscious, is termed synectics. Synectics, 
a management creativity technique used in industry was developed 
by J.J. Gordon (1961), and is based on making an observational 
investigation into the nature and process of creative activity. 
By way of problem-solving technique, Gordon shows that in creat-
ivity it is the emotional rather than the intellectual, and the 
irrational rather than the rational elements that bring success 
to problem-stating and problem-solving situations. Among the 
working hypotheses developed by Gordon (1961) are the following! 
(1) creativity is latent in almost everyone to a greater 
degree than is usually expected. 
(2) when it comes to creativity and invention, the emotion-
al and non-rational elements can be as important as the 
rational and intellectual. 
(3) the emotional, non-rational elements can be methodically 
harnessed through training and practise especially in 
metaphorical thinking. 
Although there are romantic and popular predjudices against 
the "mechanization of human creativity", synectics has identified 
four of these mechanisms each metaphorical in characters personal 
analogy, direct analogy, symbolic analogy and fantasy analogy. 
An approach to creativity which differs from Gordon's (1961) 
conception and which rejects the Jungian concept of the collective 
unconscious as having a too ready-made solution, has been put 
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forward by Ernst Kris (1952). He has systematically examined 
the conditions under which ego-dystonic preconscious material 
may reach consciousness by assuming that the ego directs a 
"counter cathexis" against the id and is eventually drawn Into 
the primary process (the basic assumption of psycho-analytic 
theory of dream formation). The reverse process of unconscious 
material becoming pre-conscious occurs when id derivations are 
cathected with ego energy and become part of pre-conscious mental 
processes. Here the "pre-conscious" differs from the "un-conscious" 
in that unconscious processes use mobile psychic energy? precon-
scious processes use bound energy. This theory can, accordingly, 
only be explained by assumptions concerning the nature of the 
prevalent psychic energy. 
Lawrence Kubiess (1958) widely accepted theory of the origin 
of creativity centers around the contention made by Kris (1952) 
that the ego enrolls the primary process in its service (regression 
in the service of the ego) and makes use of it for its purposes. 
Kubie1s theory maintains that, as we mature, cultural pressures 
and the drive for acceptance push many of our experiences into 
our preconscious mind. - The role of the preconscious, according 
to Kubiefs formulation, can be to warp the creative process. 
Kubie purports that a creative person is an individual who, in 
some manner (perhaps accidental), has retained his capacity to 
use his preconscious functions more freely than others who may 
be potentially equally gifted. Kubie asserts that both the pre-
conscious and unconscious processes act in such a way as to effect-
ively block the creative process. He feels that the essential 
quality of the creative person exists in his ability to allow 
preconscious material to readily achieve a conscious expression. 
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Harold Rugg (1963) stressed the concept that life should 
be viewed as a continuum ranging from the unconscious to the 
conscious and that many of the modern social forces or cultural 
drives may force many of our experiences into the unconscious. 
Modern society, equipped with many extremely rigid attitudes and 
taboos often keep us from dipping into the unconscious experiences. 
Accordingly, the creative process becomes blocked at both rigid 
ends of the continuum. However, Rugg proposes that between 
the conscious and the unconscious there exists a threshold over 
which creative people may pass bringing them to a "transliminal" 
charVber. Here, the creative mind Is able to draw freely from 
both the conscious and the unconscious. People, therefore, who 
are able to put themselves in touch with their transliminal 
chambers are creative people. Whereas Kubie (1958) ascribes 
creative ability only to the preconscious, Rugg (1963) holds 
that there is some creative, imaginative capacity in all sections 
of the psychefs continuum. 
Approaching the concept of creativity from a more develop-
mental perspective, Jerome Bruner (1965) does not feel that the 
unconscious is capable of organizing, in an autonomous fashion, 
its symbol-creating power. Even if this were true, however, 
Bruner insists that it is highly unlikely that, on its own, the 
unconscious could be much of a creative source of thinking. For 
creative thoughts to arise, Bruner feels that the metaphoric 
process must be under some form of conscious control. Gondii ions 
required for creative problem-solving would, therefore, stand as 
followss 
(1) a "defusing" of intellectual activity from the demands 
of immediate action, affect, and drive. 
(2) having an adequate competence model available 
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(3) having the experience of intrinsic reward from in-
creased competence that can lead to a career of "learn-
ing for its own sake." 
Although Brunerfs (1965) formulations have much in common 
with Piaget (1932), he does follow closely the ideas of Kubie 
(1958) and Kris (1952) when stressing the importance of aware-
ness and developing a sense of play in directing unconscious 
activities towards creative usage. 
Towards the view of creativity as a process 
It has been pointed out that most of the widely held con-
ceptions or theories of creativity have derived from such diverse 
sources as logic or philosophy, learning theory, Gestalt prin-
ciples of thought, psychometrics, psychoanalysis and social 
perception as summarized by Gowan (1972), Getzels (1975) and 
Maddit (1975). 
Dewey1s "logically determined" five steps towards creative 
problem-solving with the apparent focus on reasoning (a felt 
difficulty, its definition, suggestion towards solution, develop-
ment by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion and observ-
ation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection) has 
been taken as an emphasis towards the central role of logic and 
rationality in creative thinking. 
Associationists and learning theorists like Thorndike (1927) 
place the emphasis of creativity on past experience and habit 
associations rather than reason feeling these are the essential 
factors in thought. All thought, no matter how original, rests 
ultimately on associative stimulus-response principles which 
involve the outcome of conflicting action tendencies from past 
associative learning and the selection of previous associations 
to try out the new situation. 
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According to Wertheimer (1945t 1959) and the Gestaltists, 
traditional logic and classical associationism are piecemeal 
in comparison to innovative thinking which eliminates the struc-
tural trouble in the problem situation and produces a solution 
which is not only structurally better, but yields vectors in the 
direction of constant improvement. 
The psychometric tradition identifies creativity with In-
telligence or distinguishes intellectual behaviour between con-
vergent and divergent mental processes. Divergent thinking 
pertains to new information that is less determined by known 
information comprising a substratum for creative performance 
by involving fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration. 
Psychoanalytic theory points to a cleavage in all human 
thought between two basic processes, an unconscious primary 
process and a conscious secondary process. Both processes con-
flict with one another giving rise to defense mechanisms and 
repression. The primary process involves freely rising fantasies, 
daydreams and play which is characteristic of the creative in-
dividual. These primary processes become, according to Freud 
(1949)t ego-syntonic in order for "achievements of special per-
fection" or creative functioning. 
Kris (1952) has studied the access of primary process thought 
by the ego by way of the preconscious. Also arguing that the 
source of creativity Is in the preconscious, Kubie (1958) view 
the preconscious as a mediator between the conscious and the 
unconscious. 
Schachel (1959) adds still a further dimension to the issue 
to the problem of creativity by suggesting a social and perceptual 
psychoanalytic approach. Creativity, then, Is not viewed as a 
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primary process or regression in the service of the ego but, 
rather, as an openness in the encounter with the world. In other 
words, a person1s sensibilities are more freely receptive to new 
reflections of onefs self and environment in various different 
aspects. 
A compromise theory involving a dual process appeared in 
Hadamand's The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field 
(1956) in which creativity is presented as involving both cog-
itation (letting ideas, impulses, memories, and fantasies rise 
freely) and Intelligence (the process of choosing among the 
combinations). 
Getzels (1975) has observed that by focusing only on the 
sociological and psychological dimensions of creativity, we have 
omitted other factors contributing to the behaviour of the creat-
ive individual! the biological dimension, the cultural or anth-
ropological dimension and the group or social-psychological 
dimension. Accordingly, Getzels (1975) has begun to research 
creative behaviour under the criterion of organismic constitution, 
individual personality, social institutions, group settings and 
cultural values. 
Although research on creativity has led to a tremendous scope 
of approaches, and an enormous diversity of treatment, certain 
basic features emerge. First of all, there is a questioning 
of the separated meanings of cognition and learning on the one 
hand and the priority which these have been given over emotion, 
personality, and motivation on the other 
Hilgard (1972) found that personality variables were im-
portant to the study of creativity, even in the solution of simple 
laboratory type problems that seemed almost purely cognitive. 
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Guilford (1967) began his research in creativity with studies 
of "higher thought processes" as related to originality and creat-
ivity. Now he is suggesting (1975) that the same operations 
and products apply in the area of social intelligence or empathy. 
Rollo May (1972) emphasizes the emotional Involvement in 
creativity, and Stoddard (1972) deplores the lack of opportunity 
for affect or personal involvement in the childfs school experiences 
in relation to creative production. 
Creativity as process— A dialectic_between self and world and 
between world and self. 
The search for that "someone" or "something" that creates 
has been the dualistic quest of Western scientific research on 
creativity. Perhaps it is the result of our English language 
subject-object structure of our thinking* Rather than venture 
into a linguistic appr ch to the topic, it seems worthwhile to 
acknowledge the views of Anderson (1972) and May (1972) in their 
perception of creativity as "process", a continual dialectical 
process that goes on between world and self, and self and world? 
one Implies the other, and neither can be defined by omitting the 
other. Dow (1962) has explored the interrelatedness of individual 
rightness and social rightness which together constitute a way 
of living creatively. Murray"s (1948) dyadic examples of creative 
components illustrate creativeness where human relating is super-
ordinate. 
Anderson (19 54) has summed up the current attention towards 
the perception of creativity as "process" as oppossed to simply 
"product"s 
In the past creativity as product has been given 
greater attention or emphasis than creativity as 
process, The process id often obscure, unknown, 
unperceived, unverballzed, even by the person 
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himself, and therefore uncommunicated to others. 
In fact, neither history nor science has develop-
ed a method or means for recording or evaluating 
process, except by the comparison of cross-sections 
in time. The struggle involved in learning or in 
conceiving and producing an object of creativity 
is inferred and not directly measured. Even the 
motion picture is an illusion of process and motion. 
The product and process are both important. With-
out the process there would not be the product. 
Without the product or evidence of action or achieve-
ment there might not be more than fantasy (Anderson, 
195 *\ P. 243). 
A comprehensive definition of creativity which stresses 
the interactive process has been given by Hallmam 8 
...the creative act can be analyzed into five 
major components (1) it is a whole act, a unitary 
Instance of behaviour? (2) it terminates In the 
production of objects or of forms of living which 
are distinctive? (3) it evolves out of certain 
mental process? (4) it co-varies with specific per-
sonality transformation, and (5) it occurs within a 
particular kind of environment. A demonstration of 
the necessary features of each of these factors can 
employ both descriptive and logical proceedures? it 
can refer to the relevance of empirical evidence, 
and can infer what grounds are logically necessary 
in order to explain certain facts (Hallman, 1963, 
pp. 18-19). 
A review of the relevant research on moral reasoning 
Traditional conceptions of moral learning have been seriously 
challenged over the past decade as psychologists and learning 
theorists have approached child development from entirely dif-
ferent epistemological premises and methodology than, for in-
stance, those outlined by Durkheim (1925)* Modern moral phil-
osophers such as Kohlberg (1958, 1963, 1966, 1973) no longer 
assume morality is a system of rules and values defined by a 
culture and that the individual child acquires these ready-made 
values by general cultural-transmission mechanisms such as re-
inforcement learning or identification. The assumptions of 
"character education" were exposed by Hartshorne and Mayfs 
(1928, 1930) inquiries and proved ineffectual. Viewing moral 
categories as traits or virtues has been referred to by Kohlberg 
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(1966) as a "bag or virtues" approach. This definite shift in 
perspective from viewing moral instruction as character education, 
or a transmission to the child of traditional and socially approv-
ed traits, has given way in recent years to a consideration of 
a fostering of the child's own innate tendency to develop socially 
and intellectually through experience as proclaimed by Piaget 
(1932) and his followers (Kohlberg, 1966? Turlel, 1966, 1969) 
in America and similar research in Britain (Wilson, Williams and 
Sugarman, 1967)* Conceiving moral maturity within a cognitive-
developmental framework stood in direct opposition to the pre-
vailing view of the social scientists who regarded all moral 
values as culturally relative due to the Influence of the mass 
media which proclaims that our moral habits, customs and ideologies 
are only representative of a small number available. 
Although there Is growing interest today in "social cog-
nition" (Livesley and Bromely, 1973l Michel, 1974), child psych-
ology, until very recently, was dominated by the social learning 
approach (Sears, Macoby and Levin, 1957I Bandura, 1963) which 
views social development as an "Internalizing" of information 
and social norms that he has observed or experienced in his en-
vironment. Learning theorists, because of their preference for 
observable behaviour as data for psychological experiment, are 
well known for their unsympathetic opposition to psychoanalytic 
theory with its purely theoretical constructs such as "super-
ego" and its tendencey to theorize at length about invisible, 
unverifiable forces thought to underly human behaviour. Eyseenck 
(i960), an arch-adversary of psychoanalysis, applies Pavlovfs 
theory of ref?ex or classical conditioning to the development of 
moral values. Eysenck, in contrast to Freud, finds it totally 
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unnecessary to presuppose the existence of certain mental struc-
tures or Oedipus complex and assumes that moral values are learnt 
and explainable by known facts and principles of modern learning 
theory. 
During the past ten years, developmental psychologists 
have discarded the notion of the child as a "passive receiver" 
and reject the assertion that a child can directly absorb inform-
ation from his social environment. They have replaced the social 
learning model of the child with a cognitive-developmental model 
in which the child actively constructs his social knowledge 
out of an interaction between his own unique experience in the 
world and his own conceptual abilities and limitations (Piaget, 
1932? Kohlberg, 1963l Turiel, 1974). 
Although schools are presently considering and implementing 
moral models into their curriculums which are based on the re-
search of Kohlberg and his followers, there still persists among 
many school authorities, a high level of vacuous inanity and 
vagrant speculation manifested in the notion that moral reasoning 
programming should be ignored in the planning of school programs. 
Such curriculum designers seem almost overwhelmed by the rising 
tide of theoretical research propagating:! f issiparous sects through 
which individuals label themselves "Eriksonians", "Piagetians" or 
"Kohlbergians". 
As far as psychoanalytic and social learning theorists are 
concerned, decisions about right and wrong are not based on 
reasoned judgements. Neither Freud nor Eysench, for instance, 
would attabh much importance to cognitive rational factors in 
morality or even moral judgement, and they would probably view 
pilot programs in schools based on Kohlberg1s theoretical form-
ulations as ineffectual. Learning theorists emphasize affective, 
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non-rational determinants of human behaviour. They view morality 
as practically synonymous with "conformity" to the standards and 
norms imposed on the child? moral judgement therefore merely 
expresses, to the learning theorist, the extent to which society 
(largely through the agency of parents) has succeeded in restrain-
ing and controlling the innately anti-social child. 
Much of the inevitable dim view of character education and 
the consequent erosion of the partisan, authoritarian and in-
doctrinating assumptions upon which the "bag of virtues" approach 
was based was due to the attention of researchers to the seminal 
works of Piaget (1932) and Dewey (1938). These men created the 
emphasis on the cognitive-developmental approach towards under-
standing moral actions. 
Although some researchers such as Sullivan (1977) are reconsider-
ing the attributes of vices and virtues, claiming they act as two 
poles of a complex dialectic of moral emotions rather than static 
labels of praise or blame, it was in The Moral Judgement of the 
Child (1932) that Piaget provided the foundations for much of the 
current psychological research in cognitive-developmental approaches 
to moral developement. - Piagetfs research challenged the psycho-
analytic and behaviourist conceptions of the role of moral judge-
ment, and the phillsophical premises on which it is based. First, 
Piaget reaffirms human consciousness as a valid factor in human 
growth- the cognitive component. Since the psychoanalytic studies 
of the "superego", the Pavlovlan emphasis on automatic anxiety 
responses and the claim of Neo-behaviourists like Skinner (1971) 
that "reinforcement" may account for moral development, it Is 
easy to forget that "conscience" is defined as fundamentally a 
cognitive function, such as the "faculty of recognizing the dis-
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tinctlon between right and wrong." In fact, in Piagetfs view, 
the child Is only truly moral to the extent to which he has gone 
beyond conventional morality imposed on him by others (morality 
of constraint) to develop, through a co-operative interaction 
with society, a rational morality of his own (the morality of 
co-operation). Piaget discovered that a basic shift In the 
quality of the child's moral judgement takes place when he pro-
gresses from preoperational thought (age 7) and again (age 12) 
when concrete operational thought gives way to formal or abstract 
thought processes? the morality of the preoperational child is 
identified as moral realism and that of the adolescent as aioral 
autonomy. During the later stage, the adolescent develops a 
sense of ethical and moral responsibility which, now that abstract 
thought is possible, is based on abstract principles of what is 
right and wrong% 9 
This is true of the concept of social justice 
and of rational, aethetic, or social Ideals * As a 
result of the acquisition of such values, decisions, 
whether in opposition to or In agreement with the 
adult, have an altogether different significance than 
they do in the small social groups of younger children 
...The possibilities opened up by these new values are 
obvious in the adolescent, who differs from the child 
in that he is not only capable of forming theories but 
is also concerned with choosing a career that will 
permit him to satisfy his need for social reform and 
for new Ideas" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 51)-
Although Piagetss early work dealt mainly with the develop-
ment of moral judgements in children, his "clinical method" 
offered a widely used standard for assessing moral reasoning 
(eg. Boehm, 1962? Turiel, 1966? Haan, Smith and Block, 1968? 
Kohlberg, 1969? Rest, 1973). 
Piaget asserted that an individual's adult-perspective 
of justice was largely independent of adult influences and re-
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quired nothing more than the mutual respect and solidarity which 
held among children themselves. Accordingly, when parental bonds 
loosened, and strong peer bonds developed, only at this time 
did the adult morality of mutual respect begin to develop. 
Although the primary focus of inquiry, for Piaget, has 
centred on the individual's construction and reasoning about 
physical reality (the experienceable domain of objects, space, 
time, causal relationships) he has made some ground-breaking 
investigations concerning the child's use of language and symbol 
in play and imitation, the child's way of perceiving the origins 
of the visble surrounding reality, and the developement of the 
ability to use reasoned judgement in the sphere of morality. 
Early research on Piagetfs theories of the developement 
of moral judgement by MacRae (1950, 1954) sought to test his 
contention that "autonomy" and "heteronomy" actually constitute 
structural wholes and that empirical correlations exist between 
these two moralities and other variables such as social relations 
and authority. 
Both Piaget and Kohlberg have stressed that cognitive struc-
tures tend to dominate over the "affective" dynamics and that 
only the cognitive structures can serve in describing the se-
quence of developmental transformations which they call stages. 
(Cartesian rationalism and Kantian formalism stand behind this 
approach). This approach ignores the research that psychoanalytic 
and learning theory perspectives direct toward the early child-
hood antecedents of "identification" which Freud believed con-
stituted the dynamic factor in "super-ego" formation. (Freud, 
1921, 1923, 1930). Both cognitive-developmental research and 
psychoanalytic and learning theory ( which isolates and assesses 
the child rearing practices of parents and variables such as 
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sex-role, conscience and superego strength) are essentially uni-
dimensional. What is needed is a comprehensive view of moral 
development which considers both psychodynamic and developmental 
formulations. Piaget, however, never claimed to be a psychologist, 
but an epistomologist. While Piaget acknowledged the importance 
of emotional development, his concern was that of the genetic 
epistemologist. 
Kohlberg's moral model. 
Whereas Piaget's primary field of study is the development 
of successive transformations of mental structures in a logically 
necessary sequence (logico-mathematical and physical knowledge), 
Selmanfts (1976) research emphasizes the descriptive judgements 
in relation to social behaviour and institutions and Broughton (1976) 
stresses the study of social-cognitive epistemology, the thrust 
of the research of Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1963, 1966, 1973i) 
has been mainly that of a structural-developmental theorist. 
There is little doubt that, in North America, at least, research 
in moral judgement over the past twenty years has been dominated 
by Kohlberg*s work. Kohlberg, inspired by Piaget, has revived 
and legitimized the empirical study of moral development by 
developing a major model of the "growth" of moral reasoning 
which has become a paradigm and the inviolate genes of the struc-
tural-cognitive approach through a systematic longitudinal, 
cross-cultural, social class, educational, political and religious 
field of reference (Kohlberg, 1963* I969.1I966, 1973; Turiel, 
1966, 1969! Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969i Blatt, 1972; Fontana ana 
Noel, 19731 Sanderson, 1973i Kohlberg and Turiel, 1973* 1974i 
Rest, 1974; White, 1975)* 
While Kohlberg owes much to Piaget, the philopsphical 
antecedents of his theory (he acknowledges with some pride) is 
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Plato. For Kohlberg challenges the social scientist's view that 
moral judgements are relative to a particular culture, and re-
asserts the absolutist principles of Socratic ethics long Ig-
nored by social scientists, and scorned, even today, by writers 
such as Ey^enck. The fundamental difference between Kohlbergss 
approach to conscience and the maturationist and learning theory 
assumptions, is not so much psychological as It is philosophical. 
Kohlberg asserts (1968) that all theories of moral growth In-
evitably reflect definite ethical or epistemological premises 
about the meaning of morality and moral growth. Philosophical 
commitment (Deweyism in this case) is important to Kohlberg and 
his approach is closer to Piagetfs descriptive system of the child's 
Intellectual growth than It is to Piagetfs conception of moral 
judgement. For Kohlberg, a structural-developmental!st like 
Piaget, has developed a theory of moral development which reveals 
a sequence of stages in the way persons construct social or inter-
personal reality. This is decidedly different from the premises 
of "Inculcation of a bag of virtues" expounded in such stereo-
typical terms as "honesty", "service", and "self-control", 
adjectives prescribed by a culture with numerous affiliates in 
the educational system. Kohlberg1s theory posed a problem for 
the assoclationist tradition, under the guise of learning theory, 
which assumed children acquired knowledge in small doses but 
as to the relation~,ship between regularities experienced beyond 
these associations, no relation was hypothesized. Berkowitz 
(1964), for instance, assumed moral values are learned one by 
one in the order in which they are introduced by the environment 
to the child. Kohlbergfs stages, on the other hand, provide 
a modern equivalent of older types of "natural law" theories of 
ethics which seriously jeopardize maturationist and association-
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1st traditions ^° 
We have contrasted the maturationist assumption 
that basic mental structures results from an innate 
patterning, with the learning theory assumption that 
basic mental structure is the result of the pattern-
ing or association of events in the outside world. 
In contrast, the cognitive-developmental assumption 
is that basic mental structure is the result of an 
interaction between certain organismic structuring 
tendencies and the structure of the outside world, 
rather than reflecting either one directly. 
This interaction leads to cognitive "stages" 
which represent the transformations of simple early 
cognitive structures as these are applied to (or 
assimilate) the external world, and as they are 
accommodated to, or restructured by the external 
world in the course of being applied to it (Kohlberg, 
1969t P.352). 
Whereas Piagetss system of moral reasoning is based on two 
moral stages with an individual attaining moral maturity when 
he is capable of autonomous thinking, Kohlberg distinguishes 
three basic levels of moral developments the preconventional 
or pre-moral level, the conventional level and the post-con-
ventional or autonomous level. These three levels comprise 
the existence of six "hierarchical integrations" or stages which 
Kohlberg has found to be present in the moral thinking of all 
the cultures he has studied (Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, U.S. and 
Israel) and furthermore all these stages occur In the same 
developmental sequence. For, like Piaget, Kohlberg claims that 
the stages of moral reasoning, in their formal or structural 
characteristics, are sequential, hierarchical, invariant and 
universal. Kohlbergss subdivision of his three basic levels 
into two stages, creating a more differentiated and elaborate 
theory of six stages of moral devlopment, has* according to 
Hampden, Turner and Whitten (1971) created a typology of moral 
orientation that has been applied to conservative, liberal and 
radical political orientations. Moral stages are seen as a 
hierarchy of cognitive structures each of which constitutes 
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both a transformation of the previous structure and a necessary 
prerequisite for the structur al change which defines the next 
stage in the sequence. The progression of stages involves 
qualitative transformations in thinking over time in which new 
operations are integrated with, and in some cases come to super-
cede, older ones. The stages are hierarchical (each successive 
stage carries forward in modified and augmented form the op-
erations of the previous stage) and invariant (because each 
stage builds upon the previous one, a stage cannot be skipped), 
The stages in their sequence seem, on the basis of wide empirical 
testing, to be universal. 
Kohlberg has argued for the philosophical-ethical validity 
of his principled stages (5 and 6) as being based on principles 
of moral reasoning which are of demonstrably universal 
validity and appeal. Kohlberg questionss "Is it so surprising 
that psychologists never understood Socrates? It is hard to 
understand if you are not stage 6." 
The following is a description of Kohlberg1s stages of 
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moral reasoning (Table l)s 
TABLE 1* 
Definition of Moral Stages 
I.Preconventional level 
At this level the child is responsible to cultural rules and 
labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these 
labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic con-
sequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours), 
or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the 
rules and labels, The level is divided into the following two 
stages: 
Stage Is The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical 
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regard-
less of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoid-
Sources Kohlberg (1971) p. 164 
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ance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued 
in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying 
moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter 
being stage 4). 
Stage 2s The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action 
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs 
and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are view-
ed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, 
of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are 
always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity 
is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not 
of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. 
II. Conventional level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's 
family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, 
regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude 
is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social 
order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, 
and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or 
group involved in It. At this level, there are the following two 
stagess 
Stage 3s The interpersonal concordance or "good boy—nice gcrl" 
orientation. Good behaviour is that which pleases or helps others 
and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereo-
typical images of what is majority or "natural" behaviour. 
Behaviour is frequently judged by intention—"he means well" 
becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by 
being"nice." 
Stage 4s The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation 
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social 
order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing 
respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order 
for it's own sake, 
III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values 
and principles which have validity and application apart from the 
authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and 
apart from the individual8^ own identification with these groups. 
This level again has two stagess 
Stage 5s The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally 
with utilitarian over-tones. Right action tends to be defined 
in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have 
been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society, 
There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values 
and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules 
for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally 
and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal 
"values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the 
"legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility 
of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social 
utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and 
56 
order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract 
is the binding element of obligation. This is the official mor-
ality of the American government and constitution. 
Stage 6s The universal ethical principle orientation. 
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord 
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These 
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, 
the categorical imperative)! they are not concrete moral 
rules like the Ten Commandments, At heart, these are 
universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and 
equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity 
of human beings as individual persons. 
The Moral Judgement Scale is derived from Kohlberg1s 
doctoral dissertation, and is the only method present to 
assess the Kohlberg stages of moral reasoning. This scale 
is a structured projective test consisting of some hypothetical 
dilemmas which are presented in an effort to assess the reason-
ing behind specific judgements. Two methods of scoring the 
protocols have been cited in the literatures a global system 
and a detailed system. The results of these scores determine 
an individuals "stage" of moral development. Additionally, 
because of the hierarchical nature of the stages, the scale 
defines the individual's level of moral maturity. 
Kohlberg8s stress on cognitive constructs 
Moral reasoning and creativity have both cognitive and 
affective components or aspects. One important aspect of the 
cognitive-developmental approach to moral growth is that "moral 
judgement stages or sequences are to be described in cognitive-
structural terms, even in regard to "affective" aspects of moral 
judgement, like guilt, empathy, etc." (Kohlberg, 1969, p.390) 
Kohlbergs stages are based on a cognitive theory of be-
haviours 
A cognitive theory of behaviour assumes that the 
first stage in the chain of events initiated by 
the stimulus situation and resulting in the be-
havioural act, is the construction of a cognitive 
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representation of the distal environment. The 
later events In the chain are Investigated, mod-
ified and guided by this cognitive representation. 
The cognitive representation thus acts as the effect-
ive environment which arouses motives and emotions, 
and guides overt behaviour towards its target or 
goal. (Baldwin, 1969f P*326) 
Within Kohlbergfs rational scheme, even role-taking be-
comes a cognitive skills "1~3 
It is not empathy or role-playing and should not 
be confused with them. Role-taking is the ability 
to know that someone elsefs perspective may be 
different from onefs own and only to some degree 
exactly how it may be different. Role-taking is 
then a gedankenor or thought-experiment. Facility 
at such intellectual experimenting Is crucial to the 
talent of a reasoner, in a way it is not to a so-
called sensitive or perceptive person (Puka, 1975» p.6o). 
According to Turiel (1975)i however, accepting the assump-
tions of structuralism does not entail believing that there is 
one unitary structure that governs all thinking. Turiel does 
distinguish social-conventional concepts from moral ones, but, 
in all likelihood, logic or role-taking are more pervasive and 
more general than others.even though they may only be partial 
systems within the structure of thought. Turiel reminds us 
to keep In mind the relationship between theoretical and practical 
social knowledge, 
Some reservations about Kohlbergfs theory 
A criticism directed at Kohlberg1s theoretical formulations 
by Puka (1975) has been the assertion that for the attainment 
of a higher stage to be better in the full ethical sense, it must 
be attained in co-ordination with the maturing of "other abilities" 
and the development of their regular use. It seems reasonable 
to consider that these "other abilities" which help comprise 
an individual's ego-strength may also Include aspects of the 
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creative process both as a product of psychometric orientation 
and as influenced by the unconscious dynamics of the individual 
and collective psyche. Kohlberg, however, tends to ignore 
unconscious psychological processes. 
Criticism of Kohlberg1s lack of consideration for more 
affective psychological components in his essentially cognitive 
theory has appeared in response to Kohlbergss moral model (Slchel, 
1976i Sullivan, 19771 Otto and Mann, 1969). 
Sullivan (1977) has pointed out a gap in the conceptual 
elegance of both Piaget*s and Kohlberg1s structuralism in the 
area of the "aesthetic imagination." Development of what 
Norman 0. Brown (1966) calls a "symbolic consciousness" could 
influence our moral commitment to action. In other words, the 
symbolic formulation of reasoning powers may cause us to identify 
more closely to what is being said. We must go beyond the 
14 literal, rational manifestations of wordss 
To go beyond the reality-principle, through the 
looking glass of dialectical reversal, to the absurd 
truth. Overcome this world by a reductio ad absurdumi 
credo quia absurdum. From the shadow of typology to 
the night of paradox. 
Norman 0. Brown, Love8s Body, p. 240. 
Sichelfs (1976) lucid, remark that it is almost impossible to 
really analyze a concept or judgement merely in terms of the tradition-
ally logical or "purely cognitive" as Kohlberg does, promotes growing 
concern to examine some of the psychological components that may 
be considered as a necessary precondition or pre-requisite for 
moral action. 
Otto and Man (1969) contend that .scientific over-emphasis 
on cognition and reason-giving often gives us a picture of the 
growing rationalist child in perfect shape to rationalize yet 
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with no necessary abundance of sensitivity or an emotional 
openness towards their own insides, The ability to become creat-
ive involves a deemphasizing of the cognitive and contolling 
aspects of the mind in order to stimulate preconscious and un-
conscious flux. 
On Love, moral reasoning and creativity. 
Growth toward new conceptualization or creative reorganization 
requires the release of the present conceptualization resulting in 
a fluid state (or relaxation of rigid cognitive structures) out of 
which arises, according to Gowan (1972), a new and higher organ-
ization. Prevailing theories of creativity summarized by Gowan 
(1972) and emphasized by the Neo-Freudians, cite the ability to 
dip into the preconscious as enhanced by love relationships and 
the expansion from narcisstic self-love through oedipal love of 
parents to generalized heterosexual love. A love ethic, love 
as a decision-procedure, or a system of morality based on un-
iversal principles of love rather than (or in addition to) justice 
would prove interesting to consider since Gowan (1972) has 
speculated upon an advanced stage of creativity, where agape 
love, in the manner of a Buddha or Messiah embraces all mankind. 
It may be that highly creative people operate from a teleological 
philosophical framework which often deemphasizes justice and 
accentuates happiness, human flourishing and social welfare. 
Kohlberg, true to his deontological roots, believes love to be 
a positive factor, but hardly an adequate procedure for moral 
decision-making. 
Puka (1975) argues that Kohlbergfs concept of justice is 
negatively oriented, which tells us in terms of duties and ob-
ligations what things we canft avoid doing in order to remain 
passably moral, ie., not immoral. Although Puka feels morality 
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viewed in terms of social interpersonal action must include more 
than mere justice or fairness, he cautions an emphasis on the 
15 
positive side of moralitys 
Can the positive side of morality, with its 
tendency to fanaticism, rigidity, puritanical purity, 
self-flagellation and crusading egomania be trusted so 
much more than the retributive punishment side? As 
tempting as it might seem, we should be cautious before 
buying even love as the answer (Puka, 1975i pp.61-62). 
Moral reasoning in adolescents 
Children and adolescents move through Kohlbergfs invariant 
and hierarchical moral stages with varying speed so that the 
relationship between chronological age and stage or moral judge-
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ment becomes less precise as one grows older? 
To give age approximations is no longer appropriate 
after the child has left stages one and two which are gen-
erally associated with childhood. The moral thinking of 
stages three to six can be found in adolescents as well as 
adults, and some adults never reach stage five or six. 
Stage five and six thinking is most commonly found in 
college-educated middle-class youth, and even they may 
regress to earlier stages of moral development after their 
college education has been completed. Only about 10fo of 
the adults reach stage six, and many adults continue to 
function on the "law and order" level of moral development, 
giving that issue potency in election campaigns. Stages 
five and six, based on principled morality, do have as a 
prerequisite the attainment of abstract formal operations 
in mental development. Consequently, one cannot simply 
associate any one stage of moral development with ad-
olescence. But since adolescent is a period of progression 
through several of these stages, all of Kohlberg1s stages 
are relevant to a discussion of theories of adolescence. 
Much of Kohlbergfs research deals with subjects in the age 
range of 10 to 16 and a follow-up in their twenties. Ad-
olescents may be found at any one of Kohlbergfs stages of 
moral development, though most have passed through stages 
1 and 2, excluding individuals whose concepts of justice 
develops late or who are deliquent in their moral orient-
ation. A few morally precocious adolescents may have al-
ready reached stage five, on in an exceptional case, stage 
six. However, adolescence is characterized by progression 
through at least some of these stages of moral thinking 
(Rolf E. Muss, 1976, pf 47). 
Early research on moral reasoning in adolescents and young 
adults (Kohlberg, 1958, 1969* 1970? Haan, Smith and Block, 1968; 
Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg and Blatt, 1972; Sullivan 
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and Quarter, 1972; Boyd, 1973i Fishkin et al.,1973) supported 
the notion that moral thinking of stages three to six could be 
found in adolescents as well as adults and that some adults 
never reached postconventional forms of moral reasoning. Ten-
tative conclusions at that time supported the notion that no 
one stage of moral development could be associated with adolescence 
or adulthood. Eriksonfs functional stages were often used to 
describe morality in relation to adulthood. There was an assump-
tion, however, that a few adolescents would, in fact, reach stage 
five or six in the Kohlbergian scale. Kohlbergfs (1973) revision 
of this notion concluded that (a) noneof his longitudinal sub-
jects attains stage five before the age of twenty-three and (b) 
new modes of moral thought exist which develop only in adulthood. 
Adolescent moral reasoning can now be viewed as characteristic 
of conventional thinking whereas postconventional thought is not 
reached until adulthood. Evidence of "structural" stage change 
in adulthood (refuting any "functional" explanation) has been 
emphasized in Kohlberg and Turielfs (1974) longitudinal work. 
Kohlberg has ascertained that, in order for young adults to move 
towards postconventional thinking, certain conditions must be 
met, namely (a) experiences of sustained responsibility for the 
welfare of others and (b) conditions where the basis of this 
responsibility can be both questioned or affirmed on a universal 
human basis. 
What is lacking, therefore, in adolescent morality is not 
the capacity for hypothetico-deductive .reasoning or imagination 
which as Piaget remarked is highly characteristic of adolescent 
thinking (piaget, 1964), nor the awareness of moral principles 
Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969)i but a commitment to a particular 
ideology or set of beliefs in the face of uncertain reality 
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situations. Life experiences become important for the develop-
ment of an adult ethic. Formal intellectual operations, exper-
ience of a variety of social-role taking experiences and the 
questioning of one's own identity in the world must Interact 
1 6 in order to reach principled moral thinking. 
In summary, personal experiences of choice involving 
questioning and commitment, in some sort of integration 
with stimulation to cognitive-moral reflection, seems 
required for movement from conventional to principled 
(Stage 5) thought. It is probably for this reason that 
principled thought is not attained in adolescence. The 
conditions for movement to fully principled or Stage 6 
thought are probably even more of this order, though we 
have no real data on movement to this highest moral 
stage. (Kohlberg, 1973i P-4l) 
A focus on Gowan8s developmental model of creativity 
A comprehensive interpretive view of cognitive-develop-
mental stage theory (structuralism) which combines the interaction 
of logical development (Piaget) with corresponding affective 
phases (Erikson) has been developed and applied to the creative 
process by John Curtis Gowan (1972). Gowanfs synoptical bring-
ing together of Eriksonian (ego stages) and Piagetian (logical 
stages) into a tripartite grouping with creativity allows for 
the possibility of charting moral maturity within his periodic 
table. Flavell has remarked that "Piagetfs analysis both comp-
liments and significantly adds to Erikson1s account" and "a 
sense of the whole child emerges more clearly in a stereoscopic 
integration of the two"(l963, p. 4l4). 
However, Gowan1s rather open-ended approach confronts the 
problem of speculation since there may be rarer or as yet unknown 
stages of cognitive development to go with the already formulated 
Eriksonian accounts. Also brought into consideration of cyclic 
or periodic succession of partial views, is how Gowan1s putative 
stages fit the existing literature of creativity. 
^3 
Rather than focus on the possible pitfalls entailing 
the rather eclectic approach developed by Gowan, It appears 
more worthwhile to concentrate on the comprehensive fusion of 
both psychometric and psychodynamic perspectives of the creative 
process into a transactive relationship between the cognitive 
and the affective aspects of the psyche in the creative growth 
of the individual. Both perspectives help the researcher ob-
serve the psychological process that become the precursors of 
creativity. Creativity becomes a direct outcome of self aware-
ness once a certain developmental stage has been reached. This 
development, according to Gowan (1972), involves "escalation", 
that is, the emergence of a higher and more complex form of 
organization and synthesis. The interactional balance between 
thinking and emotion or thought and feeling is stressed in 
Gowan1s model and results in positive mental health for the 
whole organism. However, a child may also become effectively 
blocked from advancing in Gowan*s developmental staircase, 
therefore becoming "emotionally arrested" or a "cognitive under-
achiever". In other words, interaction is reciprocals emotional 
difficulties may underlie school failures and a lack of cognitive 
competence could create a poor self Image and disrupt relations 
with others. In accordance with the research of Piaget, Erikson 
and Kohlberg, Gowan views development as a "quantum effect" with 
identifiable levels and states instead of a smooth curve of 
accretion. Moreover, "each stage contains characteristics approp-
riate for its full efflorescence and embraces the germinal mat-
erial for the development of the next stage. Thus, each stage 
is the necessary, but not sufficient precursor of the next (Gowan, 





















































































m Gowan1s Developmental Stages of Creativity 
(After Erikson and Piaget) 
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Gowan maintains that the environment Is the sufficient 
cause for creative advances its resources, the opportunities 
and dangers it offers determine if, when and to what extent 
the next stage will evolve. Although Gowan (1972), like Kubie 
(1958) explains the "source" of .creativity in terms of the 
preconscious, he is still able to present creativity as a 
qualitative change with each successive transformation in the child's 
cognitively structured representation of the social environment. 
Thus, it becomes possible to view creativity In cognitive-struct-
ural terms although Gowan feels that certain psychodynamic de-
scriptions may be appropriate explanations for different dimensions 
of the creative process. Gowan acknowledges that the development 
of creativity requires abilities identified by Piaget and Guilford 
(structure of the intellect model) as well as a high degree of 
mental health. A basic premise of Gowan's theory of creativity 
is its emphasis on the development of "valuing"% 1" 
A child needs to be valued and to have his ideas valued 
before he can value others or their ideas. Valuing is 
a stage in affective learning, previous stages of which 
are receiving the child and responding to the child. 
Children need to build their own value system, not take 
over ours. The values a creative child builds may be' 
divergent ones,- he. may not wish to emulate his teacher or 
parent, and this may annoy us. The wise parent concentrates 
on helping his child to some value system, not necessarily 
the parentfs (Gowan, 1972, p.76). 
According to Gowan, valuing is charged with affective 
elements rather than basically a way of thinking. However, 
his conception would be in accordance with Kohlberg8s in the 
sense that it steers away from the indoctrination characteristic 
of character education. 
Gowan1s conception of creativity centres around the idea 
that every inward preconscious state has an inherent tendency -
66 
form, but it lies supine until revitalized and expressed by the 
attention of the conscious mind. This "pressing outward" on the 
"latent plastic state" the cognitive properties of the conscious 
mind. About Gowan's stage three, children pass through the 
enactive, iconic stages and eventually arrive at symbolic 
representation similar to the experience described by Bruner (1966). 
According to Gowan, attainment of symbolic representation allows 
a child to make his experience intellectually negotiable* In 
other words, the child is able to describe and articulate his ex-
periences. There occurs a "consensual validation", a child may 
have the relief of discovering he is not alone in his experiences 
and is offered reassurance and a measure of ego-strength. 
Cognition, or conceptualization of the external world Is 
an important aspect of Gowan's model as are his oedipal explanations 
of the origin of creativity. The chief "cognitive method" in 
creative development is described as the "ability to form an 
intellectually negotiable concept, more or less isomorphic to 
external experience out of a series of encounters with that ex-
perience, each of which is consenually validated through contact 
with others. It involves skills of cognition, memory, convergent 
and divergent thinking production and evaluation"(Gowan, 1972, p.44). 
Following Kellys (1955) postulation that our perceptions of 
reality are constrained by the way in which we anticipate events, 
Gowan feels that "reality exists in the transactional relationships 
in our minds and conceptualization, therefore, is not an artifact 
of culture, but a necessary condition of consciousness. Gowan 
approves of Piagetfs "middle position" of interactionism which 
attempts a synthesis between the Nomalist argument that reality 
resides in our structuring of the world and the Realist position 
that there is an independent reality. There is a relationship 
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between the knower and the known, each affecting the other, 
so that it is not .just the way the environment is conceptualized 
by the child, it is also the developmental level which affects the 
reality he perceives and organizes. Thus, the child's cognitive 
development through concrete and formal operations to creative 
functioning involves proper organization of matter and material 
in the previous stages of growth. For instance, for a child 
to become creative in the symbolic or semantic contents area, he 
must master linguistics in order to give conceptual order to ex-
perience. 
Certain aspects of Gowan's research which Gowan uses as 
supplementary descriptions but has yet not clarified in terms of 
stage development have been given the term "escalation". Accord-
ing to his definition, Gowan views escalation as a raise in the 
level of action by discrete jumps which embraces five different 
yet interrelated aspects of developments succession, discontinuity, 
emergence, differentiation and integration. Gowan uses each of 
these characteristics to analyze concept formation in the develop-
ing child and the interrelations between cognitive and affective 
developmental systems In producing mental health and the possibility 
of creativity. 
Gowan's (1972) research owes much to Bower and Hollister's 
(1967) study of the transactive effect of cognitive and affective 
aspects of concept formation. The focus of their research was 
"ego strength" as the prime organizer of concept formation. Symbol-
ization, as one ego skill through which the child organizes, binds 
and utilizes knowledge as a tool to understand the world, must 
be precise enough to yield a firm construction, yet broad and 
loose enough to yield creative insights or transformations. 
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Bower (1968) has identified five ego processes as followss 
(a) differentiation—the separation of objects, symbols and feelings. 
(b) fidelity-distortion—tying symbols to objects, words and actions. 
(c) pacing versus overloading—regulating inputs and unloading actions. 
(d) expansion-constriction—seeking new metaphors, meanings and uses. 
(e) integration-fragmentation--assimilating and Interconnecting ideas. 
These ego processes enable the child to deal, in an efficient 
manner, wlwch experience. Fidelity is the representation of the 
experience in its reality and gives a truer picture inside the 
child's mind as to what is going on in the outside. Creativity 
rests on the high fidelity of replication of experience. When 
experience becomes stereotyped, little creativity can emerge, 
Anderson (1959) helped lay the foundation for another aspect 
of Gowan's developmental approach to creativity. He expanded 
and articulated the meanings of differentiation and integration 
in the developmental process as having five aspects: 
(1) confrontation of differences 
(2) integration 
(3) a yielding up or giving up the old for a new reorganization. 
(k) a process of differentiation 
(5) a positive directionality. 
Differences emphasizing uniqueness in individuals combine 
into new original patterns; originality is Intrinsic in creativity, 
so "creativity is an outcome of development"(Gowan, 1972, p. 5*0-
Creativity becomes an emergent and characteristic outcome 
of the theory of developmental stages when the requisite degree of 
mental health is present. Gowan maintains, along with Kubie (1958)9 
that creativity is a product of preconscious activity which is re-
vitalized and expressed by the attention of the conscious mind 
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which is then made visible through cognitive properties. Higher 
cognitive stages add new degrees of freedom to ego functioning. 
This newly acquired freedom, in turn, helps Integrate preconscious 
association more effectively and with less apprehension. It is 
important that the preconscious ward off the attacks by ego and 
superego prohibitions and still fulfill its capacity to select 
and rearrange the data of experience into creative and innovative 
forms. 
Gowan's model (1972) views creativity as occuring most strong-
ly in stages 3 and 6. This corresponds roughly to stages 2 and 6 
on Kohlberg's scale (see Table k). Gowan suggests creativity first 
develops in the initiative stage (3) from the control over the 
environment experienced through the affectional approach of the 
opposite-sexed parent (1965)* A similar feeling occurs in the 
intimacy stage (6) when adolescent creativity is normally enhanced 
through the inspiration of the opposite-sexed figure. In the 
latter instance, however, biological consumation can in some cases 
reduce the high energy potential aroused so that it is more often 
when this consummation is delayed, or prevented, at least, in part, 
that creativity flourishes. 
Gowan's model provides an excellent reference for framing 
the hypotheses of this study. A comparison to Kohlberg*s moral 
model provides an initially remarkable stage correspondence that 
appears to indicate coeval stories, theoretically, at least. 
Insofar as a measure of Interpretive data is useful, it appears 
that a broad theoretical base for comparison can be established 
within a matrix that offers a comprehensive view of a possible 
coextensive relationship between creative functioning and moral 
maturity. 
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Gowan's placement of the Freudian (sexual libido), Eriksonian 
(ego strength) and Piagetian (cognitive development) theories 
into a developmental perspective helps to conceptualize the 
inclusiveness of developmental stage theory in a significant 
manner than has been heretofore realized. In order to fuse a 
moral construct into Gowan's tripartite synoptical grouping, it 
is necessary to examine Kohlberg1s moral model with references to 
Piaget and Erikson, respectively. 
TABLE 3* 
Relations Between Piaget Logical Stages and Kohlberg Moral Stages 
(all relations are that attainment of the logical stages Is nec-
essary
 9 but not sufficient, for attainment of the moral stage) ^ ° 
Logical Stage 
Symbolic, intuitive thought 
Concrete operations, Substage 1-
Categorical classification 
Concrete operations, Substage 2 
Reversible concrete thought 
Formal /perations, Substage 1 
Relations involving the inverse 
of the reciprocal. 
Formal operations, Substage 2 
Formal operations, Substage 3 
Moral Stage 
Stage 0, The good is what I 
want and like. 
Stage 1, Punishment-obedience 
orientation. 
Stage 2, Instrumental hedon-
ism and concrete reciprocity. 
Stage 3f orientation to inter-
personal relations of mutuality, 
Stage k9 Maintenance of social 
order, fixed rules and author-
ity. 
Stage 5A, Social contract, 
utilitarian law-making per-
spective, 
Stage 5B8 Higher law and con-
science orientation. 
Stage 6, Universal ethical 
principle orientation. 
Sources Kohlberg, 1971 $ p.1071. 
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Kohlberg contends that the movement from conventional to 
principled morality is one which must be considered as a matter 
of personal choice and as a choice of a self which is different 
from earlier stages of moral development. Accordingly, Kohlberg 
hypothesizes that an Eriksonian "identity-crisis" and its resolution 
might be a necessary part of this movement. Although Kohlberg 
maintains that Eriksonian stage progression plays a part in 
moral progression, he feels that ego progression would be far from 
sufficient to produce principled morality. Kohlberg (1973) implies 
that ego progression could occur without the moral progression, 
and both the ego progression and moral progression could be absent 








A -loose fit between ego 
Ego "Stages" stages 
Ascribed identities accepted 
Identity crisis or moratorium 
Identity achievement 
Sources Kohlberg and Turiel, 1973, P- ^ 7* 
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TABLE 5 
An Approximation of Kohlberg*s Moral Stages in Relationship to 
Eriksonian Ego Progression, Piagetian Logical Progression and 
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Piaget logical stages, Kohlberg moral stages and Creativity 
Piaget1s stages of cognitive development and Kohlberg1s stages 
21 
of moral development bear a point-to-point relationships 
The equilibrium of affective and interpersonal schema, 
justice or fairness, involves many of the basic struct-
ural features as the equilibrium of cognitive schema 
logicality (Kohlberg, 1971 $ p.1070-71). 
The operational child who is concerned with categorical class-
ifications is related to the punishment-obedience orientation of 
stage one moral thinking, Kohlberg1s stage two of an instrument-
al relativistic moral orientation bears a direct relationship to 
Piagetfs operational logical stage. The basic Piagetian shift 
from concrete to formal or abstract thought processes has its 
analogue in the Kohlbergian transition from preconventional to 
conventional morality constituting the basic difference between 
child and adolescent moral structure. Piagetfs inverse of re-
versibility stage (early formal operations) corresponds to Kohlberg0s 
interpersonal concordance orientation (Stage 3)« Piaget1s rather 
advanced substage of formal abstract operations is related to 
Kohlberg8s stage four orientation towards authoritys law and order 
and paves the way for stages five and six. Although it is true 
that the attainment of "logical thought is a necessary precondition 
for the corresponding level of moral thought, Piagetfs logical 
stages are not sufficient conditions for the attainment of moral 
progression. 
Freudfs affective devlopmental stages fit into the chronological 
ages of Piagetfs five cognitive stages, and since Erikson has built 
four more stages out of the last Freudian (genital) stage, it is 
interesting to see how Gowan (Table 2) accounts for the emergence 
of creativity a^ greater at the points of convergence of these 
three developmental stages. Gowan views stages 3 and 6 (initiative 
and intimacy) as dealing with the love relationship and its ex-
7k 
pansion from narcissistic self-love through oedipal love of parents 
to generalized heterosexual love, to fixation on some individual 
person. The corresponding Piagetian stages are the "intuitive" 
and "formal operationsV Rather than stressing a cognitive-in-
tellectual relation between Piagetfs stages and creative producion 
or occurance, Gowan (1972) emphasizes the importance of Piagetfs 
logical stages in the concept of free play. Piaget (1951? pl^7) 
states that "the underlying structure of play is constituted by 
a certain reorientation of the ego to reality." Gowan feels, 
accordingly, that each Piagetian stage also emphasizes an avenue 
to the preconscious. 
Kubie (1965i P- 565%£) has explored the playful and preconscious 
aspects of creative behaviour, Kubie (1958t P-39) tells us that 
the free play of preconscious process simultaneously accomplishes 
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two goals % 
1. It supplies an endless stream of old data rearranged 
into new combinations of wholes and fragments on 
grounds of analogic elements. 
2. It exercises a continuous selective influence not only 
on free associations, but also on the minutiae of living 
thinking, walking, talking, dreaming, and indeed every 
moment of waking life. 
Sadler (1969) emphasizes the relationship of playful perception 
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to focal attention in the development of creativity* 
It Is also a perceptual mode that pertains to play. 
The creative edge of perception whereby we remain open and 
sensitive to new meanings and increasing awareness of life 
possibilities originates in and is sustained through play... 
Play reveals itself as a basic existential form to keep 
oness world open, not defensively, but creatively. 
Lieberman (1967)* Wallach and Kogan (1965) and Jackson and 
Messlck (196*0 have all connected playfulness in their research 
with a sense of humour, a personality correlate often noted in 
creative persons. 
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According to Gowan (1972), the process of regression to the 
preconscious through free play and daydreaming fantasy gets its 
start during the third (initiative stage) when the child with an 
oedipal or electral attachment to the parent of the opposite sex 
develops the ability to dip into the preconscious. The preconscious 
becomes, the, the "source" of creativity. 
Gowan also emphasizes the importance of creative development 
as cognitive-developmental (assimilation-accomodation), formulated 
by Piaget (1932) and conceived as the constant Interaction between 
environmental stimulation and concept formation. Developmental 
process with moderate environmental stimulation and some openness 
In life style carry the child naturally toward creative expression. 
According to Gowan, environmental stimulation gives the individual 
2k the "something" which with to escalates 
Societies concerned with cognitive competence 
may need to reconsider the degree of environmental 
stimulation and early success experiences provided 
by their national institutions in the light of what 
Piaget said about the development of concept form-
ation. Will the boy, for example who is facile with 
concrete operations at eight (and hence judged to be 
intelligent), develop into the young man who is 
equally facile with formal operations or creativity 
at twenty? What kinds of educational stimulation are 
most likely to ensure this escalation? 
It is all very well to talk about the childfs 
cognitive development through concrete and formal 
operations to creative functioning, but the child 
must have something to escalate To operate, much 
less be creative, in the symbolic or semantic con-
tents area, the child must master linguistics. In 
creating, the child gives conceptual order to his 
experience. Hence the proper organization of matter 
and material in the prior concrete operations stage 
is a necessary precursor of verbal creativity (Gowan, 
1972, pp. 1*6-1*7)' 
Gowan sees the individual's cognitive escalation fused to 
the modes of grammar. Apparently, around adolescence, the child 
escapes the tyranny of the fact by discovering the "subjective 
mode" and the power of hypothesis making through "if-then" 
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relationships during the formal operations of the fifth develop-
mental stage. Gowan sees Piagetss concrete-operational child 
tied to the tyranny of the interrogative mode—the reality of 
what actually is. The formal operational child escapes into the 
freedom of contingency! he discovers the subjunctive and is thus 
free to become creative in "if-then" hypotheses making. 
Since formal operations are a necessary but not sufficient a 
prerequisite for principled thought in Kohlberg1s scheme, it would 
be logical and reasonable to assume that most Stage 5 and 6 moral 
thinkers are higher in the concept-formation type of creativity 
(subjunctive mode) which Gowan has described. However, the shift 
and reorganization of concepts required as the child goes from 
one cognitive level to another may demand a great deal of energy 
or impose a strain which temporarily diminishes creative perform-
ance. This may account for the observation made by Torrance (1962, 
196k) that there are drops at fourth and seventh grade in creativity 
test scores since these grades mark the beginning of new develop-
mental stages. The "if-then" subjunctive contingency of the formal 
operational child adds new degrees of freedom to ego functioning, 
and creates the possibility of higher and more complex creative 
thought. 
Morality, Identity Status and Creativity Some Conceptual Overlaps 
Although the concept of identity is not used as an empirical 
construct in this present study, it is worthwhile to consider 
the relationship between morality, identity and creativity constructs 
especially since identity in the form of Eriksonian stage theory 
appears as an integral theoretical construct in Gowan1s (1972) 
developmental model of creativity. Accordingly, a detailed ex-
amination of the relationship between morality and identity is 
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further justified since Gowan1s model offers an operational de-
scription of the overall developmental process necessary to creative 
functioning. 
Erikson (1956) maintains that, over the course of a lifetime, 
an individual experiences a series of psychological crisis each 
of which reflects the self in interaction with society. Erikson 
postulates eight developmental stages and notes that each stage 
is characteristic of a conflict that has two opposing possible 
outcomes. By working these conflicts out is a productive manner, 
a positive and constructive characteristic is built into the ego 
and a basis for further healthy development is made possible or 
enhanced. Negative aspects incorporated into the personality due 
to unresolved ego conflicts beomes a real possibility. The period 
of adolescence and young adulthood is characteristic of the period 
when the identity crisis is most pronounced, even though Erikson 
stresses that identity is facilitated by the satisfactory res-
olution of all previous stage crisis, According to Erikson (196^, 
1968), there are specific cognitive and affective characteristics 
of adolescents which are not found during earlier or later stages 
of ego developments 
In their search for a new sense of continuity and sameness 
which must now include sexual maturity, some adolescents 
have to come to grips again with the crisis of earlier 
years before they can install lasting idols and ideas as 
guardians of a final identity (Erikson, 1968, p.128). 
Adolescence becomes the phase during which the self must 
construe a sense of personal identity and avoid the dangers of 
role diffusion (identity confusion). An "adolescent ideology" 
26 begins to develop 1 
Thus youth becomes ready—if often only after a severe 
bout with moralistic regression—to envisage the more un-
iversal principles of a highest human good. The adolescent 
learns to grasp the flux of time, to anticipate the future 
in a coherent way, to perceive ideas and assent to ideals, 
to take—in short—an ideological position for which the 
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younger child is cognitively not prepared. In adolescence, 
then, an ethical view is approximated but it remains sus-
ceptible to an alternation of impulsive judgement and odd 
rationalization (Erikson, 196^, p.225). 
When an adolescent has accepted a particular ideology and 
brings it Into question through his life experiences, an adult 
ethic is shaped which is understood and consistent with behaviour. 
Therefore, neither the awareness of moral principles (Kohlberg and 
Kramer, 1969)t nor the capacity for hypothetic-deductive reasoning 
(Piaget, 196k) is lacking in adolescent ideology. It is the 
actual commitment to a particular ideology in .the face of unique 
and possible conflicting reality situations. This "psychosocial 
moratorium" during which alternative occupations and ideologies 
are to be considered implies that the individual must, in a sense, 
become responsible to himself, that is, assess what his liabilities 
and assets are and how he wants to make use of them. Erikson 
stresses that "functional" crises such as parenthood, unemploy-
ment, etc. do provide significant changes in onefs role in life, 
and he also maintains that supposed "structural" resolution of 
the adolescent or young adult Identity crises is a strong indicator 
of successful adulthood. Erikson (1968) further argues that the 
achievement of identity should involve the consideration of al-
ternatives with an ultimate commitment to an ideology and occup-
ation. 
Roperfs (1973) study on guilt and moral maturity which found 
severe guilt associated with Kohlberg1s Stage 3 subjects suggested 
that corresponding identity (Eriksonian) stages found these 
adolescents prone to bouts of self-doubt and shame, morbid and 
"often curiously preoccupied with what they appear in the eyes 
of others" (Erikson, 1968, p.128). Stage k subjects experienced 
slightly less guilt which was more likely to be experienced with 
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with reference to the violation of a rule—legal, moral or relig-
ious—and which may signal the development of an "adolescent 
ideology." 
Kohlberg notes that "while Eriksonfs stages cannot be defined, 
measured, or logically handled in the same sense as cognitive-
developmental stages, suggestive empirical relations between ego 
identity terms and moral stages are found"'(Kohlberg, 1973$ p.1077). 
Furthermore, both Kohlberg and Turiel (1973) stress that an adoles-
cent is capable of awareness of universal ethical principles but 
only the adult or young adult can consistenly be ethical* 
A study by Podd (1972) which related Kohlbergfs stages of 
moral development to Erikson1s stages of ego-identity revealed 
that "foreclosure subjects", or subjects that experienced no crisis 
but are commited to goals, showed a strong tendency to use a 
conventional mode of moral thinking. For the most part, Kohlberg1s 
Stage 3 corresponds to the Eriksonian stage where "ascribed 
identities are accepted" (Table 3) and where Roper (1973) has 
discovered the severest guilt along the moral maturity continuum. 
This location of moral and ego correspondence relates most sig-
nificantly to Gowanfs (1972) stage 5 along the creativity continuum 
in which individuals are busy "examining their own navels" with 
an overemphasis on introspection and moodiness which results from 
the discrepancy between what the ego wants itself to be and what 
it finds it can be and do. Although this may not be a time for 
psychosocial moratorium, some kind of ethical perspective may be 
taking place. Creativity, at this stage, however9 is far too ego-
bound to flourish. This would seem to support the hypothesis that 
creativity is less evident at the Stage 3 point of the moral maturity 
continuum. Such Individuals have not yet experienced an identity 
crisis and a resolution where affectional impulses are at their 
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height and one gives the identity that one has discovered to an-
other, as in Gowangs stage 6. 
Theoretical Considerations in Approaches to Creativity and Morality 
The theory of developmental stages has provided the organizing 
perspective for developing the hypotheses in this study and in-
terpreting the empirical research findings. Accordingly, an overall 
developmental focus will tend to bring into a synthesis, any dis-
parate aspects seemingly endemic to an interpenetration of moral 
maturity and creative functioning since "the transformation and 
focusing of energy...is the essence of both the developmental 
and creative process" (Gowan, 1976s p.26). Some reference, however 
slight, has to be made by drawing attention to the bifurcations 
and dichotomies inherent in the methodology of structuralism itself, 
but only Insofar as they relate to further developing a more in-
teractive approach to morality and creativity than is offered by 
Kohlberg and psychometric theoreticians such as Guilford. To try 
and Infer theoretical correlations between moral reasoning and 
creativity, a framework for comparison must grasp the fact that 
intellectual and emotional development are interdependent and basic 
to both our understanding of the process of moral reasoning and 
creativityr Up to the present, major theories of creativity have 
emphasized either the cognitive at the expense of the affective, 
or vice versa-^  Therefore, a more comprehensive theory which 
integrates both intellectual and emotional development is needed. 
Attention should be drawn to the work of those who have proposed 
approaches to morality which differ from Kohlberg4s in order to 
draw a balanced viewpoint such as work by Raths, Harmin and Simon, 
1966| Oliver and Shaver,1966; Newman and Oliver,1970; Hunt and 
Metcalf, 19681 Fraenkel,1973i Scriven, 1966, 19719 1975? Shaver, 
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1976)* Similarly, in the area of creativity research, a balanced 
viewpoint could be achieved by an examination of the works of 
cognitive approaches such as Hallman (1963) and mental health 
approaches by Maslow (195*0 and Rogers (1959)• Fortunately, 
Gowan1s (1972) model of creativity deals with all types of 
approaches. However, it proves difficult to test empirically 
without emphasizing more than a single viewpoint. On the other 
hand, Kohlberg1s theoretical approach may ignore important affective 
concerns but his instrument for the assessment of moral judgement 
is, in the opinion of many researchers, the "most sophisticated 
and reliable instrument that psychological assessment devices have 
to offer...the instrument can be reliably scored and its validity 
is argued within the perspective of cognitive developmental theory 
88.although its major focus is on moral reasoning, this limitation 
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may be an advantage" (Sullivan, 1975t P-95)« 
In focusing upon creative thinking and its relationship to 
moral reasoning, one Is left with rather fragmented or multi-
faceted perspectives on a possible connection. Consequently, 
we are left with a "mixed bag" of theoretical overlaps, some 
developmental, some contemporaneous. While there do seem to be 
some conceptual overlaps between creativity and morality which 
reflect the plausibility of logical integration, empirical over-
laps are Impeded by the lack of previous research to date. Further 
problems in conducting this type of research are discussed in 
CHAPTER V. 
Creativity, Morality and Ego Strength 
According to Kohlberg, the development of moral character 
is related to an individuals "ego strength" which includes the 
development of basically "cognitive" abilities such as the in-
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telligent prediction of consequences, the tendency to choose a 
greater long-term reward over a lesser but more Immediate short-
term reward, the ability to keep oness attention focused on a 
given topic or item for a fairly extended period of time. Kohlberg 
maintains that the encouragement of these attentional ego cap-
acities is not a task of moral education as such but of general 
programming of classroom learning activities (1966). 
Fraenkel (1973) has elaborated on what he regards as strategies 
to develop a studentfs ego strengths comparing and contrasting, 
generalizing, predicting and explaining, offering alternatives, 
describing, synthesizing, making judgements according to previously 
established criteria, and divergent thinking based on techniques 
developed by Guilford (196^), Torrance and Myers (1970) and 
J.W. Getzels (196^).There appears to be a close connection between 
what Kohlberg refers to as describing "ego strength" and the 
cognitive, rational and semantic approaches in developing creativity 
which Fraenkel (1973) uses to develop this ego strength. 
According to Gowan (1972), the vital role of his stage 3 
(initiative) in the development of creative performance involves 
ego abilities which become stronger and more integrated through to 
stage 8 (ego-integrity) which involves improved "self-concept" 
grasped through the mastery of cognitive abilities. 
It appears that many of the "ego capacities" involved in the 
Kohlbergian concept of "ego strength" refer to components which 
may be described as partaking of the psychometric definition of 
creativity, It would appear reasonable to assume that although 
advanced ego capacities are necessary but not sufficient factors 
in principled thinking, conventional moral reasoners probably 
have not developed ego strength to the degree of autonomous moral 
thinkers (Kohlberg's Stages 5 and 6), 
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Socialization and Cognitive Style 
When examining social relationships and the process of moral 
reasoning and creative functioning, we should keep aware of the 
fact that our Western culture possesses a pervasive "cognitive 
style" and can be observed in the values of a culture which are, 
in essence, the structuring principles of the social process. 
Such a regulating effect imposed by a cognitive societal orientation 
imposes an often Invisible set of constraints which limit our 
potential experience and compel our behaviour. Societal situation-
al structures resulting from such a cognitive social process 
were thought by Kant to give causal connection to accidental sub-
jective perceptions. Frames of references such as intuition, time 
and space were felt to be "sociological aprio ris" or necessary 
forms of the social synthesis. However, today we realize that 
the cognitive perspectives in the context of which persons develop 
their views of social realities vary widely and cannot be simp-
lified into covenient Kantian formalist categories, 
Hegel expresses moral unity as a "reflexive social relationship" 
in which the first person gains knowledge of himself through the 
eyes of another, Kohlberg refers to this process as "role-taking". 
Identity becomes the growing realization that the identity of 
the self and learning diverse roles are two aspects of the same 
process. Selman (1976) feels that the link between intellectual 
development and moral development may be found in the ability of 
a person to take an increasingly differentiated view of the inter-
action between oneself and others- The development of the ability 
to see oneself from the viepoint of others becomes increasingly 
important. Kohlberg (1971) sees role-taking as an essential factor 
in the development of moral reasoning and a necessary pre-condition 
for moral development. Moral conflict or "cognitive dissonance" 
8k • 
occurs as a result of onefs own point of view being confronted 
by a different perspective. If people could not assume the role 
of others they would see no conflict. Social relationships and 
interaction forms the basis of each person1 s primary role-rtaking 
opportunities (Kohlberg, 1969). Selman (1976) refers to social 
role-taking as the structural aspect of empathy. He has developed 
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four levels of social role-taking ability in TABLE 6. 
TABLE 6* 
Social Role-Taking Stages 
Stage 0 -— Egocentric Viewpoint 
(Age Range 3-6) 
Child has a sense of differentiation of self and others but 
fails to distinguish between the social perspective (thoughts, 
feelings) of other and self. Child can label otherss overt 
feelings but does not see the cause and effect relation of 
reasons to social actions. 
Stage 1 Social-Informational Role-Taking 
( Age Range 6-8) 
Child is conscious that each individual is aware of the otherfs 
perspective and that this awareness influences self and other*s 
view of each other. Putting self in other's place is a way of 
judging his intentions, purposes and actions. Child can form 
a coordinated chain of perspectives, but cannot yet abstract 
from this process to the level of simultaneous mutuality. 
Stage 3 Mutual Role-Taking 
( Age Range 10-12 ) 
Child realizes that both self and other can view each other 
mutually and simultaneously as subjects. Child can step out-
side the two-person dyad and view the interaction from a third-
person perspective. 
Stage k Social and Conventional System 
Role-Taking 
( Age Range 12-15) 
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Person realizes mutual perspective taking does not always 
lead to complete understanding. Social conventions are 
seen as necessary because they are understood by all mem-
bers of the group (the generalized other) regardless of 
their position, role, or experience. 
Sources Selman, 1976, p.309* 
As Paolitto and Hersh (1976) point out, the teacher in 
a moral education class is the primary role-taker in the group 
whose duty becomes the nurturing of an increasingly more differ-
entiated and integrated social role-taking perspectives in his/ 
her students. Higher stages of role-taking than those presented 
in TABLE 6 have been defined by Byrne (1973). 
Research conducted by MacKinnon (1972) reveals that many 
creative persons are independent, and such "Independence" appears 
to have been fostered by parents who, very early, showed an extra-
ordinary respect for the child and confidence in his ability 
to do what was appropriate. The family provided a plentiful 
supply of diverse and effective role-taking models with whom 
the child could make important Identifications. The family seems 
to have a similar effect on moral growth in that its positive 
effects upon development are primarily due to the provision of 
role-taking opportunities provided by the peer group, school 
and society. It seems reasonable to assume a connection between 
the home as fostering individuality and autonomy as well as providing 
role-taking opportunities condusive to creative functioning and 
moral reasoning. 
Creativity, Morality and .the.Imaginative Dimension 
It is difficult to offer grounded speculation upon exact 
relationships between the creative process and moral reasoning. 
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If we limit our view of creative thinking to "divergent thinking" 
it becomes easier to suppose certain relationships do, in fact, 
exist. A psychometric perspective allows a more convenient 
comparison of divergent thinking and moral reasoning since 
we are not concerned with the source of the processes involved 
nor the psychodynamic ramifications. The psychodynamic terminology 
of the unconscious could, quite adequately, elaborate on the sub-
tleties and nuances excluded by cognitive or rational descriptions. 
For the purpose of empirical research the best criterion available 
to the researcher in the spheres of creativity and moral maturity 
is the .-cognitive domain. However, if we speak of the psychology 
of human development as the study of "parallel behavioural areas 
of structural development" then it becomes most evident that 
there are many different cognitive domains which must be taken 
into preliminary consideration such as logico-mathematical 
reasoning, social perspective taking, moral judgement and socio-
moral conduct (Gibbs, Kohlberg, Colby and Speicher-Dubin, 1975)-
Divergent thinking could be one component, which, to some extent, 
may influence other components such as social stage, moral stage, 
moral action or ego strength. All the various cognitive domains 
most likely influence each other, and this interpenetration plays 
an important part in the creative process. Accordingly, it becomes 
difficult to discover specific or definitive correlations between 
divergent thinking and prescriptive moral judgements made by in-
dividuals or groups of individuals. Yet, it is possible and worth-
while to speculate upon broad or more general correlations. 
The emergence of each Kohlbergian moral stage has been seen 
to correspond to a Piagetian logical stage, an Eriksonian ego 
state and structured further by simultaneous social perspective-
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taking or the appreciation of different social orientations. 
Each successive moral stage follows a pattern of principles in 
which the child makes logical sense out of ordered subsets of 
relationships and their ordering principles. It also appears 
that hypothetical states of possible alternative systems of social 
order may become an "entry point" for principled moral thinking 
which seems to require more than just simple cognitive thought 
process. In other words, it is possible for individuals to imagine 
different social orders as alternatives to the existing social 
order during the nurturing of principled thinking. The imagination, 
may, in fact, prove instrumental In resolving cognitive dissonance. 
Cognitive conflict in principled thought may partake, therefore, 
of a more aesthetic or imaginative dimension. The more creatively 
and Imaginatively hypothetical situations or universals are per-
ceived or apprehended, the possibility of a stronger moral commitment 
may result. (Note the speech by Martin Luther King in CHAPTER 1). 
There is a good reason to assume that divergent or creative think-
ing processes aid in the structuring of various social perspective 
taking or achieving an appreciation for various social orientations 
by forming alternative concepts to the existing social order? 
Creativity, Morality and Personality Traits 
Kohlberg has maintained that cognitive stages represent 
"ways of moral thinking" according to his moral model, and not 
kinds of personality (Kohlberg et al, 1975i p.^1). Yet person-
ality traits have been assigned by researchers to post-conventional 
moral thinkers describing their radical political attitudes, strong 
Intellectual and aesthetic interests, high tolerance for ambiguity 
and need for independence. They also have been described as having 
a low practical orientation (Sullivan and Quarter, 1972). Although 
there does not appear to be definitive correlations between person-
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ality characteristics and moral ideology, certain "creative types" 
of individuals may be identified and assigned to either characteristics 
of conventional or post-conventional moral thinkers. In this way 
it is possible to speculate upon the assumption that creative 
thinking plays a role in the specification of stages as they emerge 
in ontogenesis. It is possible that creative thinking is one 
mechanism influencing moral stage transition. Using the Piagetian 
"equilibration" model, cognitive conflict is said to be an essential 
mechanism of stage transition (Turiel, 1969). Sullivan (1972) has 
ventured the notion that conflict, cognitive or otherwise, is 
generated by the personality makeup that a person has at his pre-
sent stage or some carryover factors from earlier stages. Person-
ality characteristics described as "creative" should be influential 
or significant in determining, for instance, whether Stage k moral 
subjects are likely to accomodate alternative reality situations 
Into their existing moral perspective and advance to Stage 5 o^r 
whether they would tend to rule out certain imaginative alternatives 
and become arrested at that particular Stage, A highly creative 
individual with a strong ego and independent personality is far 
more likely to experience cognitive conflict than a dependent 
personality who is very conformist to societal norms and expectations. 
Sullivan (1972) also asserts that personality characteristics 
should also influence the postconventional "path" that someone 
with conventional orientation takes. It would appear more likely 
for a creative individual to become, say, a principled absolutist 
or an instrumental relativist than move on to a straight contractual 
stage. 
Creative personalities and their motivational aspects have 
been seen as emanating from deep-seated unconscious conflicts 
of significance in the life of the individual. It has been pointed 
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that the early learning of the creative individual has eventuated 
in a self-image as a lonely searcher and crusader for fullfillment 
against conformist obstacles. The risk the creative person runs 
is valuable because it confirms or negates his expectations of 
himself and others. He has a broader basis for thrusting himself 
into conflict with social forces; the creative individual can therby 
reap the benefit that emerges from the antagonism. He not only 
expects the conflict but looks forward to It as a kind of fulfill-
ment (Maddi, 1972). It would seem, then, that a creative individual 
would be best apt to handle the cognitive dissonance arising out 
of conflicting moral ideologies as well as various political and 
social perspectives. Creative persons also attempt to avoid 
alienation by creating a locus of meaning for one's life outside 
the traditional, familial or religious values that indicate con-
ventionality or a limited engagement in self-reflective thought, 
Creative personalities construct a personal framework of meaning 
rather than imposed externally. Such Individuals have developed 
their human facilities of self-reflective thought to such a high 
degree that the alienation which results becomes assuaged through 
producing their own unique and individualistic meaning(Maddi, 1975)-
It appears likely that creative individuals correspond, by 
reason of personality variables, more closely to principled moral 
thinkers than to conventional moral thinkers. 
The Concept of Justice Creative and Moral Perspectives 
Unfortunately there has been next to no research on social 
creativity and its most important Impulse our Innate, deeply 
ingrained feeling of justice. The tendency of most psychoanalytic 
writing to date, even in regards to creativity, is to consider 
the notion of justice merely as a projection of the superego, 
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Such a view, however, discounts the importance of a balanced sense 
of justice. A most informative examination of justice through the 
medium of a psychoanalytic theory of creativity is presented by 
Anton Ehrenzweig (1967)* He considers the body social or the 
womb of society in terms of the basic metabolism of "expulsion" 
and "containment" and examines social justice in terms of their 
balanced Interaction. Containment in this sense is linked to life 
(Eros) which involves redifferentiation while death (Thanatos) 
is linked to de-differentiation (excretion, expulsion). According 
to Ehrenzweig, it is useful to measure the health of a society 
and its social cohesion by the strength of its resistance against 
fragmentation and expulsion of deviant and marginal members. Min-
orities, criminals, lunatics, old and dead people tend to be mar-
ginal and alien elements capable of provoking expelling and frag-
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mentation tendencies in any given society* 
Rich internal differentiation and a variety of classes 
and 'institutions1 (Malinowski) in a society indicate 
great strength of social cohesion while envious egallt-
arianism point to weak social health. The less the power 
of containment in a society, the more easily will a deviant 
member be treated as an falien1 element that ought to be 
expelled. The excessive need for sameness and equality 
in modern society has led to the now all too frequent 
displaced person, a "sinister symptom of social illness. 
The criminal, by deliberately putting himself outside 
society, invites the role of the scapegoat, to be 
duly expelled, a willing target for fragmentation tend-
encies active within a society (A, Ehrenzweig, 1967i p.236), 
Since at no other time does the human body come nearer to 
being an excrement than after death, the social cohesion of a society 
could be well measured according to the treatment it metes out 
to its dead. Hence, the improper treatment of the dead and fug-
itives is apt to arouse our sense of justice. Our "innate" sense 
of justice, according to psychoanalytic theory, cannot simply be 
explained as a projection of our superego. The ego's sense of 
justice serves to modify the primitive superego's extreme, near 
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psychotic aggressions. Justice is achieved by the assistance of 
the ego in its struggle to sustain itself against an over-aggressive 
oral and anal superego. Therefore, the superego alone, is not pro-
jected but interacts with the ego. And, as Ehrenzweig points out, 
the ego must be able to modify and assuage the severity of the 
primitive ego through its growing creativity. The ego, as it dev-
elops its creative production is able to sustain a proper balance 
between superego and ego which is monitored by the ever-swaying 
battle between the forces of Thanatos and Eros. Psychoanalytic 
theory has often referred to society as a "womb" into which in-
dividuals project parts of their selves in order to sacrifice 
their individual existences in the supra-individual process char-
acteristic of creativity and social creativity in particular. 
Society makes good this loss by receiving and containing safely, 
the surrendered parts of the individual. Creativity, in psycho-
analytic literature, acts as a mediator between the ego and superego. 
Kohlberg's principle of justice as fairness provides a philosoph-
ical matrix Into which his cognitive-developmental formulations 
of moral thinking develop. Kohlberg's concept of justice differs 
in perspective and focus from traditional Freudian or psychoanalytical 
approaches such as the description offered by Ehrenzweig. Kohlberg's 
moral judgement stages entail a process of role-taking, or taking 
the point of view of others conceived as subjects and co-ordinating 
these points of view and a distinctive and central principle of 
justice as fairness which operates in moral situations in which 
disequilibrium brings about a condition of unresolved conflicting 
claims. A resolution of the situation is one in which each claim 
is given its due according to some principle of justice that can 
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be recognized as fair by all the conflicting parties involved. 
Kohlberg1s "equilibrium" assumptions have been linked to the phil-
osophic tradition from Kant to Rawls (Sullivan, 1976). 
Criticisms have been directed at Kohlberg's "formalist" position 
of liberal ideology which view Kohlberg as treating the individual 
subject as an Isolated, independent entity in the data of social 
analysis and social policy (Duncan, 1973)- Although there seems 
to be some potential merit in exploring an analysis of Kohlbergfs 
alleged "bourgeois" and abstract hypothetical contract theory from 
a radical historical perspective, it is not the intention of this 
present study to undermine Kohlberg's rather "ideal" social arrange-
ments, but merely to emphasize the distinction between Kohlberg's 
structuralist position and those of the Freudian school. Kohlberg1s 
psychologism is scientific in essence and identified with Kantian 
formalism whereas psychodynamic tradition aligns justice to expulsion 
and projection heavily invested with anal aggression. 
Both Kohlberg1s theory and the formulations of Ehrensweig 
emphasize the social basis of justice. It is, according to Ehren-
zeig, this social basis from which we must never separate the creative 
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process* 
The child's creativity accompanies and sustains his developing 
human relationships. In order to enrich ourselves as in-
dividuals we have to re-shape and change our human relation-
ships without respute by projection and introjection. A 
frequent failure in human relationships is due to the same 
ego rigidity that impedes creativity. We have to give our 
substance freely, project it into other people or creative 
work for further transformation. As in creative work we 
must be humble and grateful to receive back for more than 
we ourselves have put in. Our personalities will grow through 
this creative interchange, which underlies the metabolism 
of our social life. This may be the moral of Ibsen's Faust-
ian play Peer Gynt and his hero's quest for self-realization. 
Peer went round the world in order to find himself. His 
search ended in the lap of his mother-wife who had wanted to 
receive and contain him all her life. Creativity, then, 
may be self-creation, but impossible only through social 
intercourse9 whether with other individuals as happens in 
social creativity in the narrower sense of the word, or 
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through the medium of impersonal creative work. The 
social aspect of creativity cannot he over-emphasized 
(A. Ehrenzweig, 1967, p.235). 
9k 
Development of Hypotheses 
Kohlberg (1973) has agreed that moral development and cognitive 
development are part of a broader unity, that of ego development, 
Erikson1s concept of ego development as a universal sequential 
phenomenon! serves as useful guide in viewing creativity in con-
junction with Piagetfs corresponding logical stages (Gowan1s 
model). Definite stages of ego development defined by Loevinger 
et al (I970)i van der Daele (1970) and others, imply step-by-step 
parallels to Piagetfs cognitive stages, although they include more 
references to social-emotional content. Both Piagetian cognitive 
stages and Eriksonian ego stages are necessary but not sufficient 
condtions for moral progression. All individuals at a given 
ego stage must have attained the parallel cognitive stage, but not 
all children at a particular cognitive stage have organized their 
self-concept and corresponding social experience at the parallel 
ego stage (Kohlberg, 1972). Kohlberg maintains that "premature 
development to a higher ego stage without a corresponding decalage 
throughout the childfs world and life presents problems"(Kohlberg, 
1972, p.493). 
Conversely, ego stages remain arrested in individuals who 
never go through an identity questioning (Kohlberg, 1972). In 
all likelihood, this "arrestment" is due to social forces and 
peer pressure affective the individual at that particular time. 
According to Kohlberg (1973), to have questioned conventional 
morality, you must have questioned your identity as well. The 
relativistic questioning of conventional morality is central to 
an individual's Identity concerns. Since morally conventional 
subjects have a considerable likelihood of never having experienced 
an identity-crisis, we can speculate that, in conventional moral 
thinkers9 many of our society1s coercive influences against 
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divergent attitudes, beliefs and kinds of thinking may contribute 
to the incidence of identity foreclosure associated with convention-
al moral maturity. In fact, it appears possible that conventional 
morality may be directly related to a repression of creative 
needs. Creative individuals are more likely to experience 
identity moratorium simply because creative individuals have 
been described as those who often question the societal norms 
and prevailing attitudes of the community and culture. Factors 
such as guilt, school atmosphere, peer acceptance and personal 
fears have all been shown to correlate with an individual's tendency 
to avoid situations which involve exploration or a testing of 
individual abilities. 
Gowan (1972) mentions that a youth who has not solved the 
Identity crisis of the fifth period (Stage 5) can hardly be ex-
pected to make the cognitive escalation from formal operations 
into the creativity accompanying the sixth stage (intimacy). 
This is, Gowan maintains, a common complaint of the "square 
person" or conformist, who is capable of fitting into a conventional 
job but who has great difficulty in finding out who he is operation-
ally. Sometimes this individual (In his thirties) works his way 
out of the identity crisis and escalates and achieves a new kind 
of creative power. However, if he does not, he may carry on until 
the mental or physical breakdown of old age sets in. And this is 
more or less sanctioned by our society. The authoritarian who 
formulates Idealism towards an "in-group" leader or maintenance 
of social authority (Kohlbergfs conventional stage or Gowanfs 
fifth stage) suffers a possible psychological displacement in 
which creativity is expressed through the wrong channels and vented 
on the wrong objects at the wrong place and time, Gowan feels 
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much of the violence in our culture is caused by a perverted 
creativity. It would not be incredulous to imagine a conventional 
adult (in the Kohlbergian sense) allow the goal of a leader or 
President to overshadow all other Imperatives and value systems 
so that It is proper (in the case of war) to kill, bomb, rape, 
or do anything else to members of the "out-group" who must first 
be be vilified. Members of the opposition could be, in this case, 
members of the same community such as pacifists or non-conformists. 
Erikson feels that psychic disorder is related to develop-
mental status (Evans, 19^6, p.56). Erikson believes that a crisis 
in each stage is necessary before a resolution to a higher stage 
can occur. Gowan essentially agrees with Erikson1s account but 
feels extreme guilt or other psychopathic, obsessive-compulsive 
disorders must be grasped by the "periodicity" of the crisis brought 
about by characteristics shared by developmental periods three 
stages removed from one another and, hence, in the same columnar 
family. 
Increased guilt or anxiety, as the ego attempts to make sense 
out of its previous involvement In the world of experience during 
the trust, industry and generativity periods respectively, tends 
to stunt the ability of the ego to develop sufficient power to 
bring conceptual order and organization to experience. 
The critical questionf according to Gowan, is for individuals 
to ask themselvesi "Am I In control of my environment through the 
support of my beloved, or Is my environment in control of me?" (Gowan, 
1972, p.75hJ 
The individual who progresses through to the final stage of 
creativity has done so primarily through the nurturing affects of 
love. His cognitive capabilities become ready to reason in a guilt-
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free, spontaneous and insightful fashion. Such an Individual would 
be able to perceive, question and assume an ultimate moral position 
based on a universal justice principle. 
Decreased creativity, according to the traditional psycho-
analytic view occurs In the instance of extreme guilt feelings 
(Rank, 1932). Gowan supports this notion and associates guilt 
with a definite decrease in creative production. Research by 
Roper (1973) offers promising evidence for the cognitive-develop-
mental claim that guilt can be defined by internal cognitive struct-
ures and varies qualitatively and may, therefore, be expressed 
along a dimension of maturity in moral thought. Roper used a sample 
of 29 male and female adolescents (aged 15 to 18) and divided them 
into three groups according to Kohlberg1s scale of maturity in 
moral judgement. Subjects were also tested on two measures of 
guilt—a story completion test, and the Mosher Guilt Inventory— 
in order to test the hypothesis that the relation between guilt 
and maturity of moral judgement is curvilinear. Roper argued 
that guilt can no longer be understood or measured strictly 
quantitatively since, with ego-development, there are corresponding 
changes in the type of-situation which arouses guilt affect. 
Roper1s empirical testing finds subjects whose moral orientation 
is approval-centred rather than "law and order" centred tend to 
exhibit more severe guilt than Kohlberg1s other stages. The 
higher Stage 3 guilt scores may be interpreted as providing support 
for the premise that what is conventionally regarded as guilt is 
a highly specific affect defined in terms of the Stage 3, inter-
personal concordance moral orientation. 
For Kohlberg, the character of moral anxiety is determined 
by the maturity of the child's cognitive structures and changes 
qualitatively with each successive transformation in the childss 
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cognitively structured representation of the social environment. 
Roper maintains that, in this context, where guilt Is assessed as 
a polar trait along a dimension of severity, it is regarded by 
Kohlberg as indicating only a "milestone" in the moral development 
of the child. What Kohlberg refers to as a "milestone", Roper's 
(1973) study reveals as Stage 3 moral maturity. Intensity 
along this dimension of guilt was seen to rise until this mile-
stone is reached, and then diminished with further advance on the 
hierarchy of moral maturity. 
According to writer^like Hartmann (i960) or Erikson (1964) 
the presence of a capacity for more flexible humanistic moral judge-
ment, or "moral and ethical sensitivity" (Erikson, 1964, p.221) 
presupposes a reduction in guilt and shame. 
If we view Roper's (1973) evidence in conjunction with the 
indications of Rank (1932), Maslow (1963) and Gowan (1972) which 
state that severity of guilt correlates posltitively and signif-
icantly with a reduction of creative functioning, then it appears 
logical and reasonable to suppose that, whereas guilt and moral 
maturity have been found to bear a curvilinear relationship, a 
curvilinear trend will"also be found between creativity and moral 
maturity. 
For the reasons given, it is first hypothesized thats 
(HO.. ) The relationship between creativity and maturity of 
moral judgement is curvilinear. 
This hypothesis is further supported by an examination of 
the relationship between Gowan's (1972) theory of creativity and 
its relationship to Kohlberg1s (1973) model of moral maturity. 
Gowan's developmental Stage 5 has been linked to Kolberg's Stages 
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3 and k* An examination of this relationship reveals that creative 
functioning is "not significant" at Kohlberg1s conventional moral 
level. Yet, a curvilinear relationship could be suggested by the 
observation that Gowan's Stages 3 and 6 in which creativity is 
at an optimum, correlate with Kohlberg's pre-moral level and Stages 
5 and 6 respectively. 
The Kohlbergian Stage 6 individual who follows self-chosen 
ethical principles and who believes as a rational person in the 
validity of universal moral principles and a sense of personal 
commitment bears a close resemblance to Maslow"s (1973) "self-
actualized" or extremely creative individual. Creativity in this 
sense is viewed as the ability to "perceive of the deeper facticitv 
but also, at the same time, of the oughtiness of the object" 
(Maslow, 19725 p.118). Maslow has reported that self-actualizing 
people were l) very good perceivers of reality and truth, and 
also 2) that they were generally unconfused about right and wrong 
and "made ethical decisions more quickly and more surely than 
average people" (Maslowf 1972, p. 117). 
One of Maslow's helpful techniques of bringing individuals 
or groups into free creative flow is called a "hostillectomy" 
session involving participants learning to "value" one another. 
Some sessions involve brainstorming, problem-solving or dilemma 
situations not unlike Kohlberg1s. 
Gowan(l972) suggests that the stages towards creative self-
actualization are characterized by "complexity of value and trans-
ition from egocentric to altruistic concerns" (Gowan, 1972, p.96). 
Gowan perceives that these "concerns" require continuous or recurring 
crisis situations with strong emotional valence and demand the 
courage and energy to face incessant challenge. This description 
mo 
corresponds closer to situations which are present in the nurturing 
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of principled morality as opposed to conventional morality% 
In summary, personal experiences of choice involving 
questioning and commitment, in some sort of integration 
with stimulation to cognitive-moral reflection, seems 
required for movement from conventional to principled 
(Stage 5) thought * It is probably for this reason that 
principled thought is not attained in adolescence. The 
conditions for movement to fully principled (or Stage 6) 
thought are probably even more of this order, though we 
have no real data on movement to this highest moral stage 
(Kohlberg, 19731 p.*H). 
Roper(1973) argues that large amounts of residual or 
"intro-punitive" guilt cannot co-exist with the "self-love" 
or "self-acceptance" prerequisite to the development of moral 
autonomy and the sense of justice by which "post-conventional" 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg1s Stage 6) is defined, Insofar as 
creativity is linked to an absence of guilt mediated by the 
individual's cognitive structures, it seems logical to assume 
that creativity has a better chance to flourish at the principled 
level of moral thinking. 
The "self-acceptance" prerequisite to principled thought 
can only be achieved with the advent of an adolescent ideology. 
Erikson (196^) uses the phrase "adolescent ideology" to distinguish 
adolescent morality from fear-based "infantile morality" and the 
more consistent and integrated "adult ethics". It is only when 
an Ideology which the adolescent has accepted is brought into 
question through his life experiences that an adult ethic is shaped 
which is not only understood but consistent with behaviour as well, 
Considerable attention has been given to the social relation-
ships of creative individuals--those subjects who do well on divergent 
thinking measures (Haddon and Lytton, 1968). 
Torrance (1962) has suggested that the creative child will 
be lacking in popularity and that social pressures may well be 
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a factor inhibiting his divergent thinking abilities. If Torrance 
is correct in assuming that social pressures to conform to peer 
groups and societal norms cause a reduction in creative (divergent) 
thinking, then It appears likely that creative thought, when com-
pared to Kohlberg's moral model, would be least evident in relation 
to an orientation to interpersonal relations of mutuality and 
maintenance of social order, fixed rules and authority which char-
acterize conventional moral reasoning (Stages 3-k). At this level 
"maintaining the expectations of the Individual's family, group, 
or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of 
immediate and obvious consequences...the attitude is not only one 
of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of 
loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying 
the order and identifying with the process or groups involved 
in it"(Kohlberg, 1972, p.3^3)- Accordingly, it seems plausible to 
assume a correlation exists between factors which retard creative 
thinking or production and those which fixate, in Piaget's terms, 
an "autonomous morality." 
Since structural moral stages represent general forms of 
thinking, both the capacity for higher stages and the preference 
for higher stages develop relatively fast in a "cognitively and 
socially rich environment" (Kohlberg, 1973* P-35)i it appears that 
an environment that encourages creative thinking could positively 
and significantly influence vicarious symbolic experience (role-
taking) in promoting moral stage development. In other words, 
an environment conducive to "role-taking opportunities" (Turiel, 
1973) would be one in which restraints on creative thinking would 
be at a minimum. Creativity, in this sense, may be viewed as a 
type of "catalyst" for moral advancement. 
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Another aspect of the early life space of creative subjects 
according to MacKinnon (1967) points to the idea that, in addition 
to the mother and the father, the larger familial sphere of the 
creative individual also provided a plentiful supply of diverse 
and effective models with whom the child could make important 
identifications % grandfathers, uncles, aunts and others who occupied 
prominent and responsible positions within their community. Since 
the main experiential determinants of moral development seem to 
include the amount and variety of social experience and the oppor-
tunity to take a number of roles and encounter other perspectives 
(Kohlberg, 1972), the familial sphere of the creative child would 
also encourage a sensitization of the child to a more ready id-
entification and experiencing of other people's perspectives. It 
seems, then, that moral development in creative children results 
in an increasing: ability to organize and integrate social experience. 
Independence of creative subjects appears to have been fostered 
by parents who showed an extraordinary respect for the child and 
confidence in his ability to behave appropriately (MacKinnon, 1967). 
In a similar context, studies indicate the opportunities for moral 
role-taking appears to be what is most important in the contribution 
of the family to moral development. Children who were advanced 
in moral judgement had parents who were also advanced in moral 
judgement (Holstein, 1973). Related to the child's maturity, 
however, was the parent's tendency to stimulate reciprocal role-
taking and the parents who sought the child's view and who elicited 
comparison of views in dialogue. Such parents had more morally 
advanced children. 
MacKinnon (1967) believes creativity can be fostered in a 
university setting that most resembles the family where there exists 
clear standards of conduct and ideas as to what is right and wrong 
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but at the same time encouraging active participation, active ex-
ploration and Internalization of a framework of personal conduct. 
The university can achieve this, apparently through a deep appreciatioi 
of the theoretical and aesthetic ways of thinking. 
According to Kohlberg (1973)$ "the experience of leaving home 
and entering a college community presents one of the two different 
types of "personal" as opposed to vicarious-symbolic experience 
important in movement to principled thought. The student must 
enter into a community of conflicting values (eg. moratorium), 
identity questioning and the need for commitment. The second type 
of "personal" experience involves experiences of moral responsibility 
and moral reflection leading to principles. This occurs when the 
universally human (as in war) disrupts responsibility accepted on 
a conventional basis (Kohlberg, 1973)• It seems that from a pre-
liminary standpoint, implications for the nurturing of creativity 
are similar, and in some respects> identical to those conditions 
which stimulate moral reasoning. 
Sadler's (1969) notion that equates play and creative 
perception is linked to Piaget•s formulation of play as the 
function of assimilation and Kubie*s (1958) conception of cogitation. 
If we give credence to Kubie's idea that creative performance 
involves both cogitation (to shake ideas together) and intelligence 
(selection from among ideas), it becomes possible to imagine that 
creativity may be an essential factor in the resolution of cog-
nitive conflict in the solutions to moral dilemmas. 
A possible explanation for the indicence of less intelligent 
children rarely becoming creative is that they do not reach Bruner's 
(1965) level of symbolic representation (when ideas become intellect-
ually negotiable because one can recount experience) until nearly 
the end of the initiative period (Gowan, 1969). In contrast, 
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the bright child reaches this stage about the middle of this period 
when creative motivations can cogitate the symbolic representations 
of experience. Freudian, Piagetian and Eriksonian views expressed 
In Gowan's (1972) theory appear sufficient to be able to explain 
the "motivations" which produce the cogitation. Creative people 
who have achieved an integrated identity are perhaps better able to 
attain higher moral stages, or are more apt to make the transition 
to principled thought, considering all the other requirements have 
been met. Gowan (1972) links creativity to an achieved identity. 
Identity status, which forms the background or "milieu" in which 
one structures his cognitve ability to reason both morally and 
creatively provides a meaning to the self In relation to the 
surrounding society. It is not improbable that creativity and moral 
development may be congruently temporal in stage progression. 
Erikson (Evans, 1966, p.56) feels that psychic disorder is 
related to developmental status. Development involves escalation 
over time and is not merely progression but the unfoldment of new 
Ideas and motifs. Gowan describes development as a quantum effect 
with identifiable levels and states instead of a smooth curve of 
accretion. Moreover, each stage contains characterisitcs approp-
riate for its full efforescence and embraces the germinal material 
for the development of the next stage. Thus each stage is the 
necessary, but not the suffiecient precursor of the next. According 
to Gowan "the environment is the suffiecient cause; its resources 
the opportunities and dangers it offers determine if, when and to 
what extent the next stage will evolve," (Gowan, 1972, p.106) 
Gowan has created a chart related to a taxonomy of developmental 
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psychopathology associated with Erikson's eight stages (Table7 )s 
The diagram related Eriksonian concepts to developmental 
arrests distinguishing two types of failure—failure at 
differentiation of task and failure at integration of an 
overly succesful stage Into proceeding ones. (It would have 
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been possible to have constructed a more elaborate 
chart with each of the seven kinds of developmental 
outcomes sketched, instead of the polar two at the 
continuum ends.) The first column represents approx-
imate ages; second comes the Eriksonian stage; third 
is the typology caused by failure to differentiate 
(achieve the task); fourth is the typology caused by 
failure to integrate the task (move to the next stage). 
Finally the governing morality is indicated. This may 
be defined as the ethos value or emotional complex which 
has contributed to the individual's failure at the task 
or makes him unable to go on to the next stage (Gowan, 
1972, p.107). 
According to Table 7«f obstructions, distortions or arrest 
depicts a hierarchy in which failures at the first two stages 
produce psychotics and neurotics % at the next two stages, give 
rise to problems in school, and in the third two, cause difficulties 
in university and adult life. Also, the table, infers that some 
problems are not developmental but cultural, among these' aggression, 
delinquency, drugs and dropouts. 
An identity crisis of the fifth period leads to the obstruction 
of cognitive escalation from formal operations into the creativity 
accompanying the sixth stage (intimacy) according to Gowan (1972). 
This leads to the conformist, "square" or conventional Individual. 
However, this kind of arrest is more or less sanctioned by our 
society and this kind of person (Kohlberg's Stages 3 and k) will 
feel that he is normal and hence in the right, and he must mis-
interpret his experience and the motives of others to account for 
his lot. This unresolved identity crisis leads to an extensive 
projection of blame and an internalized hostility. This crisis 
could also lead to an external hostility as seen in a politician's 
(often a Kohlbergian Stage 3 or k) aggressiveness in waging war 
on other nations when in fact what is wrong with the politician is 
that he is unable to find out operationally who he Is. 
A conventional adult having achieved identity now able to 
deal with formal operations even though he may never advance to 
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Ideally each person should go through life as a croquet game, passing each wicket, One can 
fail to negotiate wickets (failure at differentiation) and also stop and play rover (failure 
at integration),. The latter person has been so successful at a particular stage that he 
keeps at it instead of incorporating it into the next stage of on-going development. 
Source: Gowan (1972) p. 108. 
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the intimacy stage or beyonda This Individual still gets by as 
a normal or "conventional" person. However, according to Gowan 
(1972) "those who resist full development and remain at a regressed 
level are condemned to some sort of Immature behaviours character-
istic of those who have stopped growing and who have started to 
atrophy." (Gowan, 1972, p. 101) 
The conventional individual, therefore, is in contrast with 
the creative individual's open-ended dynamic lifestyle becoming, ' 
in many instances, subject to incipient authoritarianism, which 
expects simplistic answers to complex questions. Rage and destruct-
iveness is often the outcome of the Inner authoritarianism of the 
conventional individual, and is a common scene in contemporary 
society. In a sense then, the conformist in our culture is a 
result of perverted or arrested creative development. 
The conventional individual described by Gowan (1972) in the 
preceedlng passages bear a close correspondence to Kohlberg1s 
subjects at Stages 3 and. k of the moral maturity continuum (Con-
ventional moral reasoning). This relationship is also charted out 
In Table 5« This evidence and the research carried out by Roper 
(1973) which links severe guit with Conventional moral thought 
(specifically Stage 3) points to the growing evidence that creativity 
Is least likely to be found in Individuals arrested in Eriksonfs 
ego stages where ascribed Identities are accepted (see Table k) 
and which correspond to Kohlbergian Conventional morality. Creat-
ivity, according to Gowan1s (1972) formulation is "not significant" 
at this stage of development (see Table 5)- For these reasons, it 
is hypothesized that: 
(HOp) There will be higher creativity as measured by the 
Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the post-
conventional stages of Kohlberg1s scale. 
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Furthermore, it is hypothesized that? 
,(H0 ) There will be lower creativity as measured by 
the Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the 
conventional stages of Kohlberg*s scale, 
(HOh) There will be greater creativity as measured by 
the Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the 
pre-conventional stage of Kohlberg*s scale. 
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It is only those few who have enough courage 
to take up the conflict within themselves and make it 
conscious who are the creative ones and who can help 
us to avoid the total war which threatens all of us. 
Marie-Louise von Franz, 
C.G. Jung, His Myth in Our Time, 1975$ p.l66. 
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CHAPTEI. Ill 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
SAMPLE 
Originally sixty-four subjects were tested for moral maturity 
using 5 Kohlberg Dilemma Situations. Nine subjects did not record 
enough information to score. Five subjects who were administered 
the Kohlberg Dilemma Situations did not complete the Product Improve-
ment Task. Therefore, fifty subjects completed both the creativity 
measure and the moral measure. Eighteen of these fifty subjects 
attended Driftwood Elementary School in Toronto's West End at the 
time this research was conducted. Driftwood services a predominately 
working-class community with a large degree of single-parent dwellings 
and Ontario Housing (government subsidized). The local high school 
(Westview Centennial) supplied twenty-one grade 13 subjects. The 
remaining eleven subjects were contacted by a friend, Robin Collyer, 
a prominent Toronto scuptor. These subjects were chosen for their 
creative qualities exhibited in art and media. None of the subjects 
were familiar with Kohlbergss theoretical work on moral reasoning. 
The sample consisted of thirty-one males and nineteen females. No 
attempt was made to obtain a homogeneous sample in age and I,QB since 
the I.Q. scores of the subjects were not made available to the writer 
and, it was felt that in order to obtain representation in the sample 
of each moral judgement level (pre-conventional, conventional, post-
conventional), a broad age spectrum was desirable. The subjects ranged 
in age from eleven years to seventy-three. 
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Kohlberggs Major Levels of Moral Judgement 
Level 1 (Preconventional) 
-Stage Is Punishment and obedience 
orientation 
Level 2 (Conventional) 
-Stage lis Naive instrumental 
hedonism 
-Stagellls "Good boy" morality of 
maintaining good rela-
tions, approval of others 
-Stage IV: Authority maintain-
ing morality 
-Stage Vs Morality of contract 
and of democratically 
Level 3 (Postconventional) accepted law 
-Stage Vis Morality of individual 
principles of conscience 
It is possible, however, that two subjects at the same 
structural stage, may differ to a great extent in the content 
of their judgements. It is also (conversely) true that the same 
verbal content may be found to derive from a totally different 
moral structure. Both "pro" and "con" statements about the 
Heinz dilemma (situation III) illustrate how a different content 
may emanate from the same cognitive moral structure. This is 
illustrated by TABLE 8 (reproduced from Kohlberg, I969).1 
TABLE 8 
Motives for Engaging in Moral Action 
Stage Is Action is motivated by avoidance of punishment, and 
"conscience" is irrational fear of punishment, 
Pro—If you let your wife die, you will get 
in trouble. You'll be blamed for not 
spending the money to save her, and 
theresll be an investigation of you and 
the druggist for your wifefs death. 
Con— You shouldnft steal the drug because 
you111 be caught and sent to jail if 
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you do. If you do get away, your con-
science would bother you thinking how 
the police would catch up to you at 
any minute. 
Stage 2s Action motivated by desire for reward or benefit. 
Possible guilt reactions are ignored and punishment viewed 
in a pragmatic manner, ( Differentiates own fear, pleasure, 
or pain from punishment consequences.) 
Pro—If you happen to get caught, you could 
give the drug back and you wouldnft 
get much of a sentence. It wouldnst 
bother you to serve a little jail term, 
if you have your wife when you get out. 
Con--He may not get much of a jail term if 
he steals the drug, but his wife will 
probably die before he gets out, so it 
won't do him much good. If his wife 
dies, he shouldnst blame himself, It 
wasnft his fault she has cancer, 
Stage 3* Action motivated by anticipation of disapproval 
of others, actual or imagined hypothetical (for example, 
guilt). (Differentiation of disapproval from punishment, 
fear, and pain.) 
Pro—No one will think you're bad if you 
steal the drug, but your family will 
think you're an inhuman husband if 
you donft. If you let your wife die, 
you111 never be able to look anybody 
in the face again. 
Con—It isnft just the druggist who will think 
you1re a criminal, everyone else will too. 
After you steal it, you111 feel bad think-
ing how you've brought dishonour on your 
family and yourselfj you won't be able to 
face anyone again. 
Stage k% Action motivated by anticipation of dishonor, 
that is, institutionalized blame for failure 
of duty, and by guilt over concrete harm 
done to others, (Differentiates formal dis-
honor from informal disapproval. Differ-
entiates guilt for bad consequences from 
disapproval.) 
Pro-If you have any sense of honor, you won't 
let your wife die because you're afraid to 
do the only thing that will save her. You'll 
always feel guilty that you caused her death 
, if you don't do your duty to her. 
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Con--You're desperate and you may not know you're 
doing wrong after you're punished and sent to 
jail. You'll always feel guilty for your hon-
esty and lawbreaking, 
Stage 5s Concern about maintaining respect of equals and of the 
community (assuming their respect is based on reason 
rather than emotions). Concern about own self-respect, 
that is, to avoid judging self as irrational, incon-
sistent, non-purposive, (Discriminates between In-
stitutionalized blame and community disrespect or 
self-disrespect.) 
Pro--You'd lose other people's respect, not gain 
it, if you don't steal. If you let your wife 
die, it would be out of fear, not out of reason.- -
ing it out. So you'd just lose self-respect and 
probably the respect of others too. 
Con-- You would lose your standing and respect in the 
community and violate the law. You'd lose respect 
for yourself if you're carried away by emotion 
and forget the long-range point of view. 
Stage 6s Concern about self-condemnation for violating one's 
own principles. (Differentiates between community 
respect and self-respect. Differentiates between 
self-respect for general achieving rationality and 
self-respect for maintaining moral principles.) 
Pro--If you don't steal the drug and let your 
wife die, you'd always condemn yourself for 
it afterward. You wouldn't be blamed and you 
would have lived up to the outside rule of the 
law but you wouldn't have lived up to your own 
standards of conscience. 
Con— If you stole the drug, you wouldn't be blamed 
by other people but you'd condemn yourself be-
cause you wouldnst have lived up to your own 
conscience and standards of honesty. 
The illustration provided by TABLE in which both "pro" 
and f,con*f statements about the Heinz dilemna (situation 111) 
seem to emanate from the same stage of cognitive moral structure 
emphasizes the fact that two subjects at the same structural 
stage may differ widely in the content of their judgements, 
The example of the same verbal content which seems to derive 
from a totally different moral structure is illustrated by the 
case of one boy who agreed that Heinz should steal the drug to 
11? 
who agreed that Heinz should steal the drug to save his wifefs 
life. When asked, "Why?11, he replied, "Because then there would 
be no-one to cook his food" (stage 2). It is important that 
the examiner stress to the subjects at the outset of answering 
the moral dilemmas that the responses should be of adequate length. 
Hopefully, the responses will be "scorable11 in the sense of being 
of sufficient length and commitment on the moral Issues raised 
to reveal structure of moral thought. The instrument and the 
six stages which define them are only useful to the extent that 
they tap the underlying structure of the subjectfs moral judgement. 
The five dilemmas used in this study are produced in APPENDIX 
A. 
Product Improvement Task 
The description of the Product Improvement task given'here follows 
closely the description given by Torrance (1962) in his book 
Guiding Creative Talent. Torrancefs "Minnestota Tests of Creative 
Thinking" fall under three major categories-. . non-verbal tasks, . 
verbal tasks using non-verbal stimuli, and verbal tasks using 
verbal stimuli. The Product Improvement Tasks are verbal tasks 
using non-verbal stimuli. This "test" is a rather complex task with 
a high degree of face validity. This task quite often "makes 
good sense" to teachers and to parents since it is possible to 
recognize what they consider a "desirable" type of thinking. 
Administration and scoring of this task Is straightforward and 
direct. This task, especially, offers Interesting possibilities 
for scoring on a variety of dimensions-. £Lu£imy, ;0£2UJiUJL±3Cf 
originality, inventiveness. and the like. 
U8 
The Product Improvement Task allows the subjects to "regress 
in the service of the ego" which is an important development 
from a psychodynamic point of view. The variety of cognitive 
dimensions scored such as fluency, flexibility, originality and 
Inventiveness offers important data from a psychometric standpoint. 
Hence, this task Inherits developments that take Into account 
Guilfordfs structure of the Intellect model and Kubie or Kris1 
psychological formulations. This task is a "fun" task and is 
generally regarded as interesting by most subjects. It enables 
them to play around with ideas which they would not dare to do 
in a more serious task. Accordingly, there exists possibilities 
for Brunerfs emphasis on "creative play". With each response, 
the question is asked, "What kind of thinking did this idea re-
quire?" 
Testing Materials 
Thus far, four different toys have been used by researchers 
in connection with this tests a toy nurse kit, a friction fire 
truck, a stuffed small toy dog, and a stuffed small toy monkey. 
Originally, the first three toys were used with each subject. Only 
one of the toys, the stuffed dog or the stuffed monkey, is Included 
in batteries in current use. 
In addition to the toy, the materials required include a 
test booklet for recording responses and observations, a table and 
chair for the subject, a chair for the examiner, and a stop watch. 
In the group administration, a coloured slide or a picture on the 
response sheets are used. For this study a black and white draw-
ing of a dog was used with a written description appearing under 
the drawing. This can be seen in APPENDIX B. It Is also desirable 
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to display the toy Itself In the group administration, even though 
subjects do not have a chance to manipulate it. 
In additon,,the test booklet contains a general orientation 
to be used by the examiner in establishing rapport, the key in-
structions for the task, and space for observations. 
The nurse kit was used as a typically "glrlss toy" and Includes 
a variety of items suitable for playing the role of the nurses 
plastic cap, candy pills, absorbent cotton, eye chart, tongue 
depressor, hypodermic needle9 thermometer, stethoscope, spoon, 
and spectacles. The items are contained In a cardboard box illustrat-
ed with drawings of a nurse. 
The friction fire truck was selected as a typically "boy's 
toy" and is of an inexpensive variety with a number of defects. 
It has rubber wheels, is painted red, and has an extension ladder. 
There is no driver in the cab, no hose, no sirens, and no safety 
net. 
The toy dog was selected for this study because of its approp-
riatness for both boys and girls. Early experimental work did 
show that boys in the first grade gave fewer responses than girls 
for the nurse's kit and more responses than girls for the fire 
truck. Beginning with the second grade, these kinds of differences 
tend to fade out, and by the third grade boys gave more responses 
than girls for all three toys, including the nursesfs kit. It 
was partially for this reason that most of the developmental work 
by Torrance (1962) has been done with the toy dog and monkey. 
Neither seems to have any "sex taint." The monkey can be used 
as the stimulus for an alternative task. F o r t h e purposes of 
this present study, only the toy dog was used. A black line 
drawing of the dog and a written description appears at the top 
of the answer sheet and may be examined at APPENDIX E. 
12Q 
Administration and Scoring of Measures 
"Pure" measures of creativity and moral variables are important 
In correlational design in order to support the hypotheses concern-
ing the relationship between them. Consequently, in addition to 
cautioning students to refrain from discussing test-content before 
the gathering of data was completed, the administration of tests 
were widely spaced (about one or two weeks). In this way it 
was hoped that the possible influence of one test situation on 
another would be minimized. Variance in scores due to inter-
test influence was further controlled by distributing it across 
the sample. This was achieved by administering*the two instruments 
in six different sequences as shown in TABLE 9-
TABLE 9 
SEQUENCE OF TEST-ADMINISTRATION 
Testing Sequence No. of Subjects 
Dilemma Situations Product Improvement Task 10 
Product Improvement Task Dilemma Situations 11 
Dilemma Situations Product Improvement Task 11 
Product Improvement Task Dilemma Situations 10 
Dilemma Situations Product Improvement Task }j 
Product Improvement Task Dilemma Situations Ii 
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Kohlberg Dilemma Situations Scoring 
The moral dilemmas were conducted in groups of no more than 
eleven. Subjects were told that the purpose of the dilemmas 
was to find out the subject's opinions about some stories. They 
were also informed that they were participating in an investigation 
of individual attitudes and that their names would not be revealed 
when the findings were reported. 
Each subject was then asked to read silently a copy of the 
dilemma situation while the experimenter read the story aloud. 
Questions on each story followed and the same procedure was follow-
ed for the remaining four dilemma situations. 
A detailed scoring system has been used where scores are 
assigned to the * fusion of all thought content' expressing a 
single moral idea based on thirty 'elements of morality' (Kohlberg, 
1963)• Complete fIssues scoring procedure' in which each dilemma 
was given a separate rating of the subject's modal stage could 
be derived as follows: 
To obtain a Moral Maturity Score from stage ratings of 
individualdilemma situations, arithmetic (stage weighting values) 
are given to each rating as follows; 
Pure Score 3 points 
major Score 2 points 
minor Score 1 points 
(enclosed in bracket) 
The arithmetic value is determined for each rating by multiply-
ing the stage rating by the appropriate number of points. For 
examples 
3 = 3.3 = 9 
3(2) = 3.2 + 2.1 = 8 
^22 
2(3) = 2.2 + 3.1 = 7 
2 = 2.3 = 6 
These values are then summed, divided by 12 ( the minimum 
total possible ) and multi£lyed by 100. This yields a score 
with a possible range of 100 to 600. In the hypothetical example 
above, 
9 = 8 = ? = 6 x 100 = 10 x 100 = 250 
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This Moral Maturity Score is midway between pure Stage 2 
and pure Stage 3« 
In June, 19731 a shorter "standard form" scoring procedure 
had been developed to facilitate research on larger samples. A 
global, more simplified version of the Kohlberg scoring system 
uses ratings based on intuitive weighting of the nine content 
areas reflected in the responses and which, in some cases, implies 
a "feeling" for the type of reasoning as a whole and as a part. 
Reports of scores on each dilemma reflects a dominant stage-score 
(pure) as well as a minor stage-score (mixed) with an overall, 
global score given by way of the following! 
(1) a final score is given for each of five dilemmas 
by way of nine content areas 
(2) a weight of 3 Is given to a pure score 
(3) for a mixed score, a weight of 2 is given to the 
major stage and 1 to the minor stage (eg. 2(3)1 k(5) 
and 
(k) the totals for each stage are added and converted 
to percentages. 
(a) If 50% or more of an Item is at a given stage, this 
was noted as the major stage in the global score, 
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(b) if 25% or more of the item Is at a given stage, 
this was noted as the minor stage in the global 
score. 
(c) this same procedure is used to arrive at an overall 
global score involving a weighted measure of all 
five dilemmas % this final measurement results in 
the individual's stage and level of moral reasoning. 
Kurtines and Grief(197^) conclude after 15 years of research 
that (l) interrater reliability correlations indicate an 'acceptable1 
degree of reliability, (2) there may be some evidence of predictive 
validity for this model but there Is no clear demonstrating connect-
ing moral judgement and moral action vis-a-vis the Moral Judgement 
Scale, (3) there Is little evidence of construct validation for 
this scale. 
The Product Improvement Task Scoring 
The ideational fluency score is obrained by simply counting all 
of the separate responses given by the subjects, regardless of 
the quality. The flexibility score for each task Is obtained 
by counting the number-of approaches used in improving the product. 
Guides for scoring flexibility are included in the section which 
follows, The inventilevel score was devised by adapting the 
criteria used by the U.S. Patent Office in assessing inventilevel. 
Redefined, these criteria are as follows? stride forward, newness, 
challenging and thought provoking, rarity, constructiveness, and 
surprisingness. The scoring guide follows. The originality score 
was developed from a tabulation of the frequency of responses given. 
INVENT.II1EVEL 
The "inventilevel-" concept.was adapted from U.S. Patent. 
Office usage,/ suggestions made by McPharson
 (at th^ 19-55 Utah 
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Conference- on the Identification o-f Creative'Scientific Talent(l956) 
Rossman (1931), and others. Interscprer'reliability have been> 
consistently in the .90fs"and upper .80ss. The following criteria 
have been found useful for the toy dog tasks 
CHALLENGING AND THOUGHT PROVOKING 
Does the idea lead to new and additional ideas? Does it, or can 
it generate new ideas? Examples; Improvements Have him growl 
with a record inside 1 have leg scratch ear- make paws shake hands, 
etc. Unusual Uses Puzzle (make it in very small pieces)i camera 
(twist tail for shutter release)1 character in a good booki com-
munication device. 
RARITY 
Is the idea different from those generally given? Is It produced 
by only a few individuals? Examples: Improvements Make his 
eyes/nose light up, sparkle, glow in darkj squirt water from 
mouth 1 smelly nose,* holes in nose? make him able to lick face. 
Unusual Uses Toilet paper dispenser, lint remover (give it an 
electrostatic charge)i squeeze bottle (made out of plastic). 
CONSTRUCTIVENESS 
Does the idea tell how to bring about the change or how to apply 
the principle or how to solve the problem? Examples: Improvements— 
Have him stand by pushing button, or pulling his tail. Unusual Uses 
Make a sleep inducer by adding a tape recorder inside 1 give it 
an electric brain so he can be a computer, can answer questions, 
etc. 
SURPRISINGNESS 
Does the idea produce astonishment, wonder, or surprise? Does the 
idea introduce reasons to produce feelings of astonishment or 
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surprise? (The suggested idea must not be a part of any toy dog 
insofar as you (the scorer) know). Examples: Improvements Make 
him wet or warm to touchf make him have doggy smell. Unusual Uses--
Back scratcher, decoy, burglar alarm, nose as a horn. 
STRIDE FORWARD 
Does the idea present a new and original plan? How useful is the 
idea? Does this usefulness extend in a practical, realistic direction? 
Examples: Improvements Give him a beard and/or mustachej have him 
do acrobatics. Unusual uses Make him into a barrette or broochi 
Make him Into an ear muff. 
NEWNESS 
Is the idea unusual, remarkable: Is It of recent origin? Does it 
show innovation, new effects? Examples: Improvements Give him 
a doggy smell, make him inflatable. Unusual uses Make an auto-
graph dog, a garbage disposal, a kitchen timer, a penulum weight, 
fire starter, etc. from him. 
FLEXIBILITY 
Twenty or more general principles may be used in thinking 
of new ideas of improving almost any product, process, organization 
or plan. The flexibility score is the number of different principles 
or approaches used in responding to the task. Their application 
is used in the following illustration of categories for the toy 
dog: 
1. Adaptation Change it to a cat, mouse, etc. Uses other than as 
a toy dog. 
2. Addition Leash, ribbon on ear, squeaker for nose, hat with 
flowers, toes, collar and licence, "wee-wee" thing to go to bath-
room, motor, dog sweater, carrying a bone, decoration. 
3. Change Colour All red, all black, brown all over, more like 
real dog, like a particular kind of dog, pink dog, yellow nose, 
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different colored eyes, red ribbon instead of green ribbon, etc. 
^.Change Shape Hold ears up, make rear stick up, change shape 
of nose more like real dog, fatter neck, floppy ears, tongue inside 
mouth, etc. 
5»Combination Put with dog house, puppies, mommy, master, mate, 
bag for dog and house, car for master and dog, cat to chase, road 
to go on, stake for hitching dog, a bowl, remote control. 
6. Division (Thus far, we have no responses using this approach). 
7. Magnification Bigger: dog, head, tongue, hind legs* longer: 
tail, legs, tonguei wider: ears- so big you could sit on it. 
8. Minification Smaller: mouth, etci shorter: ears etc.; baby 
dog. 
9. Motion Legs so that they bend or movei eyes move, open, close; 
jump around; sniff; wag tail; wind up toy; touch button and runs 
by himself; wheels on feet; ears that move; mouth that opens and 
closes; grins, shows teeth. 
10. Multiplication Litter of dogs, pairs, etc. 
11. Position Sit up, stand up, lie down, stand on head, 
stand up straighter. 
12. Quality of material Make it out of rubber, ears should 
be strings, real dog fur, flexible material, etc. 
13. Rearrangement Eyes on same level, detachable parts, etc. 
Ik. Reversal Put head where tail is etc. 
15. Sensory Appeal (ec?j?) Marble in ear so it makes a noise, 
barks, makes a noise when you push it; squeeze ears and he barks; 
tape recorder in order to sing a song; tiny computer to translate 
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human speech into dog language, etc. 
16. Sensory Appeal (eye) Nose that glows, eyes that glow, 
eyes that light up, etc. 
17. Sensory Appeal (nose) Make it smell sweet; put catnip on 
It to make it a toy for cats, etc. 
18. Sensory appeal (touch) Holes in nose; a cold nose; nose 
made of sponge that stays moist, etc. 
19. Substitution Collar in place of ribbon, chain in place 
of ribbon, ears like bean bags, etc. 
20. Subtraction Take seal(tag) off, take bow (ribbon) off 
etc. 
ORIGINALITY 
In order to develop information to construct some measure of 
originality or unusualness of response, Torrance (1962) made 
tabulations of the responses of lk6 elementary school children 
from grades one through six and kk8 high school students. Frequencies 
and percentages were computed, and on the basis of these weighted 
values were assigned to each response for the elementary level, 
the high school level and the elementary and high school com-
bined. The procedure used to score originality is to award one 
point to each response having a value of four or for each response 
having a value of three or four. 
The following is the list of the most common responses. It 
is suggested that a score of zero be assigned to each of these 
responses, and that a score of one be assigned to all other 
appropriate responses showing evidence of creative intellectual 
energy: 
Bark, speak Fuzzy or hairy 
Bells on it Hat on head 
Bigger Leash, add 
Change Color Legs move 
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Clothing on it, cap, shoes, glasses Mouth move 
Collar, add Squeak when squeezed 
Ears flap Tail longer 
Eyes roll (when tongue is pulled) Tail wags 
Children are encouraged to write down all of their responses 
no matter how irrelevant or fantastic they may seem. This material 
is essential in assessing irrelevance and fantasy. If a subject 
obviously runs out of responses or can give no further responses 
before the eight minute deadline, he is not pressured to do so 
and may hand in his paper. With exceptionally shy and inarticulate 
children who do not grasp the idea of "changing or Improving the 
toy so that it will be more fun to play with," an alternative may 
be used. One of the more successful is, "If you had a magic wand 
and could make this toy be any way you wanted it to be, how would 
you make it different?" 
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Description of Trend Analysis 
Once the MORAL MATURITY SCORES and the CREATIVITY SCORES have 
been calculated, a trend analysis will reveal whether or not 
a curvilinear relationship exists between the independent variable 
(Moral Maturity Stages), and the dependent variable (creativity 
performance under each level). The trend analysis will shed some 
light on the nature of the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables which will either support or negate the 
hypotheses stated in this study. If the treatment levels represent 
a quantitative variable, the ensuing types of questions may be 
posed: 
(1) Is there a trend in the data? In other words, are the 
means for the dependent variable influenced by the changes 
in the independent variable, STAGES? 
(2) Is the trend of the dependent variable means LINEAR or 
NON-LINEAR? 
(3) If the trend of the dependent variable means is NON-LINEAR, 
what higher degree equation is required to provide a sat-
isfactory fit for the data? 
(k) Do the means for the dependent variable follow a trend 
that has been derived from the data? That is, does a 
particular equation based on the data provide a satisfactory 
fit for the data? 
Test for the presence of the trend: 
An answer to the first question, "Is there a trend In the data?" 
is provided by the ratio: 
MS 
F= between groups 
MS . ., . 
within groups 
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.05f V,v it is concluded that the measures of the means for 
1 2 
the dependent variable are influenced by changes in the independ-
ent variable. If there is no trend, then the data will have the 
appearance shown belowby the ^ fs. A trend is illustrated by the 




Stage a Stage b Stage c 
(STAGES) 
A trend is indicated whenever a dependent variable*s means are 
not equal for the different levels of the independent variable. 
If the F test indicates a trend, the nature of the trend may be 
either linear or non-linear and finding the simplest "fit" or 
equation for the data can be achieved most easily through the 
utilization of orthogonal polynomials: A given set of data can often 
be described by many different equations. A polynomial equation 
containing one less component than there are treatment levels, 
K-l terms will always provide a fit for the data. 
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In regression analysis, a first-degree (linear) equation 
is used as the first approximation to the relationship between 
two variables. Second-degree (quadratic), third-degree (cubic), 
and higher degree equations are used if the fit of the linear 
relationship does not prove to be satisfactory. When there 
are equal numbers of observations in each of the treatment 
classes, and when the treatment classes form equal steps 
along an ordered scale, the work of finding the degree of the 
best-fitting curve is simplified by use of comparisons corres-
ponding to these curves. Once the degree of the best-fitting 
polynomial is found, the regression coefficients for this 
curve are also readily obtained. The most complete set 
of coefficients is in the work of Anderson and Houseman 
(19^2). The Fisher and Yates tables (1953) also have an 
adequate set. A numerical example will be used to Illustrate 
the application of individual components of variation to the 
problem of finding the degree of the best-fitting curve. 
Use of orthogonal polynomials In fitting a trend: 
A polynomial is an algebraic expression containing more than 
2 3 n 
one term. For example, X= a + bY + cY + dY +.....+JY is a 




cY3=cubic equation component 
jYn=nth degree component 
An equation of the form X=a + bY is a first degree or linear 
2 
equation, X= a + bY + cY , is a second degree or quadratic 
equation, etc. These equations, when graphed, have the 
general form shown below: 
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(Polynomials may be used to "approximate" exponential or logarithmic 
curves ).x=










1 1 CREATIVITY 
r*r- (c) 
zl Y 2 Y 3 
STAGES 
( * & ' 
Yl Y 2 y 3 
STAGES 
r = a + by + eY"+dY 
Orthogonal polynomial coefficients are derived so that each set 
represnets one and only one trend or form of the relationship. 
If K=4, the best prediciton equation is of no higher degree 
than k-1. The coefficient for linear, quadratic, or cubic 
trends are shown below. 





"1 x2 ""3 
-1 0 +1 
+1 -2 +1 
NOT APPLICABLE (Only 3 levels) 
The derivation of orthogonal polynomial coefficients is 
undertaken only if there is a trend in the data* Example "b" 
is the curvilinear relationship that is predicted in the hypothesis 
of this study. In other words, it is assumed a quadratic relation-
ship will be able to fit the predicted trend. 
* Thanks to Roger Crane of Brock University who advised the 
author on how to conduct an analysis of trends # 
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FOOTNOTES ON CHAPTER 3 
1. L. Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequences the Cognitive Developmental 
Approach to Socialization," in Handbook of Socialization Theory 
and Research, D. Goslin (ed.), Chicago, 1969i P- 12. 
Moral judgement is always present and carries with it 
characteristic psychological consequences. I have point-
ed out many times that as in the past, so in the future the 
wrong we have done, thought, or intended will wreak its 
vengeance on our souls. Only the contents of judgement 
are subject to the differing conditions of time and place 
and, therefore, take correspondingly different forms. For 
moral evaluation is always founded upon the apparent certit-
udes of a moral code which pretends to know what is good 
and what evil. But once we know how uncertain the foundation 
is, ethical decision becomes a subjective, creative act. 





Analysis of Data 
A far narrower range of moral judgement scores (see TABLE 10) 
was distributed than expected (Stage 2 to Stage k). Stage 1, 
Stage 5 or Stage 6 were not represented at all. There was only 
one subject (the eldest) who had even any percentage (7%) of 
principled thought. Therefore, it seemed necessary to adjust the 
scale in such a way that differences within each stage may be used 
to further sub-divide the stages. This technique has been used 
by Ruma (196?) in order to assign "mixed" scores to a single 
stage for comparison purposes. A sub-division of the present 
sample produced a scale of eight categories! 2, 2(3)$ 3(2), 3$ 
3(*)i 2C. k(3)• and k where the number in brackets represents 
between twenty-five and fifty percent usage of the designated 
stage, and ZG represents a sub-stage midway between Stage X and 
Stage 3* A highly uneven representation results, however, 
rendering inferences about individual stages highly suspect since, 
for example, there are only 4wc examples(subject^ In Stage 2(C) and 
another in Stage 3(k)• It becomes questionable as to whether 
there is any real qualitative transformation between, for instance, 
3(k) and 3. This is especially true since the five dilemmas 
provide only an "estimate" in determining the subject's modal 
stage and certainly no marked change in the estimate (eg. Stage 
2 to Stage 3 or k) would be anticipated if further moral issues 
were presented. Kohlberg (1971 p. 166) lists 11 moral Issues. 
It seemed more feasible, therefore, to distribute the subjects 
into three groups in order to obtain divisions of approximately 
equal size but also to ensure that only "pure" Stage 3 usage 
would be classified as Stage 3. Less than pure Stage 3 subjects 
were classified as "pre-Stage 3" and those who showed more than 
13-5 
TABLE 10 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES 
MORAL DILEMMAS 
































































































































































































The Kohlberg dilemmas were scored by Susan Pagliuso, March 
22, 1978. Ms. Pagliuso taught graduate students at OISE the 
scoring system from 1973 to 1975 and held workshops for teachers 
on the stages of moral development, 1973, 1977. She is the 
author of over ten books and publications on moral educational 






















































































































































































































































Creativity measures were scored by the Research Department 
of the North York Board of Education, Toronto. 
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TABLE 12 


























MEAN CREATIVITY SCORES AND F RATIOS FOR 
- , EACH VARIABLE OF THE PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT TASK 


































* significant at ,05 level 
IM 
pure Stage 3 usage were classified as ffpost-Stage 3fS. This 
type of division was used "by Roper (1973) in his study which 
sought to determine the relationship between guilt and moral 
maturity. Three groups were divided as follows % 
(1) ffpre-Stage 3?,f modal stages 2, 2(3), 3(2),l(t\ 
(n=21) 
(2) "Stage 39f modal Stage 3 only (n=20) 
(3) ffpost-Stage 3," modal stages 3(^)f M3)i J^ 
(n=9) 
Relationship Between Maturity of Moral Judgement and Creativity 
as ^ Measured by the Product Improvement Task 
(H01 ) In order to test hypothesis one—"the relationship between 
maturity of moral judgement and creativity is curvilinear"—mean 
creativity scores were computed for each moral judgement stage 
(pre-Stage 3, Stage 3, and post-Stage 3)9 and compared as a 
function of these categories. The results of the test for the 
presence of trends in all four categories of creativity (originality9 
Ideational fluency, inventilevel, flexibility) are presented in 
TABLE 13. In each case the F obs. is less than F
 nc v and, 
, \Jj9 v^ Vp 
therefore, no trend is observed, linear or otherwise. In other 
words, it is concluded that the measures for the means of the 
dependent variable (creativity) are not Influenced by changes 
in the independent variable. Since the data did not indicate 
a trend the test for linearity of trend, the derivation of orth-
ogonal polynomial coefficients for linear, quadratic or cubic 
trends or the derivation of coefficients for linear components 
was not undertaken. For example, the X values (Fluency) for 
the data are 7.86, 6,75$ 8,67* If these values are multiplied 
by the C C2 and C coeffiecents in the table, the following 
1^ 2 
sums are derived: 7-86, 0, 8.67. Thus, in this case, 
neither the linear, nor the quadratic sum to zero. This 
indicates that neither the quadratic, nor the linear 
are useful in describing the trend. Since there are un-
equal n'Si however, the use of orthogonal coefficients 
can not strictly be used and a derivation of the linear 
components would have to be undertaken. One procedure 
which could have been used is described by Gaito (1965) 
and this requires computation involving the solution of 
a series of simultaneous equations. However, since the 
F test revealed no trend, any further analysis of data 
is merely peripheral to the hypotheses. Therefore the 
first hypothesis (HO-,) is not retained. 
(H0g) there will be greater creativity as measured by 
the Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at 
the post-conventional stales of Kohlberg8s scale. It 
was assumed that post-conventional subjects will corres-
pond to a greater degree with Gowan1 s "love-affiliation11 
stage six which is characteristic of greater creativity. 
Inspection of Figure 1 and Figure 3 indicates the 
predicted curvilinear trend is clearly evident. Further-
more, throughout Figures 1 through k the creativity curves 
are noticeably highest in the post-conventional (post-
Stage 3) moral judgment categories. 
1^ 3 
In Figure 1 and Figure 3 subjects categorized as pre-
Stage 3 and post-Stage 3 manifested greater creativity 
(Flexibility and Ideational Fluency) on these components 
of the Product Improvement Task than the Stage 3 subjects. 
Since the Ftest revealed no trend, the second hypothesis 
(HO2 ) is not retained. 
(HO3) there will be less creativity as measured by the 
Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the 
conventional stages of Kohlberg8s scale. An Inspection 
of the arcs of the creativity curves reveal that they are 
noticeably lowest in the Stage 3 moral judgment categories. 
This trend would appear to support the third hypothesis of 
this study that suggests reduced creativity is associated 
with Stage 3 moral judgment. Roper (1973) discovered 
that guilt phenonmena were directly related to Stage 3 
"interpersonal-concordance" orientation in Kohlberg1s 
moral hierarchy. It was reasoned, therefore, that creativ-
ity is more likely to be hindered or stifled by subjects 
experiencing greater guilt conflicts. Greater guilt con-
flicts suggest lower creativity* Theufore it was assumed 
that creativity will be least characteristic of a Stage 3 
moral thinker. However, since the F test reveals no 
statistically significant trend, hypothesis (HO^) is not 
retained. 
(HO^) there will be greater creativity as measured by the 
Product Improvement Task in individuals who are at the pre-
conventional stage of Kohlberg1s scale. 
1*14 
Conversely, a look at Figure 1 and Figure 3 indicates 
greater creativity in the pre-conventional moral judgment 
scale than appears at the conventional level. This would 
seem to support the fourth hypothesis of this study that 
suggests greater creativity is associated with pre-con-
ventional moral judgment. 
However since the F test indicates no significant 
trend, hypothesis (HOJL) is not retained. 
It seems, then , from a preliminary examination 
of the Figures, that all four hypotheses have been 
supported by direct empirical evidence. 
However, a comparison of the group means computed 
to test the significance of the observed trends as re-
vealed by the F test results In no statistically signif-
icant difference between group means. 
The trends observed throughout Figures 1 to k are 
not therefore sufficiently greater than chance expectations 
to provide conclusive support of either Hypothesis 1 (HOjt ), 
Hypothesis 2 (KOo)$ Hypothesis 3 (HOo), or Hypothesis k 
I H O J ^ , 
An examination of Figure 2 (Originality) and Figure k 
(Inventilevel) did not reveal a curvilinear trend* However in each oj 
ik5 
four Figures, creativity seems to increase in post-Stage 3 
moral judgement. Although not statistically significant it 
is interesting to note that the mean creativity scores on all 
functions of creativity presented in the Product Improvement Task 
are numerically greater in post-Stage 3 subjects. 
It was decided that a pooling of test scores (Originality, 
Ideational Fluency, Inventilevel, Flexibility) to obtain an 
overall creativity score may obscure important differences 
between scores on the subscales and was not undertaken. However? 
certain results from an analysis of Torrance1s scoring procedures 
raise the serious question as to whether any attention should be 
paid to the separate scores or whether a single overall creativity 
score would be more appropriate. From each of his tests Torrance 
extracts scores for fluencyf flexibility, originality and invent-
ilevel. Fluency is simply the number of relevant responses giveni 
flexibility is the number of different categories of responsei 
originality Is a sum of credits where some routine responses count 
zero, less common responses get a unit score, and, in some cases, 
responses too infrequent to be on the list In the manual get a 
credit of twoi and the inventilevel score Is the sum of the point 
values of all responses in six categories. Thorndike(l972) points 
out that, under these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
the fluency, flexibility, and originality scores tend to be high-
ly correlated, since all are accumulated over the same set of 
responses given by the examinee. Also, evidence for the consistently 
different meaning for the fluency, flexibility and originality 
scores Is almost vanishingly smalls According to Thon^ike, scoring 
and norms emphasise the separate scores, but much of the research 
on validity of the instfymectfc seems to use a total score as a var-












! I 1 
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Stage of Maturity of Moral Judgement 
Figure 1. Graphic Representation of Relation between Moral 
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Stage of Maturity If Moral Judgement 
Figure 2, Graphic Representation of Relation of Maturity 
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Stage of Maturity of Moral Judgement 
Figure 3* Graphic Representation of Relation between Moral 
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pre-Stage 3 Stage 3 post-Stage 3 
Stage of Maturity of Moral Judgement 
Figure k. Graphic Representation of Relation between Moral 
Judgement Stage and Mean Inventilevel Score. 
The dead letter. The dead metaphor. It is 
only dead metaphors that are taken literally, 
that take us In (the black magic). Language 
is always an old testament, to be made new; 
rules, to be broken; dead metaphor, to be made 
alive; literal meaning, to be made symbolical; 
oldness of letter to be made new by the spirit. 
The creator spirit stands in the grave, in the 
midden heap, the dunghill of culture (as in 
Finnegans Wake); breaking the seal of familiarity; 
breaking the cake of custom; rolling the stone 
from the sepulcher; giving the dead metaphor 
new life. 




The purpose of this study was to develop a preliminary 
synthesis between morality and creativity UBing Kohlberg1s 
model of moral maturity and Gowanss model of creativity. Both 
these theories have much in common. The major component 
which seems in accordance with both approaches is the emphasis 
on developmental stage theory. 
It could be maintained that the Product Improvement 
Task measures only one aspect of creativity as expounded by 
Gowan--Gowanfs approach was an eclectic and multi-disciplin-
ary one. However, the Product Improvement Task seemed to be 
the best choice of creativity instrument since it allowed 
the subject to regress in the service of the ego as well as 
take affirmative cognitive action In reaching the results. 
Fifty subjects were tested using Kohlberg1s Dilemma 
situations and Guilford1s Product Improvement Task and the 
results were examined in the light of both Kohlberg1s 
theoretical model of morality and Gowan1s perspectives on 
creativity as outlined In his developmental model. 
Results could have been more interesting if more of the 
subjects tested had been principled moral thinkers* If that 
were the case, a strong argument for hypothesis three (H0~) 
fsthat there will be greater creativity as measured by the 
Product Improvement Task in Individuals who are at the post-
conventional stages of Kohlberg1 s scale11 could have been made. 
The trend analysis resulted in preliminary confirmation 
of all hypotheses but it was soon ascertained that the results 




A possible explanation for the low correlation between creativity 
components (dependent variables) and moral judgement (independent 
variable) concerns the validity of the Product Improvement Task 
as a measure of creativity. Ultimately, the interpretation of the 
Product Improvement Task is determined by the agreed uppn' , under-
standing and orientation to the meaning of creativity (eg8 Guilford). 
While the curvilinear trend observed in Figs. 1 and 3 were not 
statistically significant, it is remarkable, considering the relativ-
ely small N, the narrow range in moral judgement scores^and the 
imprecision of the test,that the trend emerged at all. It would 
be rash to speculate that were such procedural difficulties sur-
mounted, observed trends would be confirmed statislcally. The 
results cannot even be taken as minor support for Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
The finding of lower creativity scores in Stage 3 subjects may be 
explained in terms of this tentative conclusion. However, it Is 
possible, had there been more post-Stage 3 subjects, that support 
for the speculation of increased creativity in principled thinking 
would be statislcally evident. This question could be approached 
if an appropriate number of Stage 5 or Stage 6 subjects could be 
found. 
Creativity Itself was seen by Gowan (1972) as an emergent 
and characteristic outcome of the theory of development stages. 
When the requisite degree of mental health Is present, creativity 
becomes an inevitable outcome of developmental process. Maslow 
(Anderson, 1968, p.8^) speaks of creativity as a "universal heritage 
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of every human" and one which "covaries with psychological health." 
The individual with an achieved identity (Erikson, 196*0 and 
mental health (Gowan, 1972) as he goes through the developmental 
process exhibits increasing creativeness. The Product Improvement 
Task in no way attends to the question of the specific cognitive 
and affective developmental aspects related to creativity in 
Gowanfs (1972) synoptical fusion of creativity constructs. If 
anything, The Product Improvement Task taps the characteristics 
which Fraenkel (1973) has described as "ego capacities" which 
are related to the Kohlbergian notion of "ego strength. Such 
characteristics have beeen cited as: comparing and contrasting, 
generalizing, predicting and explaining, synthesizing, making 
judgements according to previously established criteria, and 
divergent thinking based on techniques developed by Guilford 
(196k)
 9 Torrance and Myers (1970) and J.W. Getzels (1964). 
This Is a rather limited aspect or view of the creative function 
in relation to consideration of Freudss affective developmental 
stages, Piagetfs five cognitive stages and Erikson1s identity 
processes (ego stages). It seems that the Product Improvement 
Task may prove useful in the context of a creativity indicator 
only if it is used as one of many different approaches. There 
is no indication that a new cognitive domain of "creativity" 
in thinking is being sampled but rather that this test offers 
an alternate measure of general intelligence. M.A. Wallach (1968) 
has been able to find little evidence inJ~support of the Torrance 
tests that would construe them as "creative thinking" rather than 
simply as "thinking.ft According to Wallach, that the Torrance 
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tests seem to be functioning essentially as a battery of general 
intelligence assessors should come to no surprise in the light 
of the Torrance definition' of creative thinking which is quite 
close to the traditional concept of intelligence, including every-
thing, say, that Wechslerfs definition of general intelligence 
includes, with the addition of greater specific emphasis upon 
hypothesis-search activities in seeking problem solutions.Torrancefs 
Product Improvement Task gives emphasis to a uni-dimensional 
conception of creativity centred upon general intelligence which 
Gowan*s (1972) developmental model has been moving away from. 
Researchers have taken the opposing view and sought to contrast 
high I.Q. subjects with highly creative subjects based on measure 
designed by Guilford and used by Torrance. Getzels and Jackson 
(1963) study proposed that the high I.Q.fs tend to converge 
upon stereotyped meanings, to percieve personal success con-
ventional standards and to seek out careers that conform to what 
is expected of them. The high creatives tend to diverge from 
stereotyped meanings, to produce original fantasies, to perceive 
personal success by unconventional standards and to seek out 
careers that do not conform to what is expected of them. In 
this light, Getzel s and Jackson suggest that Guilfordfs (and 
subsequently Torrance's) factors of convergent and divergent think-
ing are highly relevant. Whichever oppossing camp you adhere to, 
it seems that the four aspects of creative thinking measured by 
the Product Improvement Task only begin to come to grips with 
the considerably larger universe of behaviour described as creat-
ive thinking. Baird (1972) suggests that without better norms, 
Torrance1s^creativity tasks (eg. Product Improvement Task) should 
be used with extreme reservation. He suggests better studies of 
15k 
predictive validity and anchoring of the test to real-life 
creative behaviour is mandatory. 
Research Problems In Creativity 
Usually creativity as "product" has been given greater 
attention than creativity as "process" since the evaluation of 
process is often obscure, unknown, unperceived, unverbalized, even 
by the person himself, and uncommunicated to others. In fact, 
"neither history nor science has developed a method or means for 
recording or evaluating process, except by the comparison of 
cross-sections in time. The struggle involved In learning or In 
conceiving and producing an object of creativity is inferred and 
not directly measured" (Anderson, p.2^3, 1959)• 
Part of the complex problem involved in describing creativity 
or reaching some kind of consensus as to what creativity "is" in-
volves the difficulty of the subject-object structure of our 
language. The concept, for instance, of the ego as the central 
organizing principle of consciousness, is bewitched by the 
grammatical convention that the verb must have a subject, and 
that a knowing requires a knower. Concepts concerning creativity 
in the light of psychological interpretation suffer from a reiflcation 
(or thingifying") of the ego. Also, Freudfs use of the term 
(noun) "the unconscious" is dubious and which Lance Whyte better 
termed "unconscious process with conscious aspects". If something 
is created* we are required to look for a cause or a "someone" 
who creates. In fact, as was pointed out in CHAPTER 11, creativity 
may be a continual dialectic process between world and self, and 
self and world; one implies the other and neither can be defined 
by omitting the other (May, 1959)* Murray (-19^ 9) offers some 
dyadic examples which illustrate creativity as two interdependent 
regions of imagination operating as a single system. Generally 
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creativity may be evaluated 
(1) externally 
(2) internally 
(3) through a mutual dyadic participation 
Although aware that outside judgement or the use of external 
criterion of novelty and value may even be detrimental to the process 
of creativity itself (Rogers, 1959)$ this present study has con-
centrated on the more "measureable" (external) aspects of creativity 
as defined by Guilford. Keeping in mind that "external evaluation 
is distinguished from Internal and dyadic evaluations only as it 
is related+o power over the innovator" Anderson* 1959)$ there Is 
no attempt in the empirical testing of the subjects In this study 
to achieve a predetermined conformitiy by the individual to any 
set external standards. However, this study does not attempt to 
avoid external criteria completely since validity is still a basic 
tenet of a correlational study and external criteria are theoretically 
most desirable. Yet, it would be wise to consider in future 
1 
studies the warning of Cronback (1957) that: 
the two disciplines of scientific psychology (ie. correlation-
al and experimental) need new methodologies* Correlational 
psychology studies only variance among organisms; experimental 
psychology studies only variance among treatments. A united dis-
cipline will study both of these, but it will also be concerned with 
the otherwise neglected interactions between organismic and treat-
ment variables...From observations we must infer a psychological 
description of the situation and present state of the organism. 
Our laws should permit us to predict, from this description, the 
behaviour of the organism-in-situation. 
Although establishing criteria for measuring extenslonality 
©r openness in two-way relating Is difficult in an empirical study 
as this present research indicates, future analysis of data should, 
at leastf consider the free interplay and possibilities of difference 
out of which is developed the permeability of boundaries character-
istic of environmental-organism interaction necessary in a two way 
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relating process. 
In summary, any creative "process" which is linked to 
the cognitive-developmental process of reaching principled thought 
should take Into consideration creativity constructs more closely 
related to the environmental and developmental functions such as 
Piagetfs logical stages or identity formation. Creativity measures 
which are based on Piagetian formulations have not been devised. 
However* it would be of great methodological and theoretical 
concern that an identity component be empirically derived to 
substantiate and reify GowaA's synthesis of identity status 
and creative functioning. This could be attempted following 
the pattern used by Podd (1971) in which ego-identity interviews 
were given to 13^ subjects as well as moral judgement interviews. 
Following J.E. Marcia, the identity interview covers occupational 
choice, religious beliefs, and political ideology. "Crisis" and 
"commitment" are assessed in each of these areas and serve to define 
each identity status. When an individual undergoes active consid-
eration of alternative goals and values he is said to have exper-
ienced a "crisisV ."Commit' ment" is the extent to which an in-
dividual had Invested himself in his choices. The identity statuses 
operationally defined ares (1) identity achievement—has gone 
through a crisis and is committed; (2) moratorium—is in crisis 
with vague commitments; (3) foreclosure—has experienced no crisis 
but is committed to goals and values of .parents and significant 
others; (k) identity diffusion—has no commitment regardless of 
crisis* 
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Michey (1976) concentrated on the interrelation of three 
developmental constructss faith status, moral reasoning and 
identity status* Identity, described as the consideration and 
commitment to alternative ideologies providing "meaning to self 
in relation to society"and the "backbone" of one's faith orientation, 
is a developmental construct that plays a key role in creative 
development, as examined in Gowan*'s (1972) model. Identity status, 
used as an empirical construct in the present paper would have 
given this research more scope and greater depth in an examination 
of creativity in its social context involving social and peer 
group pressure* 
Further .Cmnmen±a-—— Some Reservations and Educational 
Considerations 
It has been suggested that if creativity could be assessed 
functionally using the various constructs of identity status, 
logical stages and Gowanfs neo-Freudian stage descriptions, a 
more relevant correlational design could be worked out in con-
junction with Kohlberg1s cognitive-developmental approach to moral 
maturity. Diagnostic tests and sufficient data are not yet 
readily available for this suggestion to be approached practically. 
Hopefully, this present paper is an*\#initial step". 
Because a scientists point of view generally affects the 
interpretation of his data, it is important to analyze the various 
theories and epistemological perspectives of researchers attempt-
ing to study moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1973) has divided these 
scientists into the following camps: 
(l) Romantic educational ideologists 
-158 
(2) cultural transmission ideologists 
(3) progressive ideologists 
Diametrically oppossed are the cultural transmission and 
romantic ideologies in fact, they represent opposite "poles" of 
thought. The cultural transmission view evaluates educational 
change from children1 s performances no;t feelings and thoughts. 
Social growth is defined by "objective" educational/psychological 
meas' urment in relation to particular cultural standards such as 
honesty and industriousness. Yet the romantic view, also critic-
ized by Kohlberg, emphasizes too strongly, the inner "subjective" 
feelings and states of the individual* Kohlberg prefers to assess 
experience functionally as oppossed to self-projection* Kohlberg 
sees the cognitive-developmental view as an attempt to "integrate 
both behaviour and internal states in a functional epistemology 
of mind" (Kohlberg, 1975t p.^61). For a "progressive" such as 
Kohlberg, a more objective test of the effects of experience 
on later behaviour is required before decideing whether or not 
that particular experience is "developmental". Consequently, 
Kohlberg frowns upon the humanistic approaches of "self-develop-
ment" or "self-actualization". Kohlbergfs concern is for develop-
ment, not merely enjoyment and liberty, which, however, Kohlberg 
feels are important* 
Although Kohlberg feels he has achieved a synthesis of 
romantic and cultural-transmission ideologies, thereby taking 
into account both internal and external experience, there are 
certain dualistic bifurcations that result. Sullivan (1977) 
outlines some of the apparent dualisms inherent in Kohlberg8s 
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structuralism. These can be summarized as followss 
(a) Kohlberg1s penchant for form over content--the more abstract 
the stage, the purer the form, 
(b) Kohlberg1s systematic preference of structure (abstraction) 
over content (the concrete context) in his methodological 
attack. 
(c) the "decentring" effect of the development of abstraction 
vis a vis Kantian Formalism 
(d) Kohlberg's formulation of universalization Is sent!_ized to 
the jurisprudential model concretely developed in Western 
societies (cultural bias). 
(e) "decentred autonomy" as a singular Ideal creates the possibility 
of the moral agent decentring him/herself from any concrete 
moral commitments. 
(f) the fusion of the figurative (concrete) and the abstract 
is essential for moral commitment. Kohlbergfs model, in 
lacking this fusion, disregards the role of the imagination. 
(g) Kohlberg1s theoretical formulations lend themselves to 
thought/action, form/content, abstract/concrete dichotomies. 
Summarizing some of the criticisms in Kohlberg1s structuralist 
approach to morality in no way attempts to denigrate Kohlberg1s 
work. Such criticism, however, points to a possible new consideration 
when attempting a feasible interactive synthesis between creativity 
and morality. Not only must a creativity test be developed along 
structuralist lines, a recentring of Kohlbergfs structuralism must 
also take into account the affective dimension to a greater extent, 
thereby creating a much stronger dialectic tension between psycho-
dynamic and cognitive constructs. 
i6o 
Some Educational Considerations 
If the distribution of moral maturity scores obtained in this 
study is representative of grade six students and high school students 
in general, then most high school students are at the conventional 
level of moral reasoning and the grade six students reason as in-
strumental relativists. The highest score for an adult was Stage k 
"law and order" morality. This proved interesting since most of the 
adults were rather "avant-garde" artists who would probably consider 
their own moral standards to be more sophisticated and superior than 
the general population. (See TABLE 1^). 
Results of this investigation suggest that the elementary school 
teacher who wishes to conduct a moral education program; in a Grade 6 
class would find a large proportion of Stage 2 thought. The teacher 
may have to shift the studentfs attention away from their own immediate 
needs and emphasize the logic and justice of helping others. Similarily, 
high school teachers who find a large proportion of Stage 3 moral 
judgements in the moral thought of an average class of adolescents 
may have to force the shift of the studentfs attention away from his 
own approval or disapproval of Mis behaviour, to broader concerns 
where the logic and justice of conforming to win approval Is challenged 
and the logic of submission of rules becomes a focal point for class 
discussion. If these results are fairly representative of the ad-
olescent population at large, it would not be too realistic to expect 
to find principled thought, but some work may be done (for those 
who reason at Stage k) to prepare students for future movement to-
wards a more autonomous and principled morality. Conditions for the 
development of a principled morality have been discussed in CHAPTER 11. 
As creativitiy measures and identity constructs become available, 
l6t -• 
TAJ3LE lk 
DISTRIBUTION OF MORAL JUDGEMENT STAGE RATINGS ACCORDING TO AGE 
Category Modal Stage No. of 
Subjects 
"age 11-12" 
(Grade 6) 2 5 
2(3) 9 
2(C) 2 
(n=a9,) 3(2) l 
"age 18-19" 
(Grade 13)
 2 ^ j 
3 15 
(n=19) 3{2) 3 
'"over 20 years" 
3 ' 3 





it would seem worthwhile to pursue the investigation further into 
the domain of creative and moral thought. 
Future Research Considerations 
Dualistic thinkings typified by the opposed views of the biolog-
ical determinants and the socioculturalists, and inherent in Kohlbergss 
attempt to synthesize and integrate these disparate ingred-
ients into a cognitive-developmental mould, tends to be representative 
of the dichotomized thinking of Western rationalists who biscect natural 
wholes nature versus culture, innatenesss versus learning, body 
versus mind, woman versus man, etc. This type of thinking also presents 
problems when trying to arrive at a comprehensive definition of creativ-
ity. Is it the product or the process, or both? But scientists are 
discovering that the nature-culture dichotomy is not intrinsic to 
mani that behaviour is the inventory of all that an individual does, 
and there is a unity of the orgnnism within it context. But with-
in intellectual and theoretical ideologies, dualistic thinking is not 
easy to change. It is simplistic and reduces complex phenomena to 
polar opposites, categories that are readily understood. The history 
of dualism reaches back as far as patriarchal civilization and the class-
stratified society, in which people find themselves placed in opposition 
to each other, in groups and as individualsi and people and culture 
are alienated, from nature. 
Research in creativity and moral thinking must emphasize the 
ultimate interconnection of both cognitive and affective processes. 
We know now, through advances made in quantum physics, that all natural 
phenomena are ultimately interconnected, and in order to explain any one 
of them we need to understand all the others, which is obviously next 
to impossible. What makes scientific research so successful in the 
domain of physics or psychology, is the discovery that approximations 
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are possible. If one is satisfied with an approximate Understanding1 
of nature, one can describe selected groups of phenomena in this way, 
neglecting other phenomena which ar^ e less relevant. Thus one can 
explain many phenomena in terms of a few, and consequently under-
stand different aspects of nature in an approximate way without having 
to understand everything at once. This is the scientific method; alt 
scientific theories and models are approximations to the true nature 
of things, but the error involved in the approximation is often small 
enough to make such an approach meaningful. Current theories of 
morality and creativity are still partial and approximate theories, 
present theories often becoming more accurate approximations than 
previous theories, but none of them representing a complete and final 
account of psychological processes. Quantum physics advocated by 
Geoffrey Chew (196^) has indicated that it is likely elementary 
particles are actually processes. This "bootstrap" philosophy 
starts from the idea that nature cannot be reduced to fundamental 
entities, such as elementary particles or fundamental fields. It 
has to be understood entirely through its self-consistency, with its 
components being consistent both with one another and with themselves. 
This has arisen in the context of S-matrix theory and is known as the 
"bootstrap" hypothesis. Such a hypothesis views natural phenomena 
as a dynamic web of interrelated events. None of the properties of 
any part of this web is fundamental? they all follow from the properties 
of the other parts, and their overall consistency of their mutual 
interrelations determines the structure of the entire web. 
Scientific theories approaching the domains of creativity and 
morality will undoubtably change and modify existing views. It is 
evident that, at least from a philosophical basis, new breakthroughs 
in scientific methodology may allow present research to adopt different 
methodological perspectives in the hope that the total dynamics of 
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the processes which underlie creativity and morality may be explained 
more accuratley than present dualistic approaches which tend to sep-
arate creativity into process/product and moral thinking into cognitive/ 
affective dichotomies. 
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Future Research Considerations Specific to this Study 
The present study has indicated that a strong theoretical 
correlation exists between creativity and moral thinking. 
However, it remains to be seen whether or not there are 
instruments available that can do an adequate job of empir-
ically testing out these correlations. 
Research into creativity and moral maturity is still 
strongly divided into different camps. There will probably 
never be a unilateral agreement among the experts when it 
comes to precisely defining the terms "creativity" and 
"moral reasoning". Each bit of research conducted adds to 
the prospect that one day the scientific community will be 
able to move closer to an understanding of these complex 
processes* 
There are several steps specific to this study which I feel 
could be taken by a future researcher to come to a better grasp 
of the possible correlations between creativity and moral reasoning, 
1. Follow the pattern used by Podd (1971) in which ego-
identity interviews were given to a large sample of subjects as 
well as moral judgment interviews. 
2* Use a variety of creativity instruments and procedures which 
assess qualitative aspects of intellectual functions and differ 
from the traditional psychometrically assessed functions. 
3« Projective and non-projective character tests as well as 
personality inventories could be considered to explore the 
relationship between personality traits and creative and moral 
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components * 
k« Double the number of subjects tested to include at least 
100 subjects. 
5* Test a larger number of adults from a sample that might 
indicate a greater number of post-conventional subjects. 
I feel that research pertaining to the concepts of 
creativity and moral thinking is still in its infancy* Yet 
the importance of connecting the two processes Is a worthwhile 
consideration for future research* Each step along the way 
is belaboured by pitfalls and difficulty* It is hoped that 
the future will provide better instruments and information 
in order to complete a more detailed and reliable approach to 
these most important issues. 
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OCCUPATION (OR SCHOOL)_ 
AGE DATE 
Instructions for Decision Stories and Questions 
The purpose of these stories and questions is to get at your^ 
opinions and Ideas. Please write down all the ideas or feelings 
they bring to mind rather than giving "yes" or "no" answers. 
Each story is printed on a separate page and is followed by a 
page of questions for you to answer. If there is not enough 
space after the question use the other side of the page to 
continue (writing the number of the question you are answering). 
The answers can be written or typed. 
Notes A few pages are missing from this questionnaire, and 
the sectiors are not in order. This has been done on 
purpose, Do not worry about it. 
l?7 
ill 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer, 
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It 
was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently 
discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was 
charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 
for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. 
The sick womanfs husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow 
the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is 
half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, 
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the 
druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and Ifm going to make 
money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the manfs store 
to steal the drug for his wife. 
1178 
III 
20. Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually wrong or right? 
Why? 
23. Is it a husbandfs duty to steal the drug for his wife if he can 
get it no other way? Would a good husband do it? 
25- Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there 
was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why? 
Answer the next two questions only if you think he should steal the 
drug. 
23a. If the husband does not feel very close ot affectionate to 
his wife, shpuld he still steal the drug? 
2k* Suppose it wasnft Heinzfs wife who was dying of cancer but it 
was Heinzfs best friend. His friend didnft have any money and 
there was no one in his family willing to steal the drug. Should 
Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case? Why? 
179. 
Answer the next two questions only if you think Heinz should not 
steal the drug. 
Would you steal the drug to save your wifefs life? 
If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you 
steal the drug to save your own life? 
30. Heinz broke in the store and stole the drug and gave It 
to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. 
Should the judge send Heinz to jail for stealing, or should 
he let him go free? Why? 
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IV. 
The drug didnft workf and there was no other treatment known 
to medicine which could save Heinzss wife, so the doctor knew 
that she had only about 6 months to live. She was in terrible 
painf but she was so weak that a good dose of a pain-killer like 
ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delerious and 
almost crazy with painf and in her calm periods, she would ask the 
doctor to give her enough ether to kill her,. She said she 




Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that 
will make her die? Why? 
When a pet animal is badly wounded and will die, it is killed to 
put it out of its pain. Does the same thing apply here? 
Why? 
Answer the following questions only if you think the doctor should 
not give her the drug. 
kl* Would you blame the doctor for giving her the drug? 
k2. What would have been the best for the woman herself, to have 
had her live for six months more in great pain or have died 
sooner? Why? 
k3* Some countries have a law that doctors could put away a 
suffering person who will die anyway. Should the doctor do it 
in that case? 
-XBE 
Everyone should answer the remaining questions. 
^7- The doctor finally decided to kill the woman to put her out 
of her pain, so he did it without consulting the law. The police 
found out and the doctor was brought up on a charge of murder. 
The jury decided he had done itf so they found him guilty of murder 
even though they knew the woman had asked him. What punishment 
should the judge give the doctor? Why? 
^8. Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor the death 
sentence? 
k9* Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in 
same cases? Why? 
The law prescribes the death penalty for treason against the 
country. Do you think the death sentence should be given for 
treason? Why? 
18,2 
While all this was happening, Heinz was in jail for breaking 
in and trying to steal the medicine. He had been sentenced 
for 10 years. But after a couple of years, he escaped from 
the prison and went to live in another part of the country 
under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big 
factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most 
of his profits to build a hospital for the work in curing 
cancer. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the 
factory owner as being Heinz, the escaped convict whom the police 
had been looking for back in his home town. 
^Qk 
VIII. 80, Should the tailor report Heinz to the police? 
Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why? 
81. Is it a citizen's duty to report Heinz? Would a good 
citizen? 
8k. If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor, would that make 
a difference? Why? 
82. Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge? Why? 
IJBtS 
I. Joe is a lk year old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. 
His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for 
it himself. So Joe worked hard at his'xpaper route and saved up the 
$40.00 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just 
before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some 
of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's 
father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to 
give him the: money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didnft 
want to give up going to camp* so he thought of refusing to give 
his father the money. 
186 
(Story about father asking Joe for money Joe saved to go to 
camp so father can go on fishing trip.) 
0. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why? 
2. Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him 
the money? 
1. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son? 
6. Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a 
son breaking a promise to his father? 
6a. Why should a promise be kept? 
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Joe had an older brother named Alex. 
Several years later, the grown up brothers had gotten into 
serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry 
and needed money. Alex the older one, broke into a store and 
stole 500. Joe, the younger one, went to a retired old man 
who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he 
was very sick and he needed 500 to pay for the operation. 
Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying 
the man back. Although the man didnft know Joe very well, he 





If you had to say who did worse, would you say Al did worse 
to break in the store and steal the $500 or Joe did worse to 
borrow the >$500 with no intention of paying it back? Why? 
7k* Would you feel like a worse person stealing like Al or 
cheating like Joe? 
71. Why shouldnft someone steal from a store anyhow? 
75. 4ho would feel worse, the storeowner who was robbed or the 
man who was cheated out of the loan? Why? 
73- Which should the law be more harsh or strong against, 
stealing like Al or cheating like Joe? Why? 
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APPENDIX B 
THE PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT TASK 
/ 
f'yj 
The above picture represents a stuffed toy dog covered 
with red and blue velvet. The tail is very short, the long, 
droopy ears are of black velvet; the nose is of a hard black 
substancei and the eyes are made of yellow and blue felt, 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
List below the cleverest, most interesting, and most 
unusual uses you can think of for changing the toy dog so that 
children will have more fun playing with it, Uon't worry about 
how much it will cost just so it would be more fun to play with. 
(Time limit: 8 minutes) 
APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTION OF PILOT STUDY 
AND 
MAJOR CONTENT AREAS OF KOHLBERG'S MODEL 
i§2 
Description of Kohlberg's Major Content Areas and 
Description and Pilot Study of Measures 
The Moral Maturity Measure 
Subjects were assigned to stages in maturity of moral judge-
ment on the basis of Kohlberg1s Dilemma situations 111, IV, Vlll, 
Ii Vll (in order of presentation to subjects). While in its 
elaborate form the test consists of nine hypothetical dilemmas, 
few researchers have used all of them because of the time fact-
or in administration. Consequently, a five dilemma written 
version of the scale was used (See Appendix for the five 
dilemmas used). The outcome of the dilemma situations are not 
specified. The subject is asked to give his opinion about what 
the protagonist caught in the dilemma should do and, more im-
portant, is asked to give his reason for each opinion expressed. 
Opinion would be merely the verbal content of the response. But 
the purpose and design of the moral dilemmas is to elicit the 
whole moral cognitive-structural orientation underlying the 
during the scoring of the protocol. The major content areas and 
modes of expression of moral issues across the six stages may 
be summarized as follows % 
PUNISHMENT AND OBEDIENCE 
-An EGOCENTRIC SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE. 
-Very limited ROLE TAKING ability. 
-One way EXCHANGE between person and Authority person receives. 
-Unbalanced personal relationships! obey the AUTHORITY. 
-the Authority is responsible for setting up the structure 
between people. 
-RULES are set up by the Authority? the purpose of rules is to 
tell people what to do 
-Punishment and reward are used as SANCTIONS. 
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-Very poor sense of owning PROPERTY. 
-LIFE is valued because of external, physical criteria. 
INSTRUMENTALITY 
-SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE of individual distinct from Authority. 
-ROLE-TAKING ABILITY needed to recognize that others have ideas 
or attitudes of their own but tends to think others ideas are 
just like his. 
-EXCHANGES between people on a fair and reciprocal basis. 
-INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS are based on maintaining onefs own 
welfare first and foremost; hence stage name "Instrumentality". 
-Governance is accomplished through each individual, the Authority 
has lost much power. 
-RULES are viewed as a means to ones end. 
-SANCTIONS may be physical punishment, or psychological discomfort, 
or none at all. 
-PROPERTY is obtained through work and everyone has a right to 
property. 
-LIFE Is valued highly? each individual decides about his own life. 
CONFORMITY 
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE is a "role perspective", of shared empathy 
or respect for rules. 
-ROLE-TAKING ABILITY allows putting oneself in others shoes and 
understanding of group ideas. 
-EXCHANGE takes place within the context of relationshipsi a give 
and take exchange occurs. 
-INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS are most important? group member-
ships Is held and results in some pressure to maintain the group 
and hence Stage 3 thinking is named CONFORMITY. 
-GOVERANCE (structure) stems from the group (roles, etc.) 
-RULES are shared guides for being good which can be broken for 
19^ 
a good reason. 
SANCTIONS represent shared disapproval of an actf physical and 
social sanctions are used. 
-PROPERTY rights are understood in light of good role occupants, 
e.g.f good father, good doctor. 
-LIFE Is more valuable than propertyi people should care for others 
and their life. 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
-SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE is taken from within a social system with 
agreed upon rules and roles. 
-ROLE-TAKING ABILITY develops so that perspective of any member 
of society, a member of a role class or an individual can be 
taken. 
-EXCHANGE takes place between the individual and the system 
(as well as on an interpersonal basis). 
-INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS occur within a societal context 
so that rights and responsibilities are recognizedi develop-
ment of honesty, integrity and commitment between people. 
-GOVERNANCE (structure) is produced by society/public. 
-RULES are made to protect society as a co-operative scheme. 
-SANCTIONS may be legal punishment or onefs own conscience. 
-PROPERTY rights must be upheld in order to maintain the social 
system. 
-LIFE has the highest value because God created it, it is basic 
to society or it is a basic right. 
SOCIAL CONTRACT/INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
-SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE Is a perspective prior to society. 
-ROLE-TAKING ABILITY has developed so that a rational or moral 
perspective is possible. 
-EXCHANGE happens between people so that the individual rights 
of~peopLe are preserved. 
-INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS are between free and equal human 
beings who recognize certain duties and responsibilities. 
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GOVERANCE (structure) Is produced on the basis of principles. 
-RULES are a mechanism to preserve individual rights. 
-SANCTIONS are primarily the agreement of the social contract 
and onefs conscience, 
-PROPERTY rights are dervived from the right to life and are a 
precondition to society. 
LIFE Is the most fundamental right from which all others are 
derived. 
UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES 
STAGE 6 The stage of Universal Ethical Principles 
Stage 6 is guided by self-chosen ethical principles. Particular 
laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on 
such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in 
accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles 
of justices the equality of human rights and respect for the dig-
nity of human being as individual persons. These are not merely 
values which are recognized, they are principles used to generate 
particular decisions. 
The reason for doing is that, as a rational person, the Stage 
6 individual has seen the validity of principles and has become 
committed to them. 
The social perspective of the Stage 6 is a perspective of a 
"moral point of view" from which social arrangements derive 
or on which they are grounded. The perspective is that of 
any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or 
the basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, 
not means. 
Stage 6 thinking, although crucial to the whole theory, is 
hardly ever encountered. 
Morality is, for Kohlberg, an idea of justice that is primitive 
and egocentric in young children but that strives to become more 
sophisticated and social as the adolescent moves through specific 
stages of moral thinking; it occaisionally reaches in certain in-
dividuals an awareness of universal values and ethical principles. 
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Pilot Study 
A pre-administration proceedure was carried out for the 
Kohlberg dilemma situations but not for the Product Improvement 
Task. It was felt by the writer that the Product Improvement 
Task administrated to groups of individuals of twelve-year olds 
and greater was simple and straight-forward and no preliminary 
trial administration was necessary. It was decided for the 
Kohlberg dilemmas, that all vocabulary which might conceivably 
present obstacles for the grade 6 group in understanding test-
items would be written on the blackboard. Secondly, the examiner 
read each of the five dilemmas aloud slowly followed by the 
questions in order to assure comprehension by the students. A 
sample of six grade 6 students were picked randomly and it was 
discovered that three of them read below the grade 3 level (this 
is not uncommon in an inner-city school). Therefore, the best 
grade six readers were chosen for the Kohlberg dilemmas. Another 
precaution appeared to be warranted concerning the dilemmas. 
Since approximately one quarter of the grade six subjects were 
former students of the writer, it seemed possible that the ex-
istence of an interpersonal relationship between subject and 
experimenter might cause a subject to distort his responses in 
an attempt to influence or impress a former teacherfs judgement of 
his character. As a partial control for this variable, it was 
decided to have the test administered by an outside experimenter 
who was familiar with the test, but not with any of the subjects. 
This variable, however, could only be partially controlled since 
all subjects were aware that the writer would eventually see their 
test scores. The success of this experimental control was achieved 
only to the extent that the source of response distortion was 
determined by the subjects1 awareness of his former teacher1s 
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physical presence at the time of taking the test. 
